Entra ID User Sign-in Brute Force Attempted
Identifies potential brute-force attacks targeting user accounts by analyzing failed sign-in patterns in Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs. This detection focuses on a high volume of failed interactive or non-interactive authentication attempts within a short time window, often indicative of password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing. Adversaries may use these techniques to gain unauthorized access to applications integrated with Entra ID or to compromise valid user accounts.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2024/09/06"
3integration = ["azure"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/09/18"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Identifies potential brute-force attacks targeting user accounts by analyzing failed sign-in patterns in Microsoft Entra
11ID Sign-In Logs. This detection focuses on a high volume of failed interactive or non-interactive authentication
12attempts within a short time window, often indicative of password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing.
13Adversaries may use these techniques to gain unauthorized access to applications integrated with Entra ID or to
14compromise valid user accounts.
15"""
16false_positives = [
17 """
18 Automated processes that attempt to authenticate using expired credentials or have misconfigured authentication
19 settings may lead to false positives.
20 """,
21]
22from = "now-60m"
23interval = "15m"
24language = "esql"
25license = "Elastic License v2"
26name = "Entra ID User Sign-in Brute Force Attempted"
27note = """## Triage and analysis
28
29### Investigating Entra ID User Sign-in Brute Force Attempted
30
31This rule detects brute-force authentication activity in Entra ID sign-in logs. It classifies failed sign-in attempts into behavior types such as password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing. The classification (`bf_type`) helps prioritize triage and incident response.
32
33### Possible investigation steps
34
35- Review `bf_type`: Determines the brute-force technique being used (`password_spraying`, `credential_stuffing`, or `password_guessing`).
36- Examine `user_id_list`: Identify if high-value accounts (e.g., administrators, service principals, federated identities) are being targeted.
37- Review `login_errors`: Repetitive error types like `"Invalid Grant"` or `"User Not Found"` suggest automated attacks.
38- Check `ip_list` and `source_orgs`: Investigate if the activity originates from suspicious infrastructure (VPNs, hosting providers, etc.).
39- Validate `unique_ips` and `countries`: Geographic diversity and IP volume may indicate distributed or botnet-based attacks.
40- Compare `total_attempts` vs `duration_seconds`: High rate of failures in a short time period implies automation.
41- Analyze `user_agent.original` and `device_detail_browser`: User agents like `curl`, `Python`, or generic libraries may indicate scripting tools.
42- Investigate `client_app_display_name` and `incoming_token_type`: Detect potential abuse of legacy or unattended login mechanisms.
43- Inspect `target_resource_display_name`: Understand what application or resource the attacker is trying to access