-
Detects rare non-interactive sign-ins where an Entra ID client application authenticates on behalf of a principal user using an application (client) ID that is not commonly associated with that user’s historical sign-in behavior. Adversaries with stolen credentials or OAuth tokens may abuse Entra ID–managed or first-party client IDs to perform on-behalf-of (OBO) authentication, blending into legitimate cloud traffic while avoiding traditional interactive sign-in flows. This technique is commonly observed in OAuth phishing, token theft, and access broker operations, and may precede lateral movement, persistence, or data access via Microsoft Graph or other cloud resources. The rule uses a New Terms approach to identify first-seen combinations of the UPN and Client ID within a defined history window, helping surface unexpected client usage that may indicate compromised identities, malicious automation, or unauthorized application impersonation.
Read More -
Identifies concurrent azure signin events for the same user and from multiple sources, and where one of the authentication event has some suspicious properties often associated to DeviceCode and OAuth phishing. Adversaries may steal Refresh Tokens (RTs) via phishing to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) and gain unauthorized access to Azure resources.
Read More -
Identifies a high count of failed Microsoft Entra ID sign-in attempts as the result of the target user account being locked out. Adversaries may attempt to brute-force user accounts by repeatedly trying to authenticate with incorrect credentials, leading to account lockouts by Entra ID Smart Lockout policies.
Read More -
Identifies brute force attempts against Azure Entra multi-factor authentication (MFA) Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) verification codes. This rule detects high frequency failed TOTP code attempts for a single user in a short time-span with a high number of distinct session IDs. Adversaries may programmatically attemopt to brute-force TOTP codes by generating several sessions and attempt to guess the correct code.
Read More -
Identifies concurrent Entra ID sign-in events for the same user and session from multiple sources, and where one of the authentication event has some suspicious properties often associated to DeviceCode and OAuth phishing. Adversaries may steal Refresh Tokens (RTs) via phishing to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) and gain unauthorized access to Azure resources.
Read More -
Identifies separate OAuth authorization flows in Microsoft Entra ID where the same user principal and session ID are observed across multiple IP addresses within a 5-minute window. These flows involve the Microsoft Authentication Broker (MAB) as the client application and the Device Registration Service (DRS) as the target resource. This pattern is highly indicative of OAuth phishing activity, where an adversary crafts a legitimate Microsoft login URL to trick a user into completing authentication and sharing the resulting authorization code, which is then exchanged for an access and refresh token by the attacker.
Read More -
Identifies potential brute-force attacks targeting Microsoft 365 user accounts by analyzing failed sign-in patterns in Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs. This detection focuses on a high volume of failed interactive or non-interactive authentication attempts within a short time window, often indicative of password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing. Adversaries may use these techniques to gain unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 services such as Exchange Online, SharePoint, or Teams.
Read More -
Identifies potential brute-force attacks targeting user accounts by analyzing failed sign-in patterns in Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs. This detection focuses on a high volume of failed interactive or non-interactive authentication attempts within a short time window, often indicative of password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing. Adversaries may use these techniques to gain unauthorized access to applications integrated with Entra ID or to compromise valid user accounts.
Read More -
M365 or Entra ID Identity Sign-in from a Suspicious Source
Dec 10, 2025 · Domain: Cloud Domain: SaaS Data Source: Azure Data Source: Entra ID Data Source: Entra ID Sign-in Logs Data Source: Microsoft 365 Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Initial Access Resources: Investigation Guide Rule Type: Higher-Order Rule ·This rule correlate Entra-ID or Microsoft 365 mail successful sign-in events with network security alerts by source address. Adversaries may trigger some network security alerts such as reputation or other anomalies before accessing cloud resources.
Read More -
Identifies potential abuse of actor tokens in Microsoft Entra ID audit logs. Actor tokens are undocumented backend mechanisms used by Microsoft for service-to-service (S2S) operations, allowing services to perform actions on behalf of users. These tokens appear in logs with the service's display name but the impersonated user's UPN. While some legitimate Microsoft operations use actor tokens, unexpected usage may indicate exploitation of CVE-2025-55241, which allowed unauthorized access to Azure AD Graph API across tenants before being patched by Microsoft.
Read More -
Identifies when an administrator has manually confirmed a user or sign-in as compromised in Microsoft Entra ID Protection. This indicates that an administrator has reviewed the risk detection and determined that the user account or sign-in activity is definitively compromised. This is a high-confidence indicator of account compromise and should be investigated immediately.
Read More -
Identifies sign-in risk detection events via Microsofts Entra ID Protection service. Entra ID Protection detects sign-in activity such as anonymized IP addresses, unlikely travel, password spray, and more.
Read More -
Identifies user risk detection events via Microsofts Entra ID Protection service. Entra ID Protection detects user risk activity such as anonymized IP addresses, unlikely travel, password spray, and more.
Read More -
Identifies potential brute-force attempts against Microsoft 365 user accounts by detecting a high number of failed interactive or non-interactive login attempts within a 30-minute window from a single source. Attackers may attempt to brute force user accounts to gain unauthorized access to Microsoft 365 services via different services such as Exchange, SharePoint, or Teams.
Read More