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Google Workspace Bitlocker Setting Disabled
Oct 7, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Fast Profile: Recommended Threat: Ransomware Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Google Workspace administrators whom manage Windows devices and have Windows device management enabled may also enable BitLocker drive encryption to mitigate unauthorized data access on lost or stolen computers. Adversaries with valid account access may disable BitLocker to access sensitive data on an endpoint added to Google Workspace device management.
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M365 SharePoint Site Administrator Added
Oct 7, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Domain: Identity Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Privilege Escalation Tactic: Persistence Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Service: Microsoft SharePoint ·Identifies when a new SharePoint Site Administrator is added in Microsoft 365. Site Administrators have full control over SharePoint Sites, including the ability to manage permissions, access all content, and modify site settings. Adversaries who compromise a privileged account may add themselves or a controlled account as a Site Administrator to maintain persistent, high-privilege access to sensitive SharePoint data. This technique was notably observed in the 0mega ransomware campaign, where attackers elevated privileges to exfiltrate data and deploy ransom notes across SharePoint sites.
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Detects when a user authorizes a GitHub OAuth application. Stolen OAuth grants persist after password changes until revoked and can clone or ZIP private repositories. This is not a GitHub App installation (integration_installation.create).
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Google Workspace Object Copied from External Drive with App Consent
Sep 28, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Execution Tactic: Persistence Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Fast Profile: Recommended Threat: OAuth App Consent Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects when a Workspace user copies a document, spreadsheet, form, or script from an external Drive into their My Drive and, within minutes from the same IP, authorizes a custom web OAuth client that requests an Apps Script scope.
script.containeris the container sidebar or dialog. The check also matches any otherscript.*scope, a*.currentonlyscope, or a scope containingscriptsorcontainer. Adversaries send spearphishing links with a /copy URI parameter so the victim replicates a malicious object locally. Google names that replica with a "Copy of " prefix. The copy is performed by a domain user rather than a collaborator account, and the consent is not a known Google first-party client.
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Application Added to Google Workspace Domain
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Persistence Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Fast Profile: Recommended Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects when an administrator adds a Google Workspace Marketplace application to the domain. Adversaries with administrative access may register a malicious OAuth application to establish long-lived API access to mail, drive, and other Workspace data, maintaining persistence and enabling collection without relying on a single user password alone.
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Google Workspace administrators may be aware of malicious applications within the Google marketplace and block these applications for user security purposes. An adversary, with administrative privileges, may remove this application from the explicit block list to allow distribution of the application amongst users. This may also indicate the unauthorized use of an application that had been previously blocked before by a user with admin privileges.
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Deprecated - M365 Exchange DLP Policy Deleted
Identifies when a Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policy is removed in Microsoft 365. An adversary may remove a DLP policy to evade existing DLP monitoring.
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Identifies when Microsoft Cloud App Security flags potential ransomware activity in Microsoft 365. This rule detects events where the Security Compliance Center reports a "Ransomware activity" or "Potential ransomware activity" alert, which may indicate file encryption, mass file modifications, or uploads of ransomware-infected files to cloud services such as SharePoint or OneDrive.
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Identifies that a user has deleted an unusually large volume of files as reported by Microsoft Cloud App Security.
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Identifies when a user has been restricted from sending email due to exceeding sending limits of the service policies per the Security Compliance Center.
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Identifies when external access is enabled in Microsoft Teams. External access lets Teams and Skype for Business users communicate with other users that are outside their organization. An adversary may enable external access or add an allowed domain to exfiltrate data or maintain persistence in an environment.
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Identifies when guest access is enabled in Microsoft Teams. Guest access in Teams allows people outside the organization to access teams and channels. An adversary may enable guest access to maintain persistence in an environment.
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Detects when an administrator adds a domain to the Google Workspace allowlisted (trusted) domains list. Adversaries with administrative access may onboard a domain they control to relax cross-organization sharing restrictions, enabling data collection and exfiltration through Drive, Chat, and other services that honor the tenant trust boundary.
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Entra ID Concurrent Sign-in with Suspicious Properties
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Azure Data Source: Entra ID Data Source: Entra ID Sign-In Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Credential Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: High Performance: Normal Profile: Aggressive Threat: AiTM Phishing Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Entra ID Domain: Identity ·Identifies concurrent azure signin events for the same user and from multiple sources, and where one of the authentication event has some suspicious properties often associated to DeviceCode and OAuth phishing. Adversaries may steal Refresh Tokens (RTs) via phishing to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) and gain unauthorized access to Azure resources.
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Entra ID Kali365 Default User-Agent Detected
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Identity Data Source: Azure Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit Logs Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Threat: Kali365 Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Credential Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Unknown Performance: Normal Profile: Recommended Threat: AiTM Phishing Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Entra ID Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email ·Identifies the default user agent string associated with Kali365 (also referred to as Kali365 Live), a phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform that automates OAuth 2.0 device code phishing and adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) session capture against Microsoft 365 and Microsoft Entra ID. The Kali365 Electron desktop client identifies itself with the user agent
kali365-live/1.0.0when polling for and replaying captured OAuth tokens, so its appearance in Entra ID sign-in logs, Entra ID audit logs, or the Microsoft 365 unified audit log indicates that an attacker-controlled Kali365 client is interacting with the tenant using stolen tokens. Unlike dual-use offensive tooling, Kali365 is a criminal service with no legitimate enterprise use, making this user agent a high-fidelity indicator of active account compromise.
