AWS SNS Topic Created by Rare User
Identifies when an SNS topic is created by a user who does not typically perform this action. Adversaries may create SNS topics to stage capabilities for data exfiltration or other malicious activities.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2025/02/11"
3integration = ["aws"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2025/02/11"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Identifies when an SNS topic is created by a user who does not typically perform this action. Adversaries may create SNS
11topics to stage capabilities for data exfiltration or other malicious activities.
12"""
13false_positives = [
14 """
15 Legitimate users may create SNS topics for legitimate purposes. Ensure that the creation is authorized before taking
16 action.
17 """,
18]
19from = "now-9m"
20index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
21language = "kuery"
22license = "Elastic License v2"
23name = "AWS SNS Topic Created by Rare User"
24note = """## Triage and Analysis
25
26### Investigating AWS SNS Topic Created by Rare User
27
28This rule detects the creation of an AWS Simple Notification Service (SNS) topic by a user who does not typically perform this action. Adversaries may create SNS topics to facilitate data exfiltration or other malicious activities.
29
30This is a [New Terms](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule) rule that only flags when this behavior is observed for the first time on a host in the last 10 days.
31
32#### Possible Investigation Steps
33
34### 1. Identify the Actor and Context
35- **User Identity and Role**:
36 - Examine `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` to determine **who** created the SNS topic.
37 - Identify whether the actor assumed a **privileged IAM role** (`aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type: "AssumedRole"`).
38- **User Agent and Tooling**:
39 - Check `user_agent.name` to determine if this action was performed via the AWS CLI, SDK, or Console.
40 - If `aws-cli` was used, review whether it aligns with typical automation or administrative behavior.
41- **Source IP and Geographic Location**:
42 - Review `source.ip` and `source.geo` fields to confirm if the request originated from a **trusted** or **unexpected** location.
43
44### 2. Evaluate the SNS Topic Creation
45- **Topic Name and Purpose**:
46 - Check `aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.name` for the **SNS topic name** and determine whether it appears suspicious (e.g., random strings, unusual keywords).
47- **Target Region and Account**:
48 - Verify `cloud.region` and `cloud.account.id` to **ensure the SNS topic was created in an expected environment**.
49- **Associated API Calls**:
50 - Identify additional actions **before or after** this event using `event.action` values like:
51 - `Subscribe`
52 - `Publish`
53 - `SetTopicAttributes`
54 - These may indicate follow-up steps taken to misuse the SNS topic.
55
56### 3. Analyze Potential Malicious Intent
57- **Is This an Isolated Action or a Pattern?**
58 - Check if this **user has previously created SNS topics** using historical CloudTrail logs.
59 - Look for **multiple topic creations in a short period**, which may suggest an automation script or malicious behavior.
60- **Unusual Role Usage**:
61 - If `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` references an **EC2 instance role**, verify whether that instance typically performs SNS operations.
62- **Potential Data Exfiltration or Persistence**:
63 - Review whether **new subscriptions** were added (`Subscribe` API action) to forward data externally.
64 - If an SNS topic was configured to trigger **Lambda functions or S3 events**, it may indicate an attempt to persist in the environment.
65
66## False Positive Analysis
67- **Legitimate Usage of SNS**:
68 - SNS is commonly used for **event-driven notifications** in AWS.
69 - Check whether the SNS topic creation aligns with known **DevOps, automation, or monitoring activities**.
70- **Routine IAM Role Activity**:
71 - If the user typically interacts with SNS, consider **allowlisting** expected IAM roles for this action.
72- **AWS Services Creating Topics Automatically**:
73 - Some AWS services may **auto-create SNS topics** for alerts and monitoring. Confirm whether the creation was system-generated.
74
75## Response and Remediation
76- **Confirm Authorization**:
77 - If the user was not expected to create SNS topics, verify whether their IAM permissions should be restricted.
78- **Revoke Unauthorized Access**:
79 - If unauthorized, disable the access keys or IAM role associated with the event.
80- **Monitor for Further SNS Modifications**:
81 - Set up additional monitoring for **SNS Publish or Subscription events** (`Publish`, `Subscribe`).
82- **Enhance IAM Policy Controls**:
83 - Consider enforcing **least privilege** IAM policies and enabling **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** where applicable.
84- **Investigate for Persistence**:
85 - Check whether the SNS topic is **being used as a notification channel for Lambda, S3, or other AWS services**.
