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Administrator Privileges Assigned to an Okta Group
Detects when an administrator role is assigned to an Okta group. An adversary may attempt to assign administrator privileges to an Okta group in order to assign additional permissions to compromised user accounts and maintain access to their target organization.
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Administrator Role Assigned to an Okta User
Identifies when an administrator role is assigned to an Okta user. An adversary may attempt to assign an administrator role to an Okta user in order to assign additional permissions to a user account and maintain access to their target's environment.
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Attempt to Create Okta API Token
Detects attempts to create an Okta API token. An adversary may create an Okta API token to maintain access to an organization's network while they work to achieve their objectives. An attacker may abuse an API token to execute techniques such as creating user accounts or disabling security rules or policies.
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Attempt to Deactivate an Okta Application
Detects attempts to deactivate an Okta application. An adversary may attempt to modify, deactivate, or delete an Okta application in order to weaken an organization's security controls or disrupt their business operations.
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Detects attempts to deactivate an Okta network zone. Okta network zones can be configured to limit or restrict access to a network based on IP addresses or geolocations. An adversary may attempt to modify, delete, or deactivate an Okta network zone in order to remove or weaken an organization's security controls.
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Attempt to Deactivate an Okta Policy
Detects attempts to deactivate an Okta policy. An adversary may attempt to deactivate an Okta policy in order to weaken an organization's security controls. For example, an adversary may attempt to deactivate an Okta multi-factor authentication (MFA) policy in order to weaken the authentication requirements for user accounts.
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Attempt to Deactivate an Okta Policy Rule
Detects attempts to deactivate a rule within an Okta policy. An adversary may attempt to deactivate a rule within an Okta policy in order to remove or weaken an organization's security controls.
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Attempt to Delete an Okta Application
Detects attempts to delete an Okta application. An adversary may attempt to modify, deactivate, or delete an Okta application in order to weaken an organization's security controls or disrupt their business operations.
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Detects attempts to delete an Okta network zone. Okta network zones can be configured to limit or restrict access to a network based on IP addresses or geolocations. An adversary may attempt to modify, delete, or deactivate an Okta network zone in order to remove or weaken an organization's security controls.
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Attempt to Delete an Okta Policy
Detects attempts to delete an Okta policy. An adversary may attempt to delete an Okta policy in order to weaken an organization's security controls. For example, an adversary may attempt to delete an Okta multi-factor authentication (MFA) policy in order to weaken the authentication requirements for user accounts.
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Attempt to Delete an Okta Policy Rule
Detects attempts to delete a rule within an Okta policy. An adversary may attempt to delete an Okta policy rule in order to weaken an organization's security controls.
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Attempt to Modify an Okta Application
Detects attempts to modify an Okta application. An adversary may attempt to modify, deactivate, or delete an Okta application in order to weaken an organization's security controls or disrupt their business operations.
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Detects attempts to modify an Okta network zone. Okta network zones can be configured to limit or restrict access to a network based on IP addresses or geolocations. An adversary may attempt to modify, delete, or deactivate an Okta network zone in order to remove or weaken an organization's security controls.
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Attempt to Modify an Okta Policy
Detects attempts to modify an Okta policy. An adversary may attempt to modify an Okta policy in order to weaken an organization's security controls. For example, an adversary may attempt to modify an Okta multi-factor authentication (MFA) policy in order to weaken the authentication requirements for user accounts.
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Attempt to Modify an Okta Policy Rule
Detects attempts to modify a rule within an Okta policy. An adversary may attempt to modify an Okta policy rule in order to weaken an organization's security controls.
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Attempt to Reset MFA Factors for an Okta User Account
Detects attempts to reset an Okta user's enrolled multi-factor authentication (MFA) factors. An adversary may attempt to reset the MFA factors for an Okta user's account in order to register new MFA factors and abuse the account to blend in with normal activity in the victim's environment.
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Attempt to Revoke Okta API Token
Identifies attempts to revoke an Okta API token. An adversary may attempt to revoke or delete an Okta API token to disrupt an organization's business operations.
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Attempted Bypass of Okta MFA
Detects attempts to bypass Okta multi-factor authentication (MFA). An adversary may attempt to bypass the Okta MFA policies configured for an organization in order to obtain unauthorized access to an application.