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Entra ID Sign-in BloodHound Suite User-Agent Detected
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Azure Data Source: Azure Activity Logs Data Source: Graph API Data Source: Graph API Activity Logs Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit Logs Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Discovery Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL) Platform: Entra ID Domain: Identity Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS ·Identifies potential enumeration activity using AzureHound, SharpHound, or BloodHound across Microsoft cloud services. These tools are often used by red teamers and adversaries to map users, groups, roles, applications, and access relationships within Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) and Microsoft 365.
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Entra ID Sign-in Brute Force Attempted (Microsoft 365)
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Domain: Identity Data Source: Azure Data Source: Entra ID Data Source: Entra ID Sign-In Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Credential Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: High Performance: Normal Profile: Aggressive Threat: Brute Force Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Entra ID ·Identifies potential brute-force attacks targeting Microsoft 365 user accounts by analyzing failed sign-in patterns in Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs. This detection focuses on a high volume of failed interactive or non-interactive authentication attempts within a short time window, often indicative of password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing. Adversaries may use these techniques to gain unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 services such as Exchange Online, SharePoint, or Teams.
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Entra ID Sign-in TeamFiltration User-Agent Detected
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Azure Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Discovery Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Fast Profile: Recommended Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Entra ID Domain: Identity Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS ·Identifies potential enumeration or password spraying activity using TeamFiltration tool. TeamFiltration is an open-source enumeration, password spraying and exfiltration tool designed for Entra ID and Microsoft 365. Adversaries are known to use TeamFiltration in-the-wild to enumerate users, groups, and roles, as well as to perform password spraying attacks against Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft 365 accounts. This rule detects the use of TeamFiltration by monitoring for specific user-agent strings associated with the tool in Azure and Microsoft 365 logs.
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External User Added to Google Workspace Group
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Persistence Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects an external Google Workspace user account being added to an existing group. Adversaries may add external user accounts as a means to intercept shared files or emails with that specific group.
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Detects the first time a user authorizes a third-party Google OAuth application that requests identity or sign-in scopes. Adversaries may abuse compromised credentials or phishing-linked consent flows to register novel OAuth clients, obtain refresh tokens, and authenticate as valid users while evading password-only detections.
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Identifies the occurrence of a security alert from the Google Workspace alerts center. Google Workspace's security alert center provides an overview of actionable alerts that may be affecting an organization's domain. An alert is a warning of a potential security issue that Google has detected.
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GitHub Actions Unusual Bot Push to Repository
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Persistence Data Source: Github Data Source: GitHub Audit Logs Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Fast Threat: Supply Chain Rule Type: New Terms Platform: GitHub Domain: SaaS Service: GitHub Actions ·Detects when the github-actions[bot] pushes code to a repository where it has not performed this behavior before in a certain time window. This may indicate a supply chain attack where malicious code running in a CI workflow attempts to modify repository contents, such as injecting backdoor workflow files.
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GitHub Actions Workflow Modification Blocked
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Persistence Tactic: Execution Data Source: Github Data Source: GitHub Audit Logs Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Fast Profile: Recommended Threat: Supply Chain Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: GitHub Domain: SaaS Service: GitHub Actions ·Detects when a GitHub Actions workflow attempts to create or modify workflow files in a protected branch but is blocked due to insufficient permissions. This behavior is indicative of a supply chain attack where a malicious package or compromised CI/CD pipeline attempts to inject persistent backdoor workflows into a repository.
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Github Activity on a Private Repository from an Unusual IP
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Impact Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Persistence Data Source: Github Data Source: GitHub Audit Logs Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: High Performance: Fast Profile: Aggressive Threat: Supply Chain Rule Type: New Terms Platform: GitHub Domain: SaaS ·Detects when there is activity on a private GitHub repository from an unusual IP address. Adversaries may access private repositories from unfamiliar IPs to exfiltrate sensitive code or data, potentially indicating a compromise or unauthorized access.
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Detects a high number of repository cloning actions by a single user within a short time frame. Adversaries may clone multiple repositories to exfiltrate sensitive data.
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This rule detects when a member is granted the organization owner role of a GitHub organization. This role provides admin level privileges. Any new owner role should be investigated to determine its validity. Unauthorized owner roles could indicate compromise within your organization and provide unlimited access to data and settings.
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Detects when a private GitHub repository is changed to public visibility. Adversaries may change repository visibility to public in order to exfiltrate sensitive code or data, potentially indicating a compromise or unauthorized access.
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This rule detects setting modifications for protected branches of a GitHub repository. Branch protection rules can be used to enforce certain workflows or requirements before a contributor can push changes to a branch in your repository. Changes to these protected branch settings should be investigated and verified as legitimate activity. Unauthorized changes could be used to lower your organization's security posture and leave you exposed for future attacks.
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This rule detects when a GitHub repository is deleted within your organization. Repositories are a critical component used within an organization to manage work, collaborate with others and release products to the public. Any delete action against a repository should be investigated to determine it's validity. Unauthorized deletion of organization repositories could cause irreversible loss of intellectual property and indicate compromise within your organization.
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Detects when GitHub Secret Scanning is disabled for a repository. Adversaries may disable secret scanning to evade detection of hardcoded secrets, such as API keys or credentials, that could be used for further compromise or data exfiltration.
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This rule is part of the "GitHub UEBA - Unusual Activity from Account Pack", and leverages alert data to determine when multiple alerts are executed by the same user in a timespan of one hour. Analysts can use this to prioritize triage and response, as these alerts are a higher indicator of compromised user accounts or PATs.
