UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2020/10/19"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2024/05/21"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface. Attackers may attempt
 11to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
 12"""
 13from = "now-9m"
 14index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.process-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*"]
 15language = "eql"
 16license = "Elastic License v2"
 17name = "UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface"
 18risk_score = 73
 19rule_id = "68d56fdc-7ffa-4419-8e95-81641bd6f845"
 20setup = """## Setup
 21
 22If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 23events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 24Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
 25`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
 26For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
 27"""
 28severity = "high"
 29tags = [
 30    "Domain: Endpoint",
 31    "OS: Windows",
 32    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 33    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
 34    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
 35    "Tactic: Execution",
 36    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
 37    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
 38    "Data Source: Sysmon",
 39]
 40timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 41type = "eql"
 42
 43query = '''
 44process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
 45 process.parent.name == "dllhost.exe" and
 46 process.parent.args in ("/Processid:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}", "/Processid:{D2E7041B-2927-42FB-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937}") and
 47 process.pe.original_file_name != "WerFault.exe"
 48'''
 49
 50
 51[[rule.threat]]
 52framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 53[[rule.threat.technique]]
 54id = "T1548"
 55name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
 56reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
 57[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
 58id = "T1548.002"
 59name = "Bypass User Account Control"
 60reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
 61
 62
 63
 64[rule.threat.tactic]
 65id = "TA0004"
 66name = "Privilege Escalation"
 67reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
 68[[rule.threat]]
 69framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 70[[rule.threat.technique]]
 71id = "T1548"
 72name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
 73reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
 74[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
 75id = "T1548.002"
 76name = "Bypass User Account Control"
 77reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
 78
 79
 80
 81[rule.threat.tactic]
 82id = "TA0005"
 83name = "Defense Evasion"
 84reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
 85[[rule.threat]]
 86framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 87[[rule.threat.technique]]
 88id = "T1559"
 89name = "Inter-Process Communication"
 90reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/"
 91[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
 92id = "T1559.001"
 93name = "Component Object Model"
 94reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001/"
 95
 96
 97
 98[rule.threat.tactic]
 99id = "TA0002"
100name = "Execution"
101reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"