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Identifies potential brute-force attempts against Microsoft 365 user accounts by detecting a high number of failed login attempts or login sources within a 30-minute window. Attackers may attempt to brute force user accounts to gain unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 services.
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Attempts to Brute Force an Okta User Account
Identifies when an Okta user account is locked out 3 times within a 3 hour window. An adversary may attempt a brute force or password spraying attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts. The default Okta authentication policy ensures that a user account is locked out after 10 failed authentication attempts.
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Identifies the first occurrence of a user identity in AWS using
GetPasswordfor the administrator password of an EC2 instance with an assumed role. Adversaries may use this API call to escalate privileges or move laterally within EC2 instances.
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Identifies when a new SSH public key is uploaded to an AWS EC2 instance using the EC2 Instance Connect service. This action could indicate an adversary attempting to maintain access to the instance. The rule also detects the
SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKeyorSendSSHPublicKeyAPI actions, which are logged when manually uploading an SSH key to an EC2 instance or serial connection. It is important to know that this API call happens automatically by the EC2 Instance Connect service when a user connects to an EC2 instance using the EC2 Instance Connect service via the CLI or AWS Management Console.
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Identifies a successful console login activity by an EC2 instance profile using an assumed role. This is uncommon behavior and could indicate an attacker using compromised credentials to further exploit an environment. An EC2 instance assumes a role using their EC2 ID as the session name. This rule looks for the pattern "i-" which is the beginning pattern for assumed role sessions started by an EC2 instance and a successful
ConsoleLoginorGetSigninTokenAPI call.
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This rule looks for use of the IAM
AttachUserPolicyAPI operation to attach theCompromisedKeyQuarantineorCompromisedKeyQuarantineV2AWS managed policies to an existing IAM user. This policy denies access to certain actions and is applied by the AWS team in the event that an IAM user's credentials have been compromised or exposed publicly.
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Detects the creation of an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) user initiated by an assumed role on an EC2 instance. Assumed roles allow users or services to temporarily adopt different AWS permissions, but the creation of IAM users through these roles—particularly from within EC2 instances—may indicate a compromised instance. Adversaries might exploit such permissions to establish persistence by creating new IAM users under unauthorized conditions.
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Detects when an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) customer-managed policy is attached to a role by an unusual or unauthorized user. Customer-managed policies are policies created and controlled within an AWS account, granting specific permissions to roles or users when attached. This rule identifies potential privilege escalation by flagging cases where a customer-managed policy is attached to a role by an unexpected actor, which could signal unauthorized access or misuse. Attackers may attach policies to roles to expand permissions and elevate their privileges within the AWS environment. This is a New Terms rule that uses the
aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arnandaws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.roleNamefields to check if the combination of the actor ARN and target role name has not been seen in the last 14 days.
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Identifies the creation of a group in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). Groups specify permissions for multiple users. Any user in a group automatically has the permissions that are assigned to the group.
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Detects when an AWS IAM login profile is added to a root user account and is self-assigned. Adversaries, with temporary access to the root account, may add a login profile to the root user account to maintain access even if the original access key is rotated or disabled.
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Identifies AWS IAM password recovery requests. An adversary may attempt to gain unauthorized AWS access by abusing password recovery mechanisms.
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Identifies the creation of an AWS Roles Anywhere profile. AWS Roles Anywhere is a feature that allows you to use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) profiles to manage access to your AWS resources from any location via trusted anchors. This rule detects the creation of a profile that can be assumed from any service. Adversaries may create profiles tied to overly permissive roles to maintain access to AWS resources. Ensure that the profile creation is expected and that the trust policy is configured securely.
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Identifies when an AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor with an external certificate authority is created. AWS Roles Anywhere profiles are legitimate profiles that can be created by administrators to allow access from any location. This rule detects when a trust anchor is created with an external certificate authority that is not managed by AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA). Adversaries may accomplish this to maintain persistence in the environment.
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Identifies when a user has updated a SAML provider in AWS. SAML providers are used to enable federated access to the AWS Management Console. This activity could be an indication of an attacker attempting to escalate privileges.
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Identifies a high number of failed authentication attempts to the AWS management console for the Root user identity. An adversary may attempt to brute force the password for the Root user identity, as it has complete access to all services and resources for the AWS account.
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Identifies when a user has assumed a role using a new MFA device. Users can assume a role to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources using the AssumeRole API of AWS Security Token Service (STS). While a new MFA device is not always indicative of malicious behavior it should be verified as adversaries can use this technique for persistence and privilege escalation.