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Detects when a Google Workspace user disables 2-step verification (2SV) on their account. An adversary with access to a compromised account may remove 2SV to eliminate the second authentication factor, leaving password-only access and making future sign-ins easier to abuse, relay, or maintain without triggering MFA challenges.
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Google Workspace Admin Role Assigned to a User or Group
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Persistence Tactic: Privilege Escalation Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Assigning an administrative role to a user or group grants elevated privileges within Google Workspace, including access to the Google Admin console and the ability to manage domain resources and applications. Adversaries may assign administrator roles to an existing account or a newly created account/group to establish persistence, facilitate privilege escalation, and enable follow-on actions across the tenant. In particular, users with Super Admin privileges can bypass single sign-on (SSO) if it is enabled in Google Workspace.
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Google Workspace Admin Role Deletion
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Impact Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Fast Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects when a custom administrative role is deleted in Google Workspace. Adversaries may delete a custom admin role to disrupt delegated administration, remove security team access, or hinder incident response. Deleting a role removes the privileges it granted from all assigned users and groups, which can cause operational impact or blind spots during an active investigation.
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Google Workspace API Access Granted via Domain-Wide Delegation
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Resources: Investigation Guide Tactic: Persistence Tactic: Privilege Escalation Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects when a super administrator authorizes domain-wide delegation (DWD) API client access for a Google Cloud service account or OAuth client. DWD lets an application impersonate users and access Workspace APIs across the tenant. Adversaries with admin access may register or authorize a malicious client with broad scopes to maintain API-based persistence and access mail, drive, and directory data without relying on a single user's password alone.
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Google Workspace Custom Admin Role Created
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Resources: Investigation Guide Tactic: Persistence Tactic: Privilege Escalation Noise: Low Performance: Fast Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects when a custom administrative role is created in Google Workspace. Unlike prebuilt admin roles, custom roles allow granular selection of privileges across Google services and can be assigned to users or groups. Adversaries may create a custom admin role to craft elevated permissions tailored to their objectives, then assign that role to a compromised or attacker-controlled account to establish persistence and enable follow-on actions such as modifying security controls, granting OAuth access, or changing mail routing.
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Google Workspace Device Registration After OAuth from Suspicious ASN
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Persistence Tactic: Initial Access Threat: Tycoon2FA Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Fast Profile: Recommended Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects when a Google Workspace account completes OAuth authorization for a specific Google OAuth client from a high-risk autonomous system number (ASN), followed within 30 seconds by a device registration event with account state REGISTERED. This sequence can indicate device enrollment or join flows initiated from attacker-controlled or residential-proxy infrastructure after a user authorizes a sensitive client.
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Google Workspace Device Registration Burst for Single User
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Identity Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Device Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Persistence Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Credential Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Fast Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects bursts of Google Workspace device registration events for the same user, where three or more distinct "google_workspace.device.id" values are emitted in a one-minute window. Although "DEVICE_REGISTER_UNREGISTER_EVENT" fires routinely on session/sync registration and is not a true physical device enrollment, legitimate user activity typically produces fewer than three distinct device IDs in a single minute. A high-cardinality burst is the fingerprint behavior of AiTM phishing-kit relays (Tycoon2FA Google variant, EvilGinx phishlets) and stolen-OAuth-token replay tooling, both of which mint a new session attestation per relay or replay attempt.
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Detects when Google Workspace administrators initiate bulk movement or export of user Drive data. This includes admin data transfer requests that reassign a user's Drive files to another account, and Customer Takeout export jobs that package organizational data for download or off-platform transfer. Adversaries with administrative access may abuse these mechanisms to stage or exfiltrate sensitive files.
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Detects when an anonymous user views, copies, or downloads a private key or credential file from Google Drive via an anyone-with-the-link share. Adversaries who obtain or create open Drive links can harvest encryption keys and secrets stored in user drives, then use those materials to decrypt data, authenticate to services, or expand access beyond the initial compromise.
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Detects when a Gmail routing, mail-forwarding, or custom mail-host setting is created or modified in Google Workspace. Adversaries with administrative access can add Routing rules (also deliver to / change envelope recipient), recipient address map forwarding, or mail hosts and outbound gateways to copy or redirect sensitive email for collection.
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Google Workspace Impossible Travel Login
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Identity Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace User Log Events Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Credential Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Fast Profile: Recommended Threat: Impossible Travel Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects successful Google Workspace sign-ins for the same user from two geographically separated locations within a 90-minute window, where the implied travel speed between the two points exceeds what is physically possible (>=800 km/h, faster than modern commercial airliners) and the geographic separation is at least 500 km. This pattern indicates either VPN/proxy use or an adversary signing in to a compromised account from a different location than the legitimate user.
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Google Workspace MFA Enforcement Disabled For Organization
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Impact Tactic: Credential Access Tactic: Defense Evasion Tactic: Persistence Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Fast Profile: Recommended Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects when an administrator disables multi-factor authentication enforcement or removes the ability for users to enroll in 2-step verification across a Google Workspace organization or organizational unit. Adversaries with administrative access may weaken tenant-wide authentication requirements to enable password-only sign-ins, facilitate credential abuse at scale, and reduce friction for follow-on account takeover across the domain.
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Google Workspace Password Policy Modified
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Persistence Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Fast Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects when a Google Workspace administrator modifies organization password policy settings. Adversaries with administrative access may weaken password requirements, such as disabling strong password enforcement, allowing password reuse, or reducing minimum length, to increase the success of password spraying and credential stuffing against tenant accounts and to sustain access after initial compromise.
