UAC Bypass Attempt via Elevated COM Internet Explorer Add-On Installer

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2020/11/03"
 3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
 6min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
 7updated_date = "2024/03/28"
 8
 9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by abusing an elevated COM Interface to launch a malicious
13program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
14"""
15from = "now-9m"
16index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.process-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*"]
17language = "eql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "UAC Bypass Attempt via Elevated COM Internet Explorer Add-On Installer"
20references = ["https://swapcontext.blogspot.com/2020/11/uac-bypasses-from-comautoapprovallist.html"]
21risk_score = 47
22rule_id = "fc7c0fa4-8f03-4b3e-8336-c5feab0be022"
23setup = """## Setup
24
25If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
26events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
27Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
28`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
29For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
30"""
31severity = "medium"
32tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation", "Tactic: Defense Evasion", "Tactic: Execution", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend", "Data Source: Sysmon"]
33timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
34type = "eql"
35
36query = '''
37process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
38 process.executable : "C:\\*\\AppData\\*\\Temp\\IDC*.tmp\\*.exe" and
39 process.parent.name : "ieinstal.exe" and process.parent.args : "-Embedding"
40
41 /* uncomment once in winlogbeat */
42 /* and not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Microsoft Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true) */
43'''
44
45
46[[rule.threat]]
47framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
48[[rule.threat.technique]]
49id = "T1548"
50name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
51reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
52[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
53id = "T1548.002"
54name = "Bypass User Account Control"
55reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
56
57
58
59[rule.threat.tactic]
60id = "TA0004"
61name = "Privilege Escalation"
62reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
63
64[[rule.threat]]
65framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
66[[rule.threat.technique]]
67id = "T1548"
68name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
69reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
70[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
71id = "T1548.002"
72name = "Bypass User Account Control"
73reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
74
75
76
77[rule.threat.tactic]
78id = "TA0005"
79name = "Defense Evasion"
80reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
81
82[[rule.threat]]
83framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
84[[rule.threat.technique]]
85id = "T1559"
86name = "Inter-Process Communication"
87reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/"
88[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
89id = "T1559.001"
90name = "Component Object Model"
91reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001/"
92
93
94
95[rule.threat.tactic]
96id = "TA0002"
97name = "Execution"
98reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"