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Identifies when the STS
AssumeRootaction is performed by a rare user in AWS. The AssumeRoot action allows users to assume the root member account role, granting elevated but specific permissions based on the task policy specified. Adversaries whom may have compromised user credentials, such as access and secret keys, can use this technique to escalate privileges and gain unauthorized access to AWS resources. This is a New Terms rule that identifies when the STSAssumeRootaction is performed by a user that rarely assumes this role and specific member account.
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An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to verify that the credentials are valid and determine what account they are using. This rule looks for the first time an identity has called the STS
GetCallerIdentityAPI operation in the last 15 days, which may be an indicator of compromised credentials. A legitimate user would not need to call this operation as they should know the account they are using.
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Identifies the suspicious use of GetSessionToken. Tokens could be created and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.
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Identifies when a service has assumed a role in AWS Security Token Service (STS). Services can assume a role to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources. Adversaries can use this technique for credential access and privilege escalation. This is a New Terms rule that identifies when a service assumes a role in AWS Security Token Service (STS) to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources. While often legitimate, adversaries may use this technique for unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within an AWS environment.
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Identifies when a user or role has assumed a role in AWS Security Token Service (STS). Users can assume a role to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources. Adversaries can use this technique for credential access and privilege escalation. This is a New Terms rule that identifies when a service assumes a role in AWS Security Token Service (STS) to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources. While often legitimate, adversaries may use this technique for unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within an AWS environment.
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Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned
In Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), permissions to manage resources are assigned using roles. The Global Administrator is a role that enables users to have access to all administrative features in Azure AD and services that use Azure AD identities like the Microsoft 365 Defender portal, the Microsoft 365 compliance center, Exchange, SharePoint Online, and Skype for Business Online. Attackers can add users as Global Administrators to maintain access and manage all subscriptions and their settings and resources.
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Azure Application Credential Modification
Identifies when a new credential is added to an application in Azure. An application may use a certificate or secret string to prove its identity when requesting a token. Multiple certificates and secrets can be added for an application and an adversary may abuse this by creating an additional authentication method to evade defenses or persist in an environment.
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Azure Automation Account Created
Identifies when an Azure Automation account is created. Azure Automation accounts can be used to automate management tasks and orchestrate actions across systems. An adversary may create an Automation account in order to maintain persistence in their target's environment.
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Azure Blob Permissions Modification
Identifies when the Azure role-based access control (Azure RBAC) permissions are modified for an Azure Blob. An adversary may modify the permissions on a blob to weaken their target's security controls or an administrator may inadvertently modify the permissions, which could lead to data exposure or loss.
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Identifies brute force attempts against Azure Entra multi-factor authentication (MFA) Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) verification codes. This rule detects high frequency failed TOTP code attempts for a single user in a short time-span. Adversaries with valid credentials, when attempting to login to Azure portal or other Azure services, may be prompted to provide a TOTP code as part of the MFA process. If successful, adversaries can bypass MFA and gain unauthorized access to Azure resources.
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Identifies potential brute-force attempts against Microsoft 365 user accounts by detecting a high number of failed interactive or non-interactive login attempts within a 30-minute window. Attackers may attempt to brute force user accounts to gain unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 services via different services such as Exchange, SharePoint, or Teams.
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Identifies potential brute-force attempts against Microsoft 365 user accounts by detecting a high number of failed interactive or non-interactive login attempts within a 30-minute window from a single source. Attackers may attempt to brute force user accounts to gain unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 services via different services such as Exchange, SharePoint, or Teams.
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Azure External Guest User Invitation
Identifies an invitation to an external user in Azure Active Directory (AD). Azure AD is extended to include collaboration, allowing you to invite people from outside your organization to be guest users in your cloud account. Unless there is a business need to provision guest access, it is best practice avoid creating guest users. Guest users could potentially be overlooked indefinitely leading to a potential vulnerability.
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Azure Global Administrator Role Addition to PIM User
Identifies an Azure Active Directory (AD) Global Administrator role addition to a Privileged Identity Management (PIM) user account. PIM is a service that enables you to manage, control, and monitor access to important resources in an organization. Users who are assigned to the Global administrator role can read and modify any administrative setting in your Azure AD organization.