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Detects when the Google Marketplace restrictions are changed to allow any application for users in Google Workspace. Malicious APKs created by adversaries may be uploaded to the Google marketplace but not installed on devices managed within Google Workspace. Administrators should set restrictions to not allow any application from the marketplace for security reasons. Adversaries may enable any app to be installed and executed on mobile devices within a Google Workspace environment prior to distributing the malicious APK to the end user.
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Google Workspace Role Modified
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Resources: Investigation Guide Tactic: Persistence Tactic: Privilege Escalation Noise: Low Performance: Fast Profile: Recommended Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects when a custom admin role or its privileges are modified in Google Workspace. Adversaries may add or expand privileges on an existing role to elevate access for assigned users or groups without creating a new role or directly assigning a well-known admin role. Because privilege changes take effect for all principals assigned the role, modifying role permissions can silently expand access across multiple accounts.
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Google Workspace Suspended User Account Renewed
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Persistence Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Fast Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects when a previously suspended user's account is renewed in Google Workspace. An adversary may renew a suspended user account to maintain access to the Google Workspace organization with a valid account.
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Google Workspace User Login with Unusual ASN
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Identity Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace User Log Events Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Credential Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: High Performance: Normal Profile: Aggressive Rule Type: New Terms Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects the first time a Google Workspace user successfully signs in from a given source ASN within a 14-day historical window. Most users have a stable set of egress ASNs (home ISP, corporate VPN, mobile carrier). A new ASN for a user is a meaningful anomaly as it surfaces ISP changes and travel, but also catches AiTM phishing-kit relays whose egress ASN was never previously associated with the user.
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Google Workspace User Organizational Unit Changed
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Audit Logs Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Persistence Tactic: Privilege Escalation Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Users in Google Workspace are typically assigned a specific organizational unit that grants them permissions to certain services and roles that are inherited from this organizational unit. Adversaries may compromise a valid account and change which organizational account the user belongs to which then could allow them to inherit permissions to applications and resources inaccessible prior to.
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Google Workspace User Sign-in from Atypical Device Type
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Identity Data Source: Google Workspace Data Source: Google Workspace Device Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Persistence Tactic: Initial Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Fast Rule Type: New Terms Platform: Google Workspace Domain: SaaS ·Detects the first time a Google Workspace user is observed authenticating from a device of a given type (e.g., WINDOWS, MAC, ANDROID, IOS, LINUX) within a historical window. Note that "DEVICE_REGISTER_UNREGISTER_EVENT" events do not represent one-time physical device enrollments; the Google Reports API emits a fresh "google_workspace.device.id" on each event, and the same physical device may produce multiple events per day as sessions/sync renewals occur. The rule therefore surfaces a user authenticating from a new device type, not a new physical device. This is still high-fidelity because adversaries who compromise a Workspace identity via AiTM kits or stolen OAuth refresh tokens frequently relay sessions from device types that diverge from the legitimate user's baseline (e.g., a WINDOWS session appearing for a known macOS user, or simultaneous WINDOWS+MAC sessions within minutes), which is the canonical kit fingerprint. Because the underlying token retains access after password rotation, treat unexpected device-type divergence as a compromise indicator and revoke tokens, not just credentials.
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Detects a high number of unique private repo clone events originating from a single personal access token within a short time period.
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Detects a high number of closed pull requests by a single user within a short time frame. Adversaries may close multiple pull requests to disrupt development workflows or hide malicious changes.
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Detects a high number of force push actions to protected branches by a single user within a short time frame. Adversaries may perform force pushes to overwrite commit history on protected branches, potentially leading to data loss or disruption of development workflows.
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M365 Azure Monitor Alert Email with Financial or Billing Theme
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft Exchange Online Message Trace Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Initial Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Unknown Performance: Normal Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Service: Microsoft Exchange Online Data Source: Microsoft Exchange Online Logs ·Detects Azure Monitor alert notification emails with financial or billing themed subject lines delivered to organization users. Adversaries abuse Azure Monitor alert rules to deliver callback phishing emails from Microsoft's legitimate azure-noreply@microsoft.com address. Because the emails originate from Microsoft's own infrastructure, they pass SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checks, bypassing email security filters and increasing victim trust. The attacker embeds a fraudulent billing or security lure in the alert rule description, which is rendered in the notification email body. Observed subject patterns include invoice numbers, payment references, and order confirmations.
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M365 Exchange Anti-Phish Policy Deleted
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies the deletion of an anti-phishing policy in Microsoft 365. By default, Microsoft 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Anti-phishing polices increase this protection by refining settings to better detect and prevent attacks.
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M365 Exchange Anti-Phish Rule Modification
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies the modification of an anti-phishing rule in Microsoft 365. By default, Microsoft 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. Anti-phishing rules increase this protection by refining settings to better detect and prevent attacks.
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M365 Exchange DKIM Signing Configuration Disabled
Identifies when a DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) signing configuration is disabled in Microsoft 365. With DKIM in Microsoft 365, messages that are sent from Exchange Online will be cryptographically signed. This will allow the receiving email system to validate that the messages were generated by a server that the organization authorized and were not spoofed.
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M365 Exchange Email Safe Attachment Rule Disabled
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies when a safe attachment rule is disabled in Microsoft 365. Safe attachment rules can extend malware protections to include routing all messages and attachments without a known malware signature to a special hypervisor environment. An adversary or insider threat may disable a safe attachment rule to exfiltrate data or evade defenses.
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M365 Exchange Email Safe Link Policy Disabled
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies when a Safe Link policy is disabled in Microsoft 365. Safe Link policies for Office applications extend phishing protection to documents that contain hyperlinks, even after they have been delivered to a user.
