Multiple Device Token Hashes for Single Okta Session

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2023/11/08"
  3integration = ["okta"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5min_stack_comments = "ES|QL rule type becomes available in 8.13.0 as technical preview."
  6min_stack_version = "8.13.0"
  7updated_date = "2024/10/09"
  8
  9[rule]
 10author = ["Elastic"]
 11description = """
 12This rule detects when a specific Okta actor has multiple device token hashes for a single Okta session. This may
 13indicate an authenticated session has been hijacked or is being used by multiple devices. Adversaries may hijack a
 14session to gain unauthorized access to Okta admin console, applications, tenants, or other resources.
 15"""
 16from = "now-9m"
 17language = "esql"
 18license = "Elastic License v2"
 19name = "Multiple Device Token Hashes for Single Okta Session"
 20note = """
 21## Triage and analysis
 22
 23### Investigating Multiple Device Token Hashes for Single Okta Session
 24
 25This rule detects when a specific Okta actor has multiple device token hashes for a single Okta session. This may indicate an authenticated session has been hijacked or is being used by multiple devices. Adversaries may hijack a session to gain unauthorized access to Okta admin console, applications, tenants, or other resources.
 26
 27#### Possible investigation steps:
 28- Since this is an ES|QL rule, the `okta.actor.alternate_id` and `okta.authentication_context.external_session_id` values can be used to pivot into the raw authentication events related to this alert.
 29- Identify the users involved in this action by examining the `okta.actor.id`, `okta.actor.type`, `okta.actor.alternate_id`, and `okta.actor.display_name` fields.
 30- Determine the device client used for these actions by analyzing `okta.client.ip`, `okta.client.user_agent.raw_user_agent`, `okta.client.zone`, `okta.client.device`, and `okta.client.id` fields.
 31- With Okta end users identified, review the `okta.debug_context.debug_data.dt_hash` field.
 32    - Historical analysis should indicate if this device token hash is commonly associated with the user.
 33- Review the `okta.event_type` field to determine the type of authentication event that occurred.
 34    - Authentication events have been filtered out to focus on Okta activity via established sessions.
 35- Review the past activities of the actor(s) involved in this action by checking their previous actions.
 36- Evaluate the actions that happened just before and after this event in the `okta.event_type` field to help understand the full context of the activity.
 37    - This may help determine the authentication and authorization actions that occurred between the user, Okta and application.
 38- Aggregate by `okta.actor.alternate_id` and `event.action` to determine the type of actions that are being performed by the actor(s) involved in this action.
 39    - If various activity is reported that seems to indicate actions from separate users, consider deactivating the user's account temporarily.
 40
 41### False positive analysis:
 42- It is very rare that a legitimate user would have multiple device token hashes for a single Okta session as DT hashes do not change after an authenticated session is established.
 43
 44### Response and remediation:
 45- Consider stopping all sessions for the user(s) involved in this action.
 46- If this does not appear to be a false positive, consider resetting passwords for the users involved and enabling multi-factor authentication (MFA).
 47    - If MFA is already enabled, consider resetting MFA for the users.
 48- If any of the users are not legitimate, consider deactivating the user's account.
 49- Conduct a review of Okta policies and ensure they are in accordance with security best practices.
 50- Check with internal IT teams to determine if the accounts involved recently had MFA reset at the request of the user.
 51    - If so, confirm with the user this was a legitimate request.
 52    - If so and this was not a legitimate request, consider deactivating the user's account temporarily.
 53        - Reset passwords and reset MFA for the user.
 54- Alternatively adding `okta.client.ip` or a CIDR range to the `exceptions` list can prevent future occurrences of this event from triggering the rule.
 55    - This should be done with caution as it may prevent legitimate alerts from being generated.
 56"""
 57references = [
 58    "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/",
 59    "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/",
 60    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/testing-okta-visibility-and-detection-dorothy",
 61    "https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection",
 62    "https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/session-hijacking-attack-definition-damage-defense?language=en_US",
 63    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/monitoring-okta-threats-with-elastic-security",
 64    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/starter-guide-to-understanding-okta",
 65]
 66risk_score = 47
 67rule_id = "cc382a2e-7e52-11ee-9aac-f661ea17fbcd"
 68setup = """## Setup
 69
 70The Okta Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
 71severity = "medium"
 72tags = ["Use Case: Identity and Access Audit", "Data Source: Okta", "Tactic: Credential Access", "Domain: SaaS"]
 73timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 74type = "esql"
 75
 76query = '''
 77FROM logs-okta*
 78| WHERE
 79    event.dataset == "okta.system"
 80    // ignore authentication events where session and device token hash change often
 81    AND NOT event.action IN (
 82        "policy.evaluate_sign_on",
 83        "user.session.start",
 84        "user.authentication.sso"
 85    )
 86    // ignore Okta system events and only allow registered users
 87    AND (
 88        okta.actor.alternate_id != "system@okta.com"
 89        AND okta.actor.alternate_id RLIKE "[^@\\s]+\\@[^@\\s]+"
 90    )
 91    AND okta.authentication_context.external_session_id != "unknown"
 92| KEEP event.action, okta.actor.alternate_id, okta.authentication_context.external_session_id, okta.debug_context.debug_data.dt_hash
 93| STATS
 94    dt_hash_counts = COUNT_DISTINCT(okta.debug_context.debug_data.dt_hash) BY
 95        okta.actor.alternate_id,
 96        okta.authentication_context.external_session_id
 97| WHERE
 98    dt_hash_counts >= 2
 99| SORT
100    dt_hash_counts DESC
101'''
102
103
104[[rule.threat]]
105framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
106[[rule.threat.technique]]
107id = "T1539"
108name = "Steal Web Session Cookie"
109reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539/"
110
111
112[rule.threat.tactic]
113id = "TA0006"
114name = "Credential Access"
115reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"