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Azure Kubernetes Rolebindings Created
Identifies the creation of role binding or cluster role bindings. You can assign these roles to Kubernetes subjects (users, groups, or service accounts) with role bindings and cluster role bindings. An adversary who has permissions to create bindings and cluster-bindings in the cluster can create a binding to the cluster-admin ClusterRole or to other high privileges roles.
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Azure Service Principal Credentials Added
Identifies when new Service Principal credentials have been added in Azure. In most organizations, credentials will be added to service principals infrequently. Hijacking an application (by adding a rogue secret or certificate) with granted permissions will allow the attacker to access data that is normally protected by MFA requirements.
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Azure Storage Account Key Regenerated
Identifies a rotation to storage account access keys in Azure. Regenerating access keys can affect any applications or Azure services that are dependent on the storage account key. Adversaries may regenerate a key as a means of acquiring credentials to access systems and resources.
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Identifies device code authentication with an Azure broker client for Entra ID. Adversaries abuse Primary Refresh Tokens (PRTs) to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) and gain unauthorized access to Azure resources. PRTs are used in Conditional Access policies to enforce device-based controls. Compromising PRTs allows attackers to bypass these policies and gain unauthorized access. This rule detects successful sign-ins using device code authentication with the Entra ID broker client application ID (29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e).
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Identifies when a user is observed for the first time in the last 14 days authenticating using the deviceCode protocol. The device code authentication flow can be abused by attackers to phish users and steal access tokens to impersonate the victim. By its very nature, device code should only be used when logging in to devices without keyboards, where it is difficult to enter emails and passwords.
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Identifies an Identity and Access Management (IAM) custom role creation in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). Custom roles are user-defined, and allow for the bundling of one or more supported permissions to meet specific needs. Custom roles will not be updated automatically and could lead to privilege creep if not carefully scrutinized.
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Identifies an Identity and Access Management (IAM) role deletion in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). A role contains a set of permissions that allows you to perform specific actions on Google Cloud resources. An adversary may delete an IAM role to inhibit access to accounts utilized by legitimate users.
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Identifies the deletion of an Identity and Access Management (IAM) service account key in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). Each service account is associated with two sets of public/private RSA key pairs that are used to authenticate. If a key is deleted, the application will no longer be able to access Google Cloud resources using that key. A security best practice is to rotate your service account keys regularly.
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Identifies when a new service account is created in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). A service account is a special type of account used by an application or a virtual machine (VM) instance, not a person. Applications use service accounts to make authorized API calls, authorized as either the service account itself, or as G Suite or Cloud Identity users through domain-wide delegation. If service accounts are not tracked and managed properly, they can present a security risk. An adversary may create a new service account to use during their operations in order to avoid using a standard user account and attempt to evade detection.
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Identifies when a service account is deleted in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). A service account is a special type of account used by an application or a virtual machine (VM) instance, not a person. Applications use service accounts to make authorized API calls, authorized as either the service account itself, or as G Suite or Cloud Identity users through domain-wide delegation. An adversary may delete a service account in order to disrupt their target's business operations.
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Identifies when a service account is disabled in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). A service account is a special type of account used by an application or a virtual machine (VM) instance, not a person. Applications use service accounts to make authorized API calls, authorized as either the service account itself, or as G Suite or Cloud Identity users through domain-wide delegation. An adversary may disable a service account in order to disrupt to disrupt their target's business operations.
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Identifies when a new key is created for a service account in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). A service account is a special type of account used by an application or a virtual machine (VM) instance, not a person. Applications use service accounts to make authorized API calls, authorized as either the service account itself, or as G Suite or Cloud Identity users through domain-wide delegation. If private keys are not tracked and managed properly, they can present a security risk. An adversary may create a new key for a service account in order to attempt to abuse the permissions assigned to that account and evade detection.
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Identifies when the configuration is modified for a storage bucket in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). An adversary may modify the configuration of a storage bucket in order to weaken the security controls of their target's environment.
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Identifies when the Identity and Access Management (IAM) permissions are modified for a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) storage bucket. An adversary may modify the permissions on a storage bucket to weaken their target's security controls or an administrator may inadvertently modify the permissions, which could lead to data exposure or loss.
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Detects when a previously suspended user's account is renewed in Google Workspace. An adversary may renew a suspended user account to maintain access to the Google Workspace organization with a valid account.