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M365 Exchange Federated Domain Created or Modified
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Privilege Escalation Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies a new or modified federation domain, which can be used to create a trust between O365 and an external identity provider.
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M365 Exchange Inbox Forwarding Rule Created
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Collection Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies when a new Inbox forwarding rule is created in Microsoft 365. Inbox rules process messages in the Inbox based on conditions and take actions. In this case, the rules will forward the emails to a defined address. Attackers can abuse Inbox Rules to intercept and exfiltrate email data without making organization-wide configuration changes or having the corresponding privileges.
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M365 Exchange Inbox Phishing Evasion Rule Created
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Profile: Recommended Threat: AiTM Phishing Rule Type: New Terms Platform: Microsoft 365 Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies when a user creates a new inbox rule in Microsoft 365 that deletes or moves emails containing suspicious keywords. Adversaries who have compromised accounts often create inbox rules to hide alerts, security notifications, or other sensitive messages by automatically deleting them or moving them to obscure folders. Common destinations include Deleted Items, Junk Email, RSS Feeds, and RSS Subscriptions. This is a New Terms rule that triggers only when the user principal name and associated source IP address have not been observed performing this activity in the past 14 days.
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M365 Exchange Inbox Rule with Obfuscated Name
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Unknown Performance: Normal Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Microsoft 365 Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies when a Microsoft Exchange inbox rule is created or modified with a name composed only of special characters. Adversaries may use obfuscated inbox rule names to evade detection, hide malicious forwarding or deletion rules, or blend in with benign audit noise. The rule name is parsed from "o365.audit.ObjectId", which encodes the mailbox identity and rule name separated by a backslash.
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M365 Exchange Mail Flow Transport Rule Created
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Exfiltration Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies a transport rule creation in Microsoft 365. As a best practice, Exchange Online mail transport rules should not be set to forward email to domains outside of your organization. An adversary may create transport rules to exfiltrate data.
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M365 Exchange Mail Flow Transport Rule Modified
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Exfiltration Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies when a transport rule has been disabled or deleted in Microsoft 365. Mail flow rules (also known as transport rules) are used to identify and take action on messages that flow through your organization. An adversary or insider threat may modify a transport rule to exfiltrate data or evade defenses.
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M365 Exchange Mailbox Accessed by Unusual Client
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Collection Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Rule Type: New Terms Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies suspicious Microsoft 365 mail access by ClientAppId. This rule detects when a user accesses their mailbox using a client application that is not typically used by the user, which may indicate potential compromise or unauthorized access attempts. Adversaries may use custom or third-party applications to access mailboxes, bypassing standard security controls. First-party Microsoft applications are also abused after OAuth tokens are compromised, allowing adversaries to access mailboxes without raising suspicion.
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M365 Exchange Mailbox Audit Logging Bypass Added
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Fast Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Detects the occurrence of mailbox audit bypass associations. The mailbox audit is responsible for logging specified mailbox events (like accessing a folder or a message or permanently deleting a message). However, actions taken by some authorized accounts, such as accounts used by third-party tools or accounts used for lawful monitoring, can create a large number of mailbox audit log entries and may not be of interest to your organization. Because of this, administrators can create bypass associations, allowing certain accounts to perform their tasks without being logged. Attackers can abuse this allowlist mechanism to conceal actions taken, as the mailbox audit will log no activity done by the account.
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M365 Exchange Mailbox High-Risk Permission Delegated
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft Exchange Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Persistence Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: New Terms Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: Email Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies the assignment of rights to access content from another mailbox. An adversary may use the compromised account to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target organization while creating inbox rules, so messages can evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.
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M365 Exchange Mailbox Items Accessed Excessively
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Collection Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: High Performance: Normal Profile: Aggressive Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies an excessive number of Microsoft 365 mailbox items accessed by a user either via aggregated counts or throttling. Microsoft audits mailbox access via the MailItemsAccessed event, which is triggered when a user accesses mailbox items. If more than 1000 mailbox items are accessed within a 24-hour period, it is then throttled. Excessive mailbox access may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate sensitive information or perform reconnaissance on a target's mailbox. This rule detects both the throttled and unthrottled events with a high threshold.
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M365 Exchange Malware Filter Policy Deleted
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies when a malware filter policy has been deleted in Microsoft 365. A malware filter policy is used to alert administrators that an internal user sent a message that contained malware. This may indicate an account or machine compromise that would need to be investigated. Deletion of a malware filter policy may be done to evade detection.
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M365 Exchange Malware Filter Rule Modified
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies when a malware filter rule has been deleted or disabled in Microsoft 365. An adversary or insider threat may want to modify a malware filter rule to evade detection.
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M365 Exchange Management Group Role Assigned
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Persistence Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies when a new role is assigned to a management group in Microsoft 365. An adversary may attempt to add a role in order to maintain persistence in an environment.
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M365 Exchange MFA Notification Email Deleted or Moved
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: Email Service: Microsoft Exchange Online ·Identifies when an MFA enrollment, registration, or security notification email is deleted or moved to deleted items in Microsoft 365 Exchange. Adversaries who compromise accounts and register their own MFA device often delete the notification emails to cover their tracks and prevent the legitimate user from noticing the unauthorized change. This technique is commonly observed in business email compromise (BEC) and account takeover attacks.
