UAC Bypass Attempt with IEditionUpgradeManager Elevated COM Interface

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2020/10/28"
 3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
 6min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
 7updated_date = "2024/03/28"
 8
 9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Identifies attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by abusing an elevated COM Interface to launch a rogue Windows
13ClipUp program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
14"""
15from = "now-9m"
16index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.process-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*"]
17language = "eql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "UAC Bypass Attempt with IEditionUpgradeManager Elevated COM Interface"
20references = ["https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"]
21risk_score = 73
22rule_id = "b90cdde7-7e0d-4359-8bf0-2c112ce2008a"
23setup = """## Setup
24
25If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
26events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
27Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
28`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
29For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
30"""
31severity = "high"
32tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation", "Tactic: Defense Evasion", "Tactic: Execution", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend", "Data Source: Sysmon"]
33timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
34type = "eql"
35
36query = '''
37process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "Clipup.exe" and
38  not process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ClipUp.exe" and process.parent.name : "dllhost.exe" and
39  /* CLSID of the Elevated COM Interface IEditionUpgradeManager */
40  process.parent.args : "/Processid:{BD54C901-076B-434E-B6C7-17C531F4AB41}"
41'''
42
43
44[[rule.threat]]
45framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
46[[rule.threat.technique]]
47id = "T1548"
48name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
49reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
50[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
51id = "T1548.002"
52name = "Bypass User Account Control"
53reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
54
55
56
57[rule.threat.tactic]
58id = "TA0004"
59name = "Privilege Escalation"
60reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
61
62[[rule.threat]]
63framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
64[[rule.threat.technique]]
65id = "T1548"
66name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
67reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
68[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
69id = "T1548.002"
70name = "Bypass User Account Control"
71reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
72
73
74
75[rule.threat.tactic]
76id = "TA0005"
77name = "Defense Evasion"
78reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
79
80[[rule.threat]]
81framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
82[[rule.threat.technique]]
83id = "T1559"
84name = "Inter-Process Communication"
85reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/"
86[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
87id = "T1559.001"
88name = "Component Object Model"
89reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001/"
90
91
92
93[rule.threat.tactic]
94id = "TA0002"
95name = "Execution"
96reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"