GitHub Repo Created
Identifies the creation of a GitHub repository by a non-bot actor. Unexpected repository creation can indicate unauthorized infrastructure setup, data staging, or misuse of a compromised GitHub account.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2023/10/11"
3integration = ["github"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/11/17"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Identifies the creation of a GitHub repository by a non-bot actor. Unexpected repository creation can indicate
11unauthorized infrastructure setup, data staging, or misuse of a compromised GitHub account.
12"""
13false_positives = [
14 """
15 Authorized users may create repositories for development, testing, documentation, or migration. Confirm the actor,
16 organization, repository visibility, and business purpose before escalating.
17 """,
18]
19from = "now-9m"
20index = ["logs-github.audit-*"]
21language = "kuery"
22license = "Elastic License v2"
23name = "GitHub Repo Created"
24note = """## Triage and analysis
25
26### Investigating GitHub Repo Created
27
28This rule detects repository creation by an actor that GitHub does not identify as a bot. Repository creation is common
29in normal development, but it can also support unauthorized code hosting, data staging, persistence, or resource
30development after an account is compromised.
31
32### Possible investigation steps
33
34- Review `user.name`, `github.org`, `github.repo`, and `github.actor_ip` to identify the actor and repository.
35- Confirm the repository name, visibility, ownership, and creation purpose with the actor or organization owner.
36- Review nearby audit events for permission changes, collaborator additions, deploy keys, webhooks, secrets, workflow
37 creation, pushes, transfers, or visibility changes.
38- Check whether the source IP, user agent, and authentication method are expected for the actor.
39- Determine whether sensitive code, credentials, or organization data were subsequently added to the repository.
40
41### False positive analysis
42
43- Developers and administrators routinely create repositories for approved projects, testing, migrations, and
44 documentation.
45- Internal automation not identified by GitHub as a bot can still trigger this rule. Scope exceptions to a verified
46 actor and organization when that behavior is expected.
47
48### Response and remediation
49
50- If unauthorized, restrict or remove the repository, revoke suspicious sessions or tokens, and review the actor's
51 recent GitHub activity.
52- Remove unauthorized collaborators, deploy keys, webhooks, workflows, and secrets.
53- Preserve relevant audit events and repository contents before deletion when incident-response evidence is required.
54"""
55references = [
56 "https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/keeping-your-organization-secure/managing-security-settings-for-your-organization/audit-log-events-for-your-organization",
57]
58risk_score = 21
59rule_id = "6cea88e4-6ce2-4238-9981-a54c140d6336"
60severity = "low"
61tags = [
62 "Domain: Cloud",
63 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
64 "Use Case: UEBA",
65 "Tactic: Execution",
66 "Tactic: Resource Development",
67 "Data Source: Github",
68 "Data Source: GitHub Audit Logs",
69 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
70 "Noise: Medium",
71 "Performance: Fast",
72 "Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL)",
73 "Platform: GitHub",
74 "Domain: SaaS",
75]
76timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
77type = "query"
78
79query = '''
80data_stream.dataset:"github.audit" and event.category:"configuration" and event.action:"repo.create" and
81not github.actor_is_bot:true
82'''
83
84
85[[rule.threat]]
86framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
87
88[[rule.threat.technique]]
89id = "T1648"
90name = "Serverless Execution"
91reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648/"
92
93[rule.threat.tactic]
94id = "TA0002"
95name = "Execution"
96reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
97
98[[rule.threat]]
99framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
100
101[[rule.threat.technique]]
102id = "T1583"
103name = "Acquire Infrastructure"
104reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/"
105
106[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
107id = "T1583.006"
108name = "Web Services"
109reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006/"
110
111[rule.threat.tactic]
112id = "TA0042"
113name = "Resource Development"
114reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0042/"
115
116[rule.investigation_fields]
117field_names = [
118 "@timestamp",
119 "event.action",
120 "user.name",
121 "github.org",
122 "github.repo",
123 "github.repository_public",
124 "github.actor_ip",
125 "github.user_agent",
126 "github.programmatic_access_type",
127 "github.actor_is_bot",
128]
Triage and analysis
Investigating GitHub Repo Created
This rule detects repository creation by an actor that GitHub does not identify as a bot. Repository creation is common in normal development, but it can also support unauthorized code hosting, data staging, persistence, or resource development after an account is compromised.
Possible investigation steps
- Review
user.name,github.org,github.repo, andgithub.actor_ipto identify the actor and repository. - Confirm the repository name, visibility, ownership, and creation purpose with the actor or organization owner.
- Review nearby audit events for permission changes, collaborator additions, deploy keys, webhooks, secrets, workflow creation, pushes, transfers, or visibility changes.
- Check whether the source IP, user agent, and authentication method are expected for the actor.
- Determine whether sensitive code, credentials, or organization data were subsequently added to the repository.
False positive analysis
- Developers and administrators routinely create repositories for approved projects, testing, migrations, and documentation.
- Internal automation not identified by GitHub as a bot can still trigger this rule. Scope exceptions to a verified actor and organization when that behavior is expected.
Response and remediation
- If unauthorized, restrict or remove the repository, revoke suspicious sessions or tokens, and review the actor's recent GitHub activity.
- Remove unauthorized collaborators, deploy keys, webhooks, workflows, and secrets.
- Preserve relevant audit events and repository contents before deletion when incident-response evidence is required.
References
Related rules
- High Number of Cloned GitHub Repos From PAT
- GitHub Actions Unusual Bot Push to Repository
- GitHub Actions Workflow Modification Blocked
- GitHub App Deleted
- GitHub Exfiltration via High Number of Repository Clones by User