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High Number of Okta Device Token Cookies Generated for Authentication
Detects when an Okta client address has a certain threshold of Okta user authentication events with multiple device token hashes generated for single user authentication. Adversaries may attempt to launch a credential stuffing or password spraying attack from the same device by using a list of known usernames and passwords to gain unauthorized access to user accounts.
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High Number of Okta User Password Reset or Unlock Attempts
Identifies a high number of Okta user password reset or account unlock attempts. An adversary may attempt to obtain unauthorized access to Okta user accounts using these methods and attempt to blend in with normal activity in their target's environment and evade detection.
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MFA Deactivation with no Re-Activation for Okta User Account
Detects multi-factor authentication (MFA) deactivation with no subsequent re-activation for an Okta user account. An adversary may deactivate MFA for an Okta user account in order to weaken the authentication requirements for the account.
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Microsoft 365 Exchange Management Group Role Assignment
Identifies when a new role is assigned to a management group in Microsoft 365. An adversary may attempt to add a role in order to maintain persistence in an environment.
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Identifies when a Safe Link policy is disabled in Microsoft 365. Safe Link policies for Office applications extend phishing protection to documents that contain hyperlinks, even after they have been delivered to a user.
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Microsoft 365 Global Administrator Role Assigned
In Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), permissions to manage resources are assigned using roles. The Global Administrator is a role that enables users to have access to all administrative features in Azure AD and services that use Azure AD identities like the Microsoft 365 Defender portal, the Microsoft 365 compliance center, Exchange, SharePoint Online, and Skype for Business Online. Attackers can add users as Global Administrators to maintain access and manage all subscriptions and their settings and resources.
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Modification or Removal of an Okta Application Sign-On Policy
Detects attempts to modify or delete a sign on policy for an Okta application. An adversary may attempt to modify or delete the sign on policy for an Okta application in order to remove or weaken an organization's security controls.
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Multiple Device Token Hashes for Single Okta Session
This rule detects when a specific Okta actor has multiple device token hashes for a single Okta session. This may indicate an authenticated session has been hijacked or is being used by multiple devices. Adversaries may hijack a session to gain unauthorized access to Okta admin console, applications, tenants, or other resources.
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Multiple Okta Sessions Detected for a Single User
Detects when a user has started multiple Okta sessions with the same user account and different session IDs. This may indicate that an attacker has stolen the user's session cookie and is using it to access the user's account from a different location.
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Multiple Okta User Auth Events with Same Device Token Hash Behind a Proxy
Detects when Okta user authentication events are reported for multiple users with the same device token hash behind a proxy.
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Multiple Okta User Authentication Events with Client Address
Detects when a certain threshold of Okta user authentication events are reported for multiple users from the same client address. Adversaries may attempt to launch a credential stuffing or password spraying attack from the same device by using a list of known usernames and passwords to gain unauthorized access to user accounts.
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Multiple Okta User Authentication Events with Same Device Token Hash
Detects when a high number of Okta user authentication events are reported for multiple users in a short time frame. Adversaries may attempt to launch a credential stuffing or password spraying attack from the same device by using a list of known usernames and passwords to gain unauthorized access to user accounts.
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New Okta Authentication Behavior Detected
Detects events where Okta behavior detection has identified a new authentication behavior.
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New Okta Identity Provider (IdP) Added by Admin
Detects the creation of a new Identity Provider (IdP) by a Super Administrator or Organization Administrator within Okta.
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Identifies a new or modified federation domain, which can be used to create a trust between O365 and an external identity provider.
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Identifies accounts with a high number of single sign-on (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate an attempt to brute force a password or SSO token.
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Okta Brute Force or Password Spraying Attack
Identifies a high number of failed Okta user authentication attempts from a single IP address, which could be indicative of a brute force or password spraying attack. An adversary may attempt a brute force or password spraying attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts.
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Okta Sign-In Events via Third-Party IdP
Detects sign-in events where authentication is carried out via a third-party Identity Provider (IdP).
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Okta ThreatInsight Threat Suspected Promotion
Okta ThreatInsight is a feature that provides valuable debug data regarding authentication and authorization processes, which is logged in the system. Within this data, there is a specific field called threat_suspected, which represents Okta's internal evaluation of the authentication or authorization workflow. When this field is set to True, it suggests the presence of potential credential access techniques, such as password-spraying, brute-forcing, replay attacks, and other similar threats.