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M365 Identity Device Code Grant by an Unusual User (Non-Compliant Device)
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Domain: Identity Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Resources: Investigation Guide Tactic: Initial Access Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Profile: Recommended Threat: Device Code Phishing Rule Type: New Terms Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: Email ·Identifies a Microsoft 365 user completing an OAuth device code grant ("Cmsi:Cmsi") from a non-compliant device for the first time within the rule's historical window, regardless of the requesting application or target resource. Device code phishing kits complete the full login (password and MFA) at the genuine Microsoft endpoint and harvest the resulting token by polling, so MFA does not stop them. Because the victim authorizes the flow in their own browser, the grant is frequently completed on a personal or attacker-controlled device that is not enrolled or compliant with the organization's device policies. A user appearing with this device code flow on a non-compliant device for the first time in the lookback window is a strong early indicator of device code phishing, and removing the application and target constraints catches grants against any first-party application, not just the Microsoft Authentication Broker.
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M365 Identity Device Code Grant with Unusual User and ASN
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Domain: Identity Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Resources: Investigation Guide Tactic: Initial Access Noise: Low Performance: Normal Profile: Recommended Threat: Device Code Phishing Rule Type: New Terms Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: Email ·Identifies a Microsoft 365 OAuth device code grant ("Cmsi:Cmsi") with application Microsoft Authentication Broker ("29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e") for Microsoft Graph from a source ASN not previously observed for that user in a historical window. Phishing kits leveraging device code phishing complete the full login (password and MFA) at the genuine Microsoft endpoint and harvest the resulting token by polling, so MFA does not stop them and the authorization commonly originates from attacker-controlled residential proxy or hosting infrastructure rather than the user's normal network.
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M365 Identity Global Administrator Role Assigned
Identifies when the Microsoft 365 Global Administrator or Company Administrator role is assigned to a user or service principal. The Global Administrator role has extensive privileges across Entra ID and Microsoft 365 services, making it a high-value target for adversaries seeking persistent access. Successful assignments of this role may indicate potential privilege escalation or unauthorized access attempts, especially if performed by accounts that do not typically manage high-privilege roles.
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M365 Identity Login from Atypical Region
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Identity Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Initial Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Profile: Recommended Threat: Impossible Travel Rule Type: New Terms Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS ·Detects successful Microsoft 365 portal logins from a country and region the user has not previously authenticated from in a specific time window. Atypical regions are identified by combining the user's country and region geolocation history; an authentication from a new country/region pair for that user may indicate an adversary attempting to access the account from an unusual location or behind a VPN.
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M365 Identity Login from Impossible Travel Location
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Identity Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Initial Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Profile: Recommended Threat: Impossible Travel Rule Type: Threshold Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS ·Detects successful Microsoft 365 portal logins from impossible travel locations. Impossible travel locations are defined as two different countries within a short time frame. This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to access a Microsoft 365 account from a compromised account or a malicious actor attempting to access a Microsoft 365 account from a different location.
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M365 Identity OAuth Flow by First-Party Microsoft App from Multiple IPs
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Email Domain: Identity Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Resources: Investigation Guide Tactic: Defense Evasion Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS ·Identifies sign-ins on behalf of a principal user to the Microsoft Graph or legacy Azure AD API from multiple IPs using first-party Microsoft applications from the FOCI (Family of Client IDs) group. Developer tools like Azure CLI, VSCode, and Azure PowerShell accessing these resources from multiple IPs are flagged, along with any FOCI application accessing the deprecated Windows Azure Active Directory from multiple IPs. This behavior may indicate an adversary using a phished OAuth authorization code or refresh token, as seen in attacks like ConsentFix where attackers steal localhost OAuth codes and replay them from attacker infrastructure.
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M365 Identity OAuth Flow by User Sign-in to Device Registration
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Credential Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Profile: Recommended Threat: Device Code Phishing Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: Email ·Identifies attempts to register a new device in Microsoft Entra ID after OAuth authentication with authorization code grant. Adversaries may use OAuth phishing techniques to obtain an OAuth authorization code, which can then be exchanged for access and refresh tokens. This rule detects a sequence of events where a user principal authenticates via OAuth, followed by a device registration event, indicating potential misuse of the OAuth flow to establish persistence or access resources.
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M365 Identity OAuth Illicit Consent Grant by Rare Client and User
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Resources: Investigation Guide Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Credential Access Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Profile: Recommended Threat: OAuth App Consent Rule Type: New Terms Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email ·Identifies an Microsoft 365 illicit consent grant request on-behalf-of a registered Entra ID application. Adversaries may create and register an application in Microsoft Entra ID for the purpose of requesting user consent to access resources in Microsoft 365. This is accomplished by tricking a user into granting consent to the application, typically via a pre-made phishing URL. This establishes an OAuth grant that allows the malicious client applocation to access resources in Microsoft 365 on-behalf-of the user.
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M365 Identity OAuth Phishing via First-Party Microsoft Application
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Resources: Investigation Guide Tactic: Initial Access Noise: Low Performance: Normal Profile: Recommended Threat: AiTM Phishing Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: Email ·Detects potentially suspicious OAuth authorization activity in Microsoft 365 where first-party Microsoft applications from the FOCI (Family of Client IDs) group request access to Microsoft Graph or legacy Azure AD resources. Developer tools like Azure CLI, Visual Studio Code, and Azure PowerShell accessing these resources are flagged, as they are commonly abused in phishing campaigns like ConsentFix. Additionally, any FOCI family application accessing the deprecated Windows Azure Active Directory resource is flagged since this API is rarely used legitimately and attackers target it for stealth. First-party apps are trusted by default in all tenants and cannot be blocked, making them ideal for OAuth phishing attacks.
