Detects a single source IP making a high number of Vertex AI GenerateContent (or StreamGenerateContent) audit calls against the same model resource in the lookback window. That pattern fits model extraction, automated scraping, or a compromised caller burning prediction quota.

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An audit log export archive was accessed, meaning the actor downloaded exported audit activity. Attackers pull audit exports to see what defenders can observe, look for detection gaps, or remove evidence before making other control-plane changes.

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Starting an organization data export only signals intent. Accessing the export archive via its signed URL means the actor actually downloaded chats, projects, user metadata, and configuration. An attacker with administrative access can use this to exfiltrate intellectual property and credentials at scale.

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Detects when GenAI tools access sensitive files such as cloud credentials, SSH keys, browser password databases, or shell configurations. Attackers leverage GenAI agents to systematically locate and exfiltrate credentials, API keys, and tokens. Access to credential stores (.aws/credentials, .ssh/id_*) suggests harvesting, while writes to shell configs (.bashrc, .zshrc) indicate persistence attempts. Note: On linux only creation events are available. Access events are not yet implemented.

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Detects non-allowlisted curl activity on Linux, macOS, and Windows hosts and uses an LLM to assess whether the activity is malicious, benign, or requires investigation. The rule parses and normalizes the destination, redacts sensitive command-line values, and aggregates activity by host and destination before invoking the ES|QL COMPLETION command. Only true positive or suspicious verdicts with confidence above 0.7 generate alerts.

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Detects non-allowlisted curl activity on Linux hosts via Auditd Manager or Auditbeat and uses an LLM to assess whether the activity is malicious, benign, or requires investigation. The rule parses and normalizes the destination, redacts sensitive command-line values, and aggregates activity by host and destination before invoking the ES|QL COMPLETION command. Only true positive or suspicious verdicts with confidence above 0.7 generate alerts.

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Detects non-allowlisted wget activity on Linux, macOS, and Windows hosts and uses an LLM to assess whether the activity is malicious, benign, or requires investigation. The rule parses and normalizes the destination, redacts sensitive command-line values, and aggregates activity by host and destination before invoking the ES|QL COMPLETION command. Only true positive or suspicious verdicts with confidence above 0.7 generate alerts.

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Detects non-allowlisted wget activity on Linux hosts via Auditd Manager or Auditbeat and uses an LLM to assess whether the activity is malicious, benign, or requires investigation. The rule parses and normalizes the destination, redacts sensitive command-line values, and aggregates activity by host and destination before invoking the ES|QL COMPLETION command. Only true positive or suspicious verdicts with confidence above 0.7 generate alerts.

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Identifies execution of a third-party S3 or object-storage client (S3 Browser, s5cmd, s3cmd, MinIO mc, rclone, Cyberduck, s3fs, goofys, juicefs) launched by a script interpreter, a shell one-liner, or from a temporary or user-writable path. After stealing cloud credentials, adversaries switch from the AWS CLI to these clients to enumerate and drain buckets in bulk. Gating on a scripted context separates post-exploitation automation from interactive developer use.

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Detects creation of a new AWS CloudTrail trail via CreateTrail API. While legitimate during onboarding or auditing improvements, adversaries can create trails that write to attacker-controlled destinations, limit regions, or otherwise subvert monitoring objectives. New trails should be validated for destination ownership, encryption, multi-region coverage, and organizational scope.

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Identifies successful export tasks of EC2 instances via the APIs CreateInstanceExportTask, ExportImage, or CreateStoreImageTask. These exports can be used by administrators for legitimate VM migration or backup workflows however, an attacker with access to an EC2 instance or AWS credentials can export a VM or its image and then transfer it off-account for exfiltration of data.

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Detects successful creation of an Amazon EC2 Traffic Mirroring session. A session copies full packets from a source Elastic Network Interface (ENI) to a mirror target (e.g., an ENI or NLB) using a mirror filter (ingress/egress rules). While used for diagnostics and NDR/IDS tooling, adversaries can abuse sessions to covertly capture and exfiltrate sensitive, potentially unencrypted, traffic from instances or subnets.

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Identifies the export of a DB snapshot or DB cluster data to Amazon S3. Snapshot exports can be used for analytics or migration workflows, but adversaries may abuse them to exfiltrate sensitive data outside of RDS-managed storage. Exporting a snapshot creates a portable copy of the database contents, which, if performed without authorization, can indicate data theft, staging for exfiltration, or operator misconfiguration that exposes regulated information.

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Detects a principal modifying an S3 bucket ACL to grant public read or write access that has not been observed doing so within the history window, using canned ACLs such as public-read or public-read-write. ACL-based public access is a distinct API path (PutBucketAcl) that can bypass some Block Public Access controls. Monitoring for new identities performing this change helps surface freshly compromised credentials being used to stage data for exfiltration or inadvertently expose sensitive content.