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Okta User Session Impersonation
A user has initiated a session impersonation granting them access to the environment with the permissions of the user they are impersonating. This would likely indicate Okta administrative access and should only ever occur if requested and expected.
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Okta User Sessions Started from Different Geolocations
Detects when a specific Okta actor has multiple sessions started from different geolocations. Adversaries may attempt to launch an attack by using a list of known usernames and passwords to gain unauthorized access to user accounts from different locations.
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Possible Okta DoS Attack
Detects possible Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against an Okta organization. An adversary may attempt to disrupt an organization's business operations by performing a DoS attack against its Okta service.
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Potential Okta MFA Bombing via Push Notifications
Detects when an attacker abuses the Multi-Factor authentication mechanism by repeatedly issuing login requests until the user eventually accepts the Okta push notification. An adversary may attempt to bypass the Okta MFA policies configured for an organization to obtain unauthorized access.
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Potentially Successful MFA Bombing via Push Notifications
Detects when an attacker abuses the Multi-Factor authentication mechanism by repeatedly issuing login requests until the user eventually accepts the Okta push notification. An adversary may attempt to bypass the Okta MFA policies configured for an organization to obtain unauthorized access.
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A machine learning job found an unusually large spike in successful authentication events. This can be due to password spraying, user enumeration or brute force activity.
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Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on Windows hosts indicative of credential compromise, followed by efforts to undermine multi-factor authentication (MFA) and single sign-on (SSO) mechanisms for an Okta user account.
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Detects successful single sign-on (SSO) events to Okta applications from an unrecognized or "unknown" client device, as identified by the user-agent string. This activity may be indicative of exploitation of a vulnerability in Okta's Classic Engine, which could allow an attacker to bypass application-specific sign-on policies, such as device or network restrictions. The vulnerability potentially enables unauthorized access to applications using only valid, stolen credentials, without requiring additional authentication factors.
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Suspicious Activity Reported by Okta User
Detects when a user reports suspicious activity for their Okta account. These events should be investigated, as they can help security teams identify when an adversary is attempting to gain access to their network.
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Identifies a failed OAuth 2.0 token grant attempt for a public client app using client credentials. This event is generated when a public client app attempts to exchange a client credentials grant for an OAuth 2.0 access token, but the request is denied due to the lack of required scopes. This could indicate compromised client credentials in which an adversary is attempting to obtain an access token for unauthorized scopes. This is a New Terms rule where the
okta.actor.display_namefield value has not been seen in the last 14 days regarding this event.
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A machine learning job detected a user logging in from an IP address that is unusual for the user. This can be due to credentialed access via a compromised account when the user and the threat actor are in different locations. An unusual source IP address for a username could also be due to lateral movement when a compromised account is used to pivot between hosts.
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Deprecated - Potential Password Spraying of Microsoft 365 User Accounts
Identifies a high number (25) of failed Microsoft 365 user authentication attempts from a single IP address within 30 minutes, which could be indicative of a password spraying attack. An adversary may attempt a password spraying attack to obtain unauthorized access to user accounts.
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An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to persist or escalate privileges by creating a new set of credentials for an existing user. This rule looks for use of the IAM
CreateAccessKeyAPI operation to create new programmatic access keys for another IAM user.
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Detects when a user grants permissions to an Azure-registered application or when an administrator grants tenant-wide permissions to an application. An adversary may create an Azure-registered application that requests access to data such as contact information, email, or documents.
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An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to persist or escalate privileges by attaching additional permissions to compromised user accounts. This rule looks for use of the IAM
AttachUserPolicyAPI operation to attach the highly permissiveAdministratorAccessAWS managed policy to an existing IAM user.
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An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to persist or escalate privileges by attaching additional permissions to user groups the compromised user account belongs to. This rule looks for use of the IAM
AttachGroupPolicyAPI operation to attach the highly permissiveAdministratorAccessAWS managed policy to an existing IAM user group.
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An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to persist or escalate privileges by attaching additional permissions to compromised IAM roles. This rule looks for use of the IAM
AttachRolePolicyAPI operation to attach the highly permissiveAdministratorAccessAWS managed policy to an existing IAM role.
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Detects an external Google Workspace user account being added to an existing group. Adversaries may add external user accounts as a means to intercept shared files or emails with that specific group.
