Entra ID Device Registration with ROADtools Default OS Build

Identifies a Microsoft Entra ID device registration where the recorded cloud device operating system build is "10.0.19041.928" and the device display name follows the default "DESKTOP-" pattern. This combination is the default device profile that ROADtools (roadtx) uses when registering a device, and it is uncommon for the OS build to match the hardcoded value across an environment of otherwise patched hosts. Adversaries register rogue devices in Entra ID to acquire a Primary Refresh Token (PRT), establish persistence, and obtain trusted, programmatic access to the tenant. Because the OS build is a tool default, this is a high-fidelity but evadable indicator; baseline approved provisioning tooling and device naming conventions before relying on it. This rule also flags a device registration via Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) whose user agent carries the ROADtools hardcoded Dsreg build "10.0.19044.1826" ("Dsreg/10.0 (Windows 10.0.19044.1826)"), which is a separate tool tell from the device OS build and survives a change to the registered OS version or device name.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2026/05/26"
  3integration = ["azure"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/11/17"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10Identifies a Microsoft Entra ID device registration where the recorded cloud device operating system build is
 11"10.0.19041.928" and the device display name follows the default "DESKTOP-" pattern. This combination is the default
 12device profile that ROADtools (roadtx) uses when registering a device, and it is uncommon for the OS build to match the
 13hardcoded value across an environment of otherwise patched hosts. Adversaries register rogue devices in Entra ID to
 14acquire a Primary Refresh Token (PRT), establish persistence, and obtain trusted, programmatic access to the tenant.
 15Because the OS build is a tool default, this is a high-fidelity but evadable indicator; baseline approved provisioning
 16tooling and device naming conventions before relying on it. This rule also flags a device registration via Windows Hello
 17for Business (WHfB) whose user agent carries the ROADtools hardcoded Dsreg build "10.0.19044.1826" ("Dsreg/10.0 (Windows
 1810.0.19044.1826)"), which is a separate tool tell from the device OS build and survives a change to the registered OS
 19version or device name.
 20"""
 21false_positives = [
 22    """
 23    Legitimate device registrations may coincidentally use the `10.0.19041.928` build (Windows 10 20H1) with a default
 24    `DESKTOP-` hostname, particularly on imaged or unmanaged Windows hosts that have not been updated. Validate against
 25    your device inventory, expected provisioning workflows, and the registering user before escalating.
 26    """,
 27    """
 28    Authorized red team or penetration testing engagements that use ROADtools to register devices will match this rule.
 29    If this is expected, add exceptions for the specific user principal names, source IPs, or device names involved.
 30    """,
 31    """
 32    A genuine native Windows device-registration client (Dsreg) running on a host that is actually on build
 33    `10.0.19044.1826` (Windows 10 21H2) will present the same user agent. Validate the host's real build and the
 34    registration source; the hardcoded `10.0.19044.1826` value repeating across registrations is the tool tell.
 35    """,
 36]
 37from = "now-9m"
 38index = ["logs-azure.auditlogs-*"]
 39language = "kuery"
 40license = "Elastic License v2"
 41name = "Entra ID Device Registration with ROADtools Default OS Build"
 42note = """## Triage and analysis
 43
 44### Investigating Entra ID Device Registration with ROADtools Default OS Build
 45
 46ROADtools (roadtx) registers a device in Entra ID with a default cloud device OS build of `10.0.19041.928` and a default
 47display name of `DESKTOP-<8 random characters>`. This OS build is the current default value roadtx uses and
 48differs from the OS version of legitimate hosts, making the build a useful indicator of ROADtools device registration.
 49Rogue device registration is typically a precursor to Primary Refresh Token (PRT) acquisition, MFA/Conditional Access
 50bypass, and persistent token-based access.
 51
 52The matching Entra ID audit event is an `Add device` operation initiated by the `Device Registration Service`, where the
 53modified properties record the registered device characteristics:
 54
 55- `azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.0.modified_properties.3` (`CloudDeviceOSVersion`) = `10.0.19041.928`
 56- `azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.0.modified_properties.4` (`CloudDisplayName`) = `DESKTOP-*`
 57
 58### Possible investigation steps
 59
 60- Confirm the registering identity via `azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.user.userPrincipalName` and determine
 61whether that user is expected to register a new device.
 62- Review `azure.auditlogs.identity` to confirm the `Device Registration Service` initiated the request, and use
 63`azure.correlation_id` to pivot across the full registration flow (`Add device`, `Add registered users to device`,
 64`Add registered owner to device`).
 65- Inspect the device name in `azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.0.display_name`; default `DESKTOP-` names that
 66do not match your naming convention are suspicious.
 67- Pivot to `azure.signinlogs` for the same user and timeframe and look for follow-on sign-ins where the incoming token
 68type is a `primaryRefreshToken`, or for risky/AiTM sign-ins immediately preceding the registration.
 69- Review `azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.user.ipAddress` and geolocation for the registration source. Flag
 70unexpected IPs, hosting/VPS ASNs, or impossible-travel relative to the user's normal activity.
 71- Correlate with the user-agent-based device registration rules (e.g., `Dsreg/*`, `DeviceRegistrationClient`,
 72`Microsoft.OData.Client/*`) for the same user or correlation ID to strengthen attribution to ROADtools.
 73
 74### False positive analysis
 75
 76- Unmanaged or imaged Windows 10 20H1 hosts may legitimately present the `10.0.19041.928` build with a default
 77`DESKTOP-` hostname. Validate against device inventory and known provisioning programs.
 78- Authorized security assessments using ROADtools will match. Document the engagement and add scoped exceptions.
 79
 80### Response and remediation
 81
 82- If confirmed malicious, remove the registered device from Entra ID and revoke the user's refresh tokens and primary
 83refresh tokens.
 84- Disable the account or reset credentials per policy and review for additional persistence (added owners, app
 85registrations, or service principal credentials).
 86- Conduct historical analysis using `azure.correlation_id` and the registering user to determine scope of access.
 87- Tighten device registration and join controls via Conditional Access (restrict who can register/join devices and
 88require MFA for registration).
 89"""
 90references = [
 91    "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/roadtools-cloud-attacks/",
 92    "https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools",
 93    "https://dirkjanm.io/introducing-roadtools-token-exchange-roadtx/",
 94]
 95risk_score = 73
 96rule_id = "db1271cd-f574-4173-b4e5-7369f3c03d44"
 97severity = "high"
 98tags = [
 99    "Domain: Cloud",
100    "Domain: Identity",
101    "Data Source: Azure",
102    "Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID",
103    "Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit Logs",
104    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
105    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
106    "Tactic: Persistence",
107    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
108    "Noise: Unknown",
109    "Performance: Normal",
110    "Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL)",
111    "Platform: Entra ID",
112]
113timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
114type = "query"
115
116query = '''
117data_stream.dataset:"azure.auditlogs" and 
118(
119   (
120    event.action:"Add device" and
121    azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.0.modified_properties.3.new_value:*10.0.19041.928* and
122    azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.0.modified_properties.4.new_value:*DESKTOP-*
123   ) or ( 
124    event.action: "Add Windows Hello for Business credential" and
125    azure.auditlogs.properties.userAgent: "Dsreg/10.0 (Windows 10.0.19044.1826)"
126 )
127)
128'''
129
130
131[[rule.threat]]
132framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
133[[rule.threat.technique]]
134id = "T1098"
135name = "Account Manipulation"
136reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
137[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
138id = "T1098.005"
139name = "Device Registration"
140reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/"
141
142
143
144[rule.threat.tactic]
145id = "TA0003"
146name = "Persistence"
147reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
148
149[rule.investigation_fields]
150field_names = [
151    "@timestamp",
152    "event.action",
153    "event.outcome",
154    "azure.auditlogs.identity",
155    "azure.auditlogs.operation_name",
156    "azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.0.display_name",
157    "azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.0.modified_properties.3.new_value",
158    "azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.0.modified_properties.4.new_value",
159    "azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.user.userPrincipalName",
160    "azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.user.ipAddress",
161    "azure.auditlogs.properties.userAgent",
162    "azure.correlation_id",
163]

