UAC Bypass via Windows Firewall Snap-In Hijack

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2020/10/14"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/09/18"
  6[transform]
  7[[transform.osquery]]
  8label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
  9query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
 10
 11[[transform.osquery]]
 12label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
 13query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
 14
 15[[transform.osquery]]
 16label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
 17query = """
 18SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
 19NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
 20user_account == null)
 21"""
 22
 23[[transform.osquery]]
 24label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
 25query = """
 26SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
 27services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
 28authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
 29"""
 30
 31
 32[rule]
 33author = ["Elastic"]
 34description = """
 35Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by hijacking the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Windows
 36Firewall snap-in. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
 37"""
 38from = "now-9m"
 39index = [
 40    "winlogbeat-*",
 41    "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
 42    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
 43    "endgame-*",
 44    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
 45    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
 46]
 47language = "eql"
 48license = "Elastic License v2"
 49name = "UAC Bypass via Windows Firewall Snap-In Hijack"
 50note = """## Triage and analysis
 51
 52### Investigating UAC Bypass via Windows Firewall Snap-In Hijack
 53
 54Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as low to high integrity levels) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. UAC can deny an operation under high-integrity enforcement, or allow the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and enter an administrator password when prompted.
 55
 56For more information about the UAC and how it works, check the [official Microsoft docs page](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works).
 57
 58This rule identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by hijacking the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Windows Firewall snap-in. Attackers bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
 59
 60> **Note**:
 61> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
 62
 63#### Possible investigation steps
 64
 65- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
 66- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
 67- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
 68- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
 69- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
 70  - Analyze any suspicious spawned processes using a private sandboxed analysis system.
 71  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
 72    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
 73      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
 74      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
 75        - $osquery_0
 76    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
 77    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
 78      - $osquery_1
 79      - $osquery_2
 80      - $osquery_3
 81  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
 82- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
 83
 84### False positive analysis
 85
 86- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
 87
 88### Response and remediation
 89
 90- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
 91- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
 92- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
 93  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
 94  - Stop suspicious processes.
 95  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
 96  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
 97- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
 98- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
 99- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
100- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
101- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
102"""
103
104setup = """## Setup
105
106This rule is designed for data generated by [Elastic Defend](https://www.elastic.co/security/endpoint-security), which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.
107
108Setup instructions: https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend
109
110### Additional data sources
111
112This rule also supports the following third-party data sources. For setup instructions, refer to the links below:
113
114- [Microsoft Defender XDR](https://ela.st/m365-defender)
115- [SentinelOne Cloud Funnel](https://ela.st/sentinel-one-cloud-funnel)
116- [Sysmon Event ID 1 - Process Creation](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-1-setup)
117"""
118
119references = ["https://github.com/AzAgarampur/byeintegrity-uac"]
120risk_score = 47
121rule_id = "1178ae09-5aff-460a-9f2f-455cd0ac4d8e"
122severity = "medium"
123tags = [
124    "Domain: Endpoint",
125    "OS: Windows",
126    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
127    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
128    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
129    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
130    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
131    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
132    "Data Source: Sysmon",
133    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR",
134    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
135    "Noise: Medium",
136    "Performance: Normal",
137    "Profile: Recommended",
138    "Threat: Living off the Land",
139    "Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)",
140    "Platform: Windows",
141    "Resources: Osquery",
142]
143timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
144type = "eql"
145
146query = '''
147process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
148 process.parent.name == "mmc.exe" and
149 /* process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" can be added in future for tuning */
150 /* args of the Windows Firewall SnapIn */
151  process.parent.args == "WF.msc" and process.name != "WerFault.exe"
152'''
153
154
155[[rule.threat]]
156framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
157
158[[rule.threat.technique]]
159id = "T1548"
160name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
161reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
162
163[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
164id = "T1548.002"
165name = "Bypass User Account Control"
166reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
167
168[rule.threat.tactic]
169id = "TA0004"
170name = "Privilege Escalation"
171reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
172
173[[rule.threat]]
174framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
175
176[[rule.threat.technique]]
177id = "T1218"
178name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
179reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
180
181[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
182id = "T1218.014"
183name = "MMC"
184reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014/"
185
186[rule.threat.tactic]
187id = "TA0005"
188name = "Defense Evasion"
189reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"