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Identifies a high number of failed S3 operations against a single bucket from a single source address within a short timeframe. This activity can indicate attempts to collect bucket objects or cause an increase in billing to an account via internal "AccessDenied" errors.

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Detects when an Amazon S3 bucket policy is modified to grant public access using a wildcard (Principal:"") statement. This rule analyzes PutBucketPolicy events that include both Effect=Allow and Principal:"" in the request parameters, indicating that permissions were extended to all identities, potentially making the bucket or its contents publicly accessible. Publicly exposing an S3 bucket is one of the most common causes of sensitive data leaks in AWS environments. Adversaries or misconfigurations can leverage this exposure to exfiltrate data, host malicious content, or collect credentials and logs left in open storage.

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Detects when an Amazon S3 bucket policy is modified to share access with an external AWS account. This rule analyzes PutBucketPolicy events and compares the S3 bucket’s account ID to any account IDs referenced in the policy’s Effect=Allow statements. If the policy includes principals from accounts other than the bucket owner’s, the rule triggers an alert. This behavior may indicate an adversary backdooring a bucket for data exfiltration or cross-account persistence. For example, an attacker who compromises credentials could attach a policy allowing access from an external AWS account they control, enabling continued access even after credentials are rotated. Note: This rule will not alert if the account ID is part of the bucket’s name or appears in the resource ARN. Such cases are common in standardized naming conventions (e.g., “mybucket-123456789012”). To ensure full coverage, use complementary rules to monitor for suspicious PutBucketPolicy API requests targeting buckets with account IDs embedded in their names or resources.

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Detects successful S3 GetObject calls targeting high-value credential and secret files commonly stored in S3 buckets: AWS credentials files (".aws/credentials", ".aws/config"), SSH private keys ("id_rsa", "id_ed25519", "id_ecdsa", "id_dsa"), environment files (".env"), PEM and PuTTY key files, and other private key patterns. These file types are high-yield targets for credential harvesting from S3. The rule excludes AWSService identity type to suppress S3 replication, Glacier restore, and other AWS-internal data movement that legitimately reads these files.

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Identifies when the same AWS principal, from the same source IP, successfully invokes read-only S3 control-plane APIs that reveal bucket posture across many buckets in a short period. This pattern can indicate automated reconnaissance or security scanning, similar to CSPM tools and post-compromise enumeration. The rule excludes AWS service principals, requires programmatic-style sessions (not Management Console credentials), and requires populated resource and identity fields so nulls do not skew cardinality.

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Identifies AWS CloudTrail events where an unauthenticated source is attempting to access an S3 bucket. This activity may indicate a misconfigured S3 bucket policy that allows public access to the bucket, potentially exposing sensitive data to unauthorized users. Adversaries can specify --no-sign-request in the AWS CLI to retrieve objects from an S3 bucket without authentication. This is a New Terms rule, which means it will trigger for each unique combination of the source.address and targeted bucket name that has not been seen making this API request.

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Identifies when a user subscribes to an SNS topic using a new protocol type (ie. email, http, lambda, etc.). SNS allows users to subscribe to recieve topic messages across a broad range of protocols like email, sms, lambda functions, http endpoints, and applications. Adversaries may subscribe to an SNS topic to collect sensitive information or exfiltrate data via an external email address, cross-account AWS service or other means. This rule identifies a new protocol subscription method for a particular user.

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Identifies the first time, in a historical window, a host runs AzCopy copy or sync to Azure Blob, Data Lake, or File storage, or starts Azure Storage Explorer. These Microsoft utilities are legitimate data-transfer tools; ransomware and cloud-ransomware operators drop portable copies and use SAS-authenticated jobs to pull data from victim storage and push it to attacker-controlled accounts.

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Identifies when Azure Storage Account Blob public access is enabled, allowing external access to blob containers. This technique was observed in cloud ransom-based campaigns where threat actors modified storage accounts to expose non-remotely accessible accounts to the internet for data exfiltration. Adversaries abuse the Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/write operation to modify public access settings.

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Identifies the first time an Azure Storage resource receives an anonymous data-plane read (GetBlob and related Get or List operations). Anonymous requests are used to probe public containers and to test stolen blob URLs before a SAS is appended. First-seen resource ID keeps volume down while still covering WireServer-related probes of status or extension blobs.

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Identifies the execution of the OpenSSL utility to encrypt data. Adversaries may use OpenSSL to encrypt data to disrupt the availability of their target's data and may attempt to hold the organization's data to ransom for the purposes of extortion.

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Detects when a discovery command is executed followed by the immediate modification of a suspicious file via the same process. Many types of malware execute discovery commands, save the output to a file, and then exfiltrate that file via their C2 channel.