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M365 Identity OAuth ROPC Grant via Legacy Authentication Client
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Identity Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: New Terms Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Email ·Identifies a successful login by a user principal through a legacy authenticated client (such as Authenticated SMTP, IMAP, POP, or Exchange ActiveSync) in the Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log, evidenced by the "BAV2ROPC" user agent. Legacy basic-authentication clients are translated by Entra ID into a Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) grant, a single-factor flow that submits the user's password directly and bypasses interactive multi-factor authentication. This is commonly abused during password spraying and account takeover.
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M365 Identity Unusual SSO Authentication Errors for User
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Identity Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Initial Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: New Terms Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Domain: Cloud Domain: Email ·Identifies the first occurrence of SSO, SAML, or federated authentication errors for a user. These errors may indicate token manipulation, SAML assertion tampering, or OAuth phishing attempts. Modern adversaries often target SSO mechanisms through token theft, SAML response manipulation, or exploiting federated authentication weaknesses rather than traditional brute force attacks.
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M365 Identity User Account Lockouts
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Tactic: Credential Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: High Performance: Normal Profile: Aggressive Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Microsoft 365 ·Detects a burst of Microsoft 365 user account lockouts within a short 5-minute window. A high number of IdsLocked login errors across multiple user accounts may indicate brute-force attempts for the same users resulting in lockouts.
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M365 Identity User Brute Force Attempted
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Credential Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: High Performance: Normal Profile: Aggressive Threat: Brute Force Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Microsoft 365 ·Identifies brute-force authentication activity targeting Microsoft 365 user accounts using failed sign-in patterns that match password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing behavior. Adversaries may attempt brute-force authentication with credentials obtained from previous breaches, leaks, marketplaces or guessable passwords.
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Identifies the occurrence of files uploaded to OneDrive being detected as Malware by the file scanning engine. Attackers can use File Sharing and Organization Repositories to spread laterally within the company and amplify their access. Users can inadvertently share these files without knowing their maliciousness, giving adversaries an opportunity to gain initial access to other endpoints in the environment.
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M365 OneDrive/SharePoint Excessive File Downloads
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Domain: Storage Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Data Source: SharePoint Data Source: OneDrive Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Collection Tactic: Exfiltration Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: Email Service: Microsoft SharePoint Service: Microsoft OneDrive ·Identifies when an excessive number of files are downloaded from OneDrive or SharePoint by an authorized user or application in a short period of time. This may indicate a potential data exfiltration event, especially if the downloads are performed using OAuth authentication which could suggest an OAuth phishing attack such as Device Code Authentication phishing.
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M365 or Entra ID Identity Sign-in from a Suspicious Source
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Azure Data Source: Entra ID Data Source: Entra ID Sign-In Logs Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Initial Access Resources: Investigation Guide Rule Type: Higher-Order Rule Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Entra ID Domain: Identity Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: Email ·This rule correlate Entra-ID or Microsoft 365 mail successful sign-in events with network security alerts by source address. Adversaries may trigger some network security alerts such as reputation or other anomalies before accessing cloud resources.
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M365 Potential AiTM UserLoggedIn via Office App (Tycoon2FA)
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Identity Domain: SaaS Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Threat: Tycoon2FA Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Credential Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Unknown Performance: Normal Profile: Recommended Threat: AiTM Phishing Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: Email ·Detects Microsoft 365 audit "UserLoggedIn" events consistent with Tycoon 2FA phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) activity: the Microsoft Authentication Broker requesting access where the object identifier matches Microsoft Graph or Exchange Online, or the Office web client application authenticating to itself, combined with Node.js-style user agents (node, axios, undici). Tycoon 2FA bypasses MFA by relaying authentication and capturing session material, often targeting Microsoft 365 and Gmail. Baseline legitimate automation and developer tooling before tuning.
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Identifies the occurrence of files uploaded to SharePoint being detected as Malware by the file scanning engine. Attackers can use File Sharing and Organization Repositories to spread laterally within the company and amplify their access. Users can inadvertently share these files without knowing their maliciousness, giving adversaries opportunities to gain initial access to other endpoints in the environment.
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M365 SharePoint Search for Sensitive Content
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Discovery Tactic: Collection Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Service: Microsoft SharePoint ·Identifies search queries in SharePoint containing sensitive terms related to credentials, financial data, PII, legal matters, or infrastructure information. Adversaries who compromise user accounts often search for high-value files before exfiltration. This rule detects searches containing terms across multiple sensitivity categories, regardless of the access method (browser, PowerShell, or API). The actual search query text is analyzed against a curated list of sensitive terms to identify potential reconnaissance activity.
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M365 SharePoint Site Sharing Policy Weakened
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Service: Microsoft SharePoint ·Identifies when a SharePoint or OneDrive site sharing policy is changed to weaken security controls. The SharingPolicyChanged event fires for many routine policy modifications, but this rule targets specific high-risk transitions where sharing restrictions are relaxed. This includes enabling guest sharing, enabling anonymous link sharing, making a site public, or enabling guest user access. Adversaries who compromise administrative accounts may weaken sharing policies to exfiltrate data to external accounts or create persistent external access paths.
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M365 SharePoint/OneDrive File Access via PowerShell
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Collection Tactic: Exfiltration Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Medium Performance: Normal Rule Type: New Terms Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: Email Service: Microsoft SharePoint Service: Microsoft OneDrive ·Identifies file downloads or access from OneDrive or SharePoint using PowerShell-based user agents. Adversaries may use native PowerShell cmdlets like Invoke-WebRequest or Invoke-RestMethod with Microsoft Graph API to exfiltrate data after compromising OAuth tokens via device code phishing or other credential theft techniques. This rule detects both direct PowerShell access and PnP PowerShell module usage for file operations. FileAccessed events are included to detect adversaries reading file content via API and saving locally, bypassing traditional download methods. Normal users access SharePoint/OneDrive via browsers or sync clients, making PowerShell-based file access inherently suspicious.
