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Detects when account-level email sending is explicitly enabled in Amazon SES, via the v1 UpdateAccountSendingEnabled API with Enabled: true or the v2 PutAccountSendingAttributes API with SendingEnabled: true. Account-level sending is commonly paused by an administrator, or by automation wired to CloudWatch reputation alarms when bounce or complaint rates rise. An attacker who compromises an AWS account may re-enable sending to restore a paused capability as part of phishing infrastructure setup, allowing bulk email under the victim organization's trusted sending domain. Neither API can resume sending that AWS itself has paused.
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Detects the first time an AWS identity requests a service quota increase via the AWS Service Quotas API within a 7-day history window. Service quota increases are submitted to AWS Support and, when approved, raise the limits on EC2 instances, Lambda concurrency, VPC resources, and other services. An adversary who obtains AWS credentials may request quota increases as infrastructure preparation for large-scale cryptomining, DDoS amplification, phishing campaigns, or data exfiltration operations that require compute or network resources beyond the account's current limits.
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Detects an SES email identity being verified and subsequently deleted within a 30-minute window, performed by the same AWS identity. Amazon SES requires email addresses and domains to be verified before they can be used as senders. An adversary who obtains SES credentials may verify a domain or address they control, use it to send phishing or spam email, then delete the identity to remove evidence of the sending domain from the account's verified identity list. This verify-use-delete pattern is a recognized attacker technique for SES abuse.
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Detects the first occurrence in 7 days of an AWS identity attaching the managed policy AmazonSESFullAccess to an IAM user, role, or group. AmazonSESFullAccess grants unrestricted permission to send email, manage identities and templates, manage suppression lists, and access SES account-level settings. Granting this policy to an unexpected IAM entity, particularly a newly created user or a role not previously associated with email operations, is a documented technique used by threat actors to establish phishing infrastructure on compromised AWS accounts, enabling them to send email on behalf of the victim organization's trusted sending domain. Using new terms on the calling identity suppresses recurring attachments by known email automation while surfacing identities performing this action for the first time.
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Identifies when an AWS Route 53 private hosted zone is associated with a new Virtual Private Cloud (VPC). Private hosted zones restrict DNS resolution to specific VPCs, and associating additional VPCs expands the scope of what networks can resolve internal DNS records. Adversaries with sufficient permissions may associate unauthorized VPCs to intercept, observe, or reroute internal traffic, establish persistence, or expand their visibility within an AWS environment.
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Looks for compiler activity by a user context which does not normally run compilers. This can be the result of ad-hoc software changes or unauthorized software deployment. This can also be due to local privilege elevation via locally run exploits or malware activity.
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Identifies when the transfer lock on an AWS Route 53 domain is disabled. The transfer lock protects domains from being moved to another registrar or AWS account without authorization. Disabling this lock removes an important safeguard against domain hijacking. Adversaries who gain access to domain-management permissions may disable the lock as a precursor to unauthorized domain transfer, takeover, or service disruption.
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Identifies when an AWS Route 53 domain is transferred to another AWS account. Transferring a domain changes administrative control of the DNS namespace, enabling the receiving account to modify DNS records, route traffic, request certificates, and potentially hijack operational workloads. Adversaries who gain access to privileged IAM users or long-lived credentials may leverage domain transfers to establish persistence, redirect traffic, conduct phishing, or stage infrastructure for broader attacks. This rule detects successful domain transfer requests.
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Identifies when an SNS topic is created by a user who does not typically perform this action. Adversaries may create SNS topics to stage capabilities for data exfiltration or other malicious activities. This is a New Terms rule that only flags when this behavior is observed for the first time by a user or role.
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Detects when a custom domain is added or verified in an Entra ID tenant. Adding and verifying a custom domain are precursor steps to configuring domain federation, which can be abused by adversaries to route authentication through an attacker-controlled identity provider (Golden SAML). In most organizations, custom domains are added infrequently and these events should be investigated to ensure they are part of a legitimate administrative workflow.
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