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Identifies the use of WinRAR or 7-Zip to create encrypted archives. Adversaries often compress and encrypt data in preparation for exfiltration.

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Identifies when an application accesses SharePoint Online or OneDrive for Business for the first time in the tenant within a specified timeframe. This detects successful OAuth phishing campaigns, illicit consent grants, or compromised third-party applications gaining initial access to file storage. Adversaries often use malicious OAuth applications or phishing techniques to gain consent from users, allowing persistent access to organizational data repositories without traditional credential theft.

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Detects PowerShell script block content that creates Exchange mailbox export requests via New-MailboxExportRequest, commonly writing PST files. Adversaries can abuse export requests to collect and stage email content for exfiltration.

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Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, New-MailBoxExportRequest, to export the contents of a primary mailbox or archive to a .pst file. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information.

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Identifies the first source and destination IP pair observed in a five-day history window where an NFS client asserts AUTH_SYS (RPC UNIX) credentials with UID 0 (root). NFSv3 and NFSv4 clients can claim arbitrary UIDs through AUTH_SYS, and weak export controls may honor root-equivalent access from unexpected hosts. This is a common precursor to unauthorized mounts, sensitive file reads, and remote encryption of exported shares.

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This rule detects the download of a FortiGate device configuration file. Configuration exports contain sensitive data including administrator password hashes, LDAP bind credentials, VPN pre-shared keys, routing tables, and firewall policies. Threat actors exploiting CVE-2026-24858 have been observed exporting the full device configuration immediately after gaining access to harvest credentials and map the internal network.

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Identifies the creation of a subscription in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). In GCP, the publisher-subscriber relationship (Pub/Sub) is an asynchronous messaging service that decouples event-producing and event-processing services. A subscription is a named resource representing the stream of messages to be delivered to the subscribing application.

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Identifies the creation of a topic in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). In GCP, the publisher-subscriber relationship (Pub/Sub) is an asynchronous messaging service that decouples event-producing and event-processing services. A topic is used to forward messages from publishers to subscribers.

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Detects when Google Workspace administrators initiate bulk movement or export of user Drive data. This includes admin data transfer requests that reassign a user's Drive files to another account, and Customer Takeout export jobs that package organizational data for download or off-platform transfer. Adversaries with administrative access may abuse these mechanisms to stage or exfiltrate sensitive files.

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Detects when an anonymous user views, copies, or downloads a private key or credential file from Google Drive via an anyone-with-the-link share. Adversaries who obtain or create open Drive links can harvest encryption keys and secrets stored in user drives, then use those materials to decrypt data, authenticate to services, or expand access beyond the initial compromise.

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Detects when a Gmail routing, mail-forwarding, or custom mail-host setting is created or modified in Google Workspace. Adversaries with administrative access can add Routing rules (also deliver to / change envelope recipient), recipient address map forwarding, or mail hosts and outbound gateways to copy or redirect sensitive email for collection.

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Detects when secrets or configmaps are accessed, created, modified, or deleted in a Kubernetes cluster by the Azure Arc AAD proxy service account. When operations are routed through the Azure Arc Cluster Connect proxy, the Kubernetes audit log records the acting user as system:serviceaccount:azure-arc:azure-arc-kube-aad-proxy-sa with the actual caller identity in the impersonatedUser field. This pattern indicates that someone is accessing the cluster through the Azure ARM API rather than directly via kubectl against the API server. While legitimate for Arc-managed workflows, adversaries with stolen service principal credentials can abuse Arc Cluster Connect to read, exfiltrate, or modify secrets and configmaps while appearing as the Arc proxy service account in K8s audit logs. This rule uses a 5-day new-terms history window keyed on the impersonated identity and alerts the first time that Azure AD principal performs this activity.

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This rule monitors for the usage of the most common audio recording utilities on unix systems by an uncommon process parent. Adversaries may collect audio data from users or systems for a variety of reasons including espionage, credential theft, or reconnaissance.

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This rule monitors for the usage of the most common clipboard utilities on unix systems by an uncommon process parent. Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.

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This rule monitors for the usage of the most common video recording or screenshot utilities on unix systems by an uncommon process parent. Adversaries may collect video or screenshot data from users or systems for a variety of reasons including espionage, credential theft, or reconnaissance.

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Identifies when a new Inbox forwarding rule is created in Microsoft 365. Inbox rules process messages in the Inbox based on conditions and take actions. In this case, the rules will forward the emails to a defined address. Attackers can abuse Inbox Rules to intercept and exfiltrate email data without making organization-wide configuration changes or having the corresponding privileges.