86"""
87references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/api/API_CreateTopic.html"]
88risk_score = 21
89rule_id = "3c3f65b8-e8b4-11ef-9511-f661ea17fbce"
90severity = "low"
91tags = [
92 "Domain: Cloud",
93 "Data Source: AWS",
94 "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
95 "Data Source: AWS SNS",
96 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
97 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
98 "Tactic: Resource Development",
99]
100timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
101type = "new_terms"
102
103query = '''
104event.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
105 and event.provider: "sns.amazonaws.com"
106 and event.action: "CreateTopic"
107 and event.outcome: "success"
108 and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type: "AssumedRole"
109 and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn: *i-*
110'''
111
112
113[[rule.threat]]
114framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
115[[rule.threat.technique]]
116id = "T1608"
117name = "Stage Capabilities"
118reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/"
119
120
121[rule.threat.tactic]
122id = "TA0042"
123name = "Resource Development"
124reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0042/"
125
126[rule.investigation_fields]
127field_names = [
128 "@timestamp",
129 "user.name",
130 "source.address",
131 "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
132 "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
133 "user_agent.original",
134 "event.action",
135 "event.outcome",
136 "cloud.region",
137 "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.protocol",
138 "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.topicArn",
139 "aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters",
140]
141
142[rule.new_terms]
143field = "new_terms_fields"
144value = ["aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn"]
145[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
146field = "history_window_start"
147value = "now-10d"
Triage and Analysis
Investigating AWS SNS Topic Created by Rare User
This rule detects the creation of an AWS Simple Notification Service (SNS) topic by a user who does not typically perform this action. Adversaries may create SNS topics to facilitate data exfiltration or other malicious activities.
This is a New Terms rule that only flags when this behavior is observed for the first time on a host in the last 10 days.
Possible Investigation Steps
1. Identify the Actor and Context
- User Identity and Role:
- Examine
aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn
to determine who created the SNS topic. - Identify whether the actor assumed a privileged IAM role (
aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type: "AssumedRole"
).
- Examine
- User Agent and Tooling:
- Check
user_agent.name
to determine if this action was performed via the AWS CLI, SDK, or Console. - If
aws-cli
was used, review whether it aligns with typical automation or administrative behavior.
- Check
- Source IP and Geographic Location:
- Review
source.ip
andsource.geo
fields to confirm if the request originated from a trusted or unexpected location.
- Review
2. Evaluate the SNS Topic Creation
- Topic Name and Purpose:
- Check
aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.name
for the SNS topic name and determine whether it appears suspicious (e.g., random strings, unusual keywords).
- Check
- Target Region and Account:
- Verify
cloud.region
andcloud.account.id
to ensure the SNS topic was created in an expected environment.
- Verify
- Associated API Calls:
- Identify additional actions before or after this event using
event.action
values like:Subscribe
Publish
SetTopicAttributes
- These may indicate follow-up steps taken to misuse the SNS topic.
- Identify additional actions before or after this event using
3. Analyze Potential Malicious Intent
- Is This an Isolated Action or a Pattern?
- Check if this user has previously created SNS topics using historical CloudTrail logs.
- Look for multiple topic creations in a short period, which may suggest an automation script or malicious behavior.
- Unusual Role Usage:
- If
aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn
references an EC2 instance role, verify whether that instance typically performs SNS operations.
- If
- Potential Data Exfiltration or Persistence:
- Review whether new subscriptions were added (
Subscribe
API action) to forward data externally. - If an SNS topic was configured to trigger Lambda functions or S3 events, it may indicate an attempt to persist in the environment.
- Review whether new subscriptions were added (
False Positive Analysis
- Legitimate Usage of SNS:
- SNS is commonly used for event-driven notifications in AWS.
- Check whether the SNS topic creation aligns with known DevOps, automation, or monitoring activities.
- Routine IAM Role Activity:
- If the user typically interacts with SNS, consider allowlisting expected IAM roles for this action.
- AWS Services Creating Topics Automatically:
- Some AWS services may auto-create SNS topics for alerts and monitoring. Confirm whether the creation was system-generated.
Response and Remediation
- Confirm Authorization:
- If the user was not expected to create SNS topics, verify whether their IAM permissions should be restricted.
- Revoke Unauthorized Access:
- If unauthorized, disable the access keys or IAM role associated with the event.
- Monitor for Further SNS Modifications:
- Set up additional monitoring for SNS Publish or Subscription events (
Publish
,Subscribe
).
- Set up additional monitoring for SNS Publish or Subscription events (
- Enhance IAM Policy Controls:
- Consider enforcing least privilege IAM policies and enabling multi-factor authentication (MFA) where applicable.
- Investigate for Persistence:
- Check whether the SNS topic is being used as a notification channel for Lambda, S3, or other AWS services.
References
Related rules
- AWS SSM Command Document Created by Rare User
- SNS Topic Message Publish by Rare User
- AWS S3 Object Versioning Suspended
- AWS SSM `SendCommand` Execution by Rare User
- AWS Lambda Function Policy Updated to Allow Public Invocation