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Detects when an AWS IAM login profile is added to a root user account and is self-assigned. Adversaries, with temporary access to the root account, may add a login profile to the root user account to maintain access even if the original access key is rotated or disabled.
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Detects when a single AWS resource is running multiple
Describe
andList
API calls in a 10-second window. This behavior could indicate an actor attempting to discover the AWS infrastructure using compromised credentials or a compromised instance. Adversaries may use this information to identify potential targets for further exploitation or to gain a better understanding of the target's infrastructure.
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An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to persist or escalate privileges by attaching additional permissions to compromised user accounts. This rule looks for use of the IAM
AttachUserPolicy
API operation to attach the highly permissiveAdministratorAccess
AWS managed policy to an existing IAM user.
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Detects the creation of an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) user initiated by an assumed role on an EC2 instance. Assumed roles allow users or services to temporarily adopt different AWS permissions, but the creation of IAM users through these roles—particularly from within EC2 instances—may indicate a compromised instance. Adversaries might exploit such permissions to establish persistence by creating new IAM users under unauthorized conditions.
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Detects when an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) customer-managed policy is attached to a role by an unusual or unauthorized user. Customer-managed policies are policies created and controlled within an AWS account, granting specific permissions to roles or users when attached. This rule identifies potential privilege escalation by flagging cases where a customer-managed policy is attached to a role by an unexpected actor, which could signal unauthorized access or misuse. Attackers may attach policies to roles to expand permissions and elevate their privileges within the AWS environment. This is a New Terms rule that uses the
aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn
andaws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.roleName
fields to check if the combination of the actor ARN and target role name has not been seen in the last 14 days.
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An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to persist or escalate privileges by creating a new set of credentials for an existing user. This rule looks for use of the IAM
CreateAccessKey
API operation to create new programmatic access keys for another IAM user.
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Identifies the deactivation of a specified multi-factor authentication (MFA) device and removes it from association with the user name for which it was originally enabled. In AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM), a device must be deactivated before it can be deleted.
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An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to persist or escalate privileges by attaching additional permissions to user groups the compromised user account belongs to. This rule looks for use of the IAM
AttachGroupPolicy
API operation to attach the highly permissiveAdministratorAccess
AWS managed policy to an existing IAM user group.
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An adversary with access to a set of compromised credentials may attempt to persist or escalate privileges by attaching additional permissions to compromised IAM roles. This rule looks for use of the IAM
AttachRolePolicy
API operation to attach the highly permissiveAdministratorAccess
AWS managed policy to an existing IAM role.
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Identifies when a user has updated a SAML provider in AWS. SAML providers are used to enable federated access to the AWS Management Console. This activity could be an indication of an attacker attempting to escalate privileges.
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This rule looks for use of the IAM
AttachUserPolicy
API operation to attach theCompromisedKeyQuarantine
orCompromisedKeyQuarantineV2
AWS managed policies to an existing IAM user. This policy denies access to certain actions and is applied by the AWS team in the event that an IAM user's credentials have been compromised or exposed publicly.
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Identifies the creation of an AWS Roles Anywhere profile. AWS Roles Anywhere is a feature that allows you to use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) profiles to manage access to your AWS resources from any location via trusted anchors. This rule detects the creation of a profile that can be assumed from any service. Adversaries may create profiles tied to overly permissive roles to maintain access to AWS resources. Ensure that the profile creation is expected and that the trust policy is configured securely.
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Identifies when an AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor with an external certificate authority is created. AWS Roles Anywhere profiles are legitimate profiles that can be created by administrators to allow access from any location. This rule detects when a trust anchor is created with an external certificate authority that is not managed by AWS Certificate Manager Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA). Adversaries may accomplish this to maintain persistence in the environment.
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Identifies the creation of a group in AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM). Groups specify permissions for multiple users. Any user in a group automatically has the permissions that are assigned to the group.
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AWS IAM Group Deletion
Identifies the deletion of a specified AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) resource group. Deleting a resource group does not delete resources that are members of the group; it only deletes the group structure.
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