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Identifies suspicious Microsoft 365 mail access by ClientAppId. This rule detects when a user accesses their mailbox using a client application that is not typically used by the user, which may indicate potential compromise or unauthorized access attempts. Adversaries may use custom or third-party applications to access mailboxes, bypassing standard security controls. First-party Microsoft applications are also abused after OAuth tokens are compromised, allowing adversaries to access mailboxes without raising suspicion.

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Identifies an excessive number of Microsoft 365 mailbox items accessed by a user either via aggregated counts or throttling. Microsoft audits mailbox access via the MailItemsAccessed event, which is triggered when a user accesses mailbox items. If more than 1000 mailbox items are accessed within a 24-hour period, it is then throttled. Excessive mailbox access may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate sensitive information or perform reconnaissance on a target's mailbox. This rule detects both the throttled and unthrottled events with a high threshold.

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Identifies when an excessive number of files are downloaded from OneDrive or SharePoint by an authorized user or application in a short period of time. This may indicate a potential data exfiltration event, especially if the downloads are performed using OAuth authentication which could suggest an OAuth phishing attack such as Device Code Authentication phishing.

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Identifies search queries in SharePoint containing sensitive terms related to credentials, financial data, PII, legal matters, or infrastructure information. Adversaries who compromise user accounts often search for high-value files before exfiltration. This rule detects searches containing terms across multiple sensitivity categories, regardless of the access method (browser, PowerShell, or API). The actual search query text is analyzed against a curated list of sensitive terms to identify potential reconnaissance activity.

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Identifies file downloads or access from OneDrive or SharePoint using PowerShell-based user agents. Adversaries may use native PowerShell cmdlets like Invoke-WebRequest or Invoke-RestMethod with Microsoft Graph API to exfiltrate data after compromising OAuth tokens via device code phishing or other credential theft techniques. This rule detects both direct PowerShell access and PnP PowerShell module usage for file operations. FileAccessed events are included to detect adversaries reading file content via API and saving locally, bypassing traditional download methods. Normal users access SharePoint/OneDrive via browsers or sync clients, making PowerShell-based file access inherently suspicious.

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Identifies access to email resources via Microsoft Graph API using an first-party application on behalf of a user principal. This behavior may indicate an adversary using a phished OAuth refresh token or a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) to access email resources. The pattern includes requests to Microsoft Graph API endpoints related to email, such as /me/mailFolders/inbox/messages or /users/{user_id}/messages, using a public client application ID and a user principal object ID. This is a New Terms rule that only signals if the application ID, user principal object ID, and source ASN have not been seen doing this activity historically.

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Detects when an unusual parent process like Node.js, Python, or osascript executes the pbpaste binary to access clipboard data. This technique has been used by malware like OtterCookie to steal passwords and seed phrases from the clipboard.

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Detects PowerShell script block content that references Win32 keylogging primitives such as key state polling or low-level input hooks. Adversaries use keylogging to capture credentials and other sensitive user input.

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Detects PowerShell script block content that indicates programmatic mailbox access using Outlook Interop/MAPI or EWS APIs. Adversaries can use mailbox access to collect email content and attachments for exfiltration.

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Detects PowerShell script block content that references webcam capture APIs or video capture device objects. Attackers use webcam recording to surveil victims or collect sensitive footage for extortion.

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Detects PowerShell scripts that references native Windows API functions commonly used for discovery of users, groups, shares, sessions, domain trusts, and service security. Attackers use these APIs for situational awareness and targeting prior to lateral movement or collection.

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Detects PowerShell script block content that invokes microphone capture routines or WinMM audio APIs. Adversaries may use audio recording to surveil users or capture sensitive conversations for theft or extortion.

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Detects PowerShell script block content that retrieves clipboard data using Get-Clipboard or Windows clipboard APIs. Adversaries can collect copied credentials, tokens, or other sensitive data from the clipboard.

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Detects PowerShell script block content that uses CopyFromScreen with .NET bitmap classes to capture screenshots. Attackers use screen capture to collect on-screen information and credentials.

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Detects when a sensitive file is accessed followed by the immediate creation of a compressed file in a suspicious location. This activity can indicate an attempt to collect sensitive local data and stage it for exfiltration.

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Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing sensitive information, such as credentials and system configurations inside a container.

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Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing sensitive information, such as credentials and system configurations.

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Identifies the use of a compression utility to collect known files containing sensitive information, such as credentials and system configurations inside a container.

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Detects Inter-Process Communication with Outlook via Component Object Model from an unusual process. Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information or send email on their behalf via API.

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Detects when TCC access is granted for multiple user folders like Desktop, Downloads and Documents in quick succession. Many information stealers require TCC permissions to access these locations and will prompt users to grant access for data exfiltration.

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Identifies an attempt to export an AWS EC2 instance. A virtual machine (VM) export may indicate an attempt to extract or exfiltrate information.

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