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Assigning the administrative role to a user will grant them access to the Google Admin console and grant them administrator privileges which allow them to access and manage various resources and applications. An adversary may create a new administrator account for persistence or apply the admin role to an existing user to carry out further intrusion efforts. Users with super-admin privileges can bypass single-sign on if enabled in Google Workspace.
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Google Workspace Admin Role Deletion
Detects when a custom admin role is deleted. An adversary may delete a custom admin role in order to impact the permissions or capabilities of system administrators.
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Detects when a domain-wide delegation of authority is granted to a service account. Domain-wide delegation can be configured to grant third-party and internal applications to access the data of Google Workspace users. An adversary may configure domain-wide delegation to maintain access to their target’s data.
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Detects when a custom admin role is created in Google Workspace. An adversary may create a custom admin role in order to elevate the permissions of other user accounts and persist in their target’s environment.
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Detects when a Google Workspace password policy is modified. An adversary may attempt to modify a password policy in order to weaken an organization’s security controls.
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Detects when a custom admin role or its permissions are modified. An adversary may modify a custom admin role in order to elevate the permissions of other user accounts and persist in their target’s environment.
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Detects when multi-factor authentication (MFA) is disabled for a Google Workspace organization. An adversary may attempt to modify a password policy in order to weaken an organization’s security controls.
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A machine learning job found an unusual user name in the authentication logs. An unusual user name is one way of detecting credentialed access by means of a new or dormant user account. An inactive user account (because the user has left the organization) that becomes active may be due to credentialed access using a compromised account password. Threat actors will sometimes also create new users as a means of persisting in a compromised web application.
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A machine learning job found an unusually large spike in authentication failure events. This can be due to password spraying, user enumeration or brute force activity and may be a precursor to account takeover or credentialed access.
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A machine learning job found an unusually large spike in successful authentication events from a particular source IP address. This can be due to password spraying, user enumeration or brute force activity.
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A machine learning job detected a user logging in at a time of day that is unusual for the user. This can be due to credentialed access via a compromised account when the user and the threat actor are in different time zones. In addition, unauthorized user activity often takes place during non-business hours.
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Identifies attempts to modify an AWS IAM Assume Role Policy. An adversary may attempt to modify the AssumeRolePolicy of a misconfigured role in order to gain the privileges of that role.
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Identifies a high number of failed attempts to assume an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role. IAM roles are used to delegate access to users or services. An adversary may attempt to enumerate IAM roles in order to determine if a role exists before attempting to assume or hijack the discovered role.
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Identifies the addition of a user to a specified group in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM).
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Identifies attempts to login to AWS as the root user without using multi-factor authentication (MFA). Amazon AWS best practices indicate that the root user should be protected by MFA.
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Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in
Identifies high risk Azure Active Directory (AD) sign-ins by leveraging Microsoft's Identity Protection machine learning and heuristics. Identity Protection categorizes risk into three tiers: low, medium, and high. While Microsoft does not provide specific details about how risk is calculated, each level brings higher confidence that the user or sign-in is compromised.
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Azure Active Directory High Risk User Sign-in Heuristic
Identifies high risk Azure Active Directory (AD) sign-ins by leveraging Microsoft Identity Protection machine learning and heuristics.
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Azure Active Directory PowerShell Sign-in
Identifies a sign-in using the Azure Active Directory PowerShell module. PowerShell for Azure Active Directory allows for managing settings from the command line, which is intended for users who are members of an admin role.
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Azure Privilege Identity Management Role Modified
Azure Active Directory (AD) Privileged Identity Management (PIM) is a service that enables you to manage, control, and monitor access to important resources in an organization. PIM can be used to manage the built-in Azure resource roles such as Global Administrator and Application Administrator. An adversary may add a user to a PIM role in order to maintain persistence in their target's environment or modify a PIM role to weaken their target's security controls.
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Azure Service Principal Addition
Identifies when a new service principal is added in Azure. An application, hosted service, or automated tool that accesses or modifies resources needs an identity created. This identity is known as a service principal. For security reasons, it's always recommended to use service principals with automated tools rather than allowing them to log in with a user identity.
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Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled for an Azure User
Identifies when multi-factor authentication (MFA) is disabled for an Azure user account. An adversary may disable MFA for a user account in order to weaken the authentication requirements for the account.
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