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M365 Teams Custom Application Interaction Enabled
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Data Source: Microsoft 365 Use Case: Configuration Audit Tactic: Defense Evasion Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: SaaS Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Service: Microsoft Teams ·Identifies when custom applications are allowed in Microsoft Teams. If an organization requires applications other than those available in the Teams app store, custom applications can be developed as packages and uploaded. An adversary may abuse this behavior to establish persistence in an environment.
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M365 Teams Rogue Help Desk Chat Created
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Initial Access Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL) Platform: Microsoft 365 Domain: Email Service: Microsoft Teams ·Identifies a one-on-one Microsoft Teams chat created by a user from a foreign tenant whose display name, member profile, or email local-part resembles IT help desk or Microsoft security staff. Adversaries abuse cross-tenant Teams external access to impersonate support personnel and socially engineer victims into granting remote access or disclosing credentials.
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This rule detects when a specific Okta actor has multiple device token hashes and multiple source IPs for a single Okta session. This may indicate an authenticated session has been hijacked or replayed from a different device and network. Adversaries may steal session cookies or tokens to gain unauthorized access to Okta admin console, applications, tenants, or other resources.
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This rule detects when a new GitHub App has been installed in your organization account. GitHub Apps extend GitHub's functionality both within and outside of GitHub. When an app is installed it is granted permissions to read or modify your repository and organization data. Only trusted apps should be installed and any newly installed apps should be investigated to verify their legitimacy. Unauthorized app installation could lower your organization's security posture and leave you exposed for future attacks.
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Detects when a new member is added to a GitHub organization as an owner. This role provides admin level privileges. Any new owner roles should be investigated to determine it's validity. Unauthorized owner roles could indicate compromise within your organization and provide unlimited access to data and settings.
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Detects when a new GitHub Personal Access Token (PAT) is created. Adversaries may create new PATs to maintain persistent access to a compromised account or to escalate privileges within an organization.
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This rule detects the creation of a self-hosted Github runner from a first time seen user.name in the last 5 days. Adversaries may abuse self-hosted runners to execute workflow jobs on customer infrastructure.
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Detects a high number of failed force push attempts to protected branches by a single user within a short time frame. Adversaries may attempt multiple force pushes to overwrite commit history on protected branches, potentially leading to data loss or disruption of development workflows.
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Detects successful single sign-on (SSO) events to Okta applications from an unrecognized or "unknown" client device, as identified by the user-agent string. This activity may be indicative of exploitation of a vulnerability in Okta's Classic Engine, which could allow an attacker to bypass application-specific sign-on policies, such as device or network restrictions. The vulnerability potentially enables unauthorized access to applications using only valid, stolen credentials, without requiring additional authentication factors.
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Suspicious Process Execution by Zoom
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Endpoint OS: Linux OS: macOS Use Case: Threat Detection Use Case: Vulnerability Tactic: Execution Data Source: Elastic Defend Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL) Resources: Investigation Guide Platform: Linux Platform: macOS Domain: SaaS Data Source: Zoom Vuln: CVE-2026-53413 ·Identifies suspicious process execution associated with the Zoom desktop client on macOS and Linux. The rule detects shells, script interpreters, downloaders, and network utilities spawned by Zoom on either platform. On Linux, it also detects Zoom replacing its own process image with an executable outside the Zoom installation directory. These behaviors may indicate successful exploitation of a Zoom client vulnerability, including CVE-2026-53413.
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Suspicious Zoom Child Process
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Endpoint OS: Windows Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Defense Evasion Tactic: Execution Data Source: Elastic Endgame Resources: Investigation Guide Data Source: Elastic Defend Data Source: SentinelOne Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs Data Source: Crowdstrike Data Source: Sysmon Noise: Low Performance: Normal Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL) Platform: Windows Domain: SaaS Data Source: Zoom Resources: Osquery ·A suspicious Zoom child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to run unnoticed. Verify process details such as command line, network connections, file writes and associated file signature details as well.
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Unauthorized Scope for Public App OAuth2 Token Grant with Client Credentials
Identifies a failed OAuth 2.0 token grant attempt for a public client app using client credentials. This event is generated when a public client app attempts to exchange a client credentials grant for an OAuth 2.0 access token, but the request is denied due to the lack of required scopes. This could indicate compromised client credentials in which an adversary is attempting to obtain an access token for unauthorized scopes. This is a New Terms rule where the
okta.actor.display_namefield value has not been seen in the last 14 days regarding this event.
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This rule identifies Zoom meetings that are created without a passcode. Meetings without a passcode are susceptible to Zoombombing. Zoombombing is carried out by taking advantage of Zoom sessions that are not protected with a passcode. Zoombombing refers to the unwanted, disruptive intrusion, generally by Internet trolls and hackers, into a video conference call. In a typical Zoombombing incident, a teleconferencing session is hijacked by the insertion of material that is lewd, obscene, racist, or antisemitic in nature, typically resulting of the shutdown of the session.
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Identifies potential brute-force attempts against Microsoft 365 user accounts by detecting a high number of failed interactive or non-interactive login attempts within a 30-minute window from a single source. Attackers may attempt to brute force user accounts to gain unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 services via different services such as Exchange, SharePoint, or Teams.
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