Triage and analysis

Investigating Entra ID Device Registration with ROADtools Default OS Build

ROADtools (roadtx) registers a device in Entra ID with a default cloud device OS build of 10.0.19041.928 and a default display name of DESKTOP-<8 random characters>. This OS build is the current default value roadtx uses and differs from the OS version of legitimate hosts, making the build a useful indicator of ROADtools device registration. Rogue device registration is typically a precursor to Primary Refresh Token (PRT) acquisition, MFA/Conditional Access bypass, and persistent token-based access.

The matching Entra ID audit event is an Add device operation initiated by the Device Registration Service, where the modified properties record the registered device characteristics:

  • azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.0.modified_properties.3 (CloudDeviceOSVersion) = 10.0.19041.928
  • azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.0.modified_properties.4 (CloudDisplayName) = DESKTOP-*

Possible investigation steps

  • Confirm the registering identity via azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.user.userPrincipalName and determine whether that user is expected to register a new device.
  • Review azure.auditlogs.identity to confirm the Device Registration Service initiated the request, and use azure.correlation_id to pivot across the full registration flow (Add device, Add registered users to device, Add registered owner to device).
  • Inspect the device name in azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.0.display_name; default DESKTOP- names that do not match your naming convention are suspicious.
  • Pivot to azure.signinlogs for the same user and timeframe and look for follow-on sign-ins where the incoming token type is a primaryRefreshToken, or for risky/AiTM sign-ins immediately preceding the registration.
  • Review azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.user.ipAddress and geolocation for the registration source. Flag unexpected IPs, hosting/VPS ASNs, or impossible-travel relative to the user's normal activity.
  • Correlate with the user-agent-based device registration rules (e.g., Dsreg/*, DeviceRegistrationClient, Microsoft.OData.Client/*) for the same user or correlation ID to strengthen attribution to ROADtools.

False positive analysis

  • Unmanaged or imaged Windows 10 20H1 hosts may legitimately present the 10.0.19041.928 build with a default DESKTOP- hostname. Validate against device inventory and known provisioning programs.
  • Authorized security assessments using ROADtools will match. Document the engagement and add scoped exceptions.

Response and remediation

  • If confirmed malicious, remove the registered device from Entra ID and revoke the user's refresh tokens and primary refresh tokens.
  • Disable the account or reset credentials per policy and review for additional persistence (added owners, app registrations, or service principal credentials).
  • Conduct historical analysis using azure.correlation_id and the registering user to determine scope of access.
  • Tighten device registration and join controls via Conditional Access (restrict who can register/join devices and require MFA for registration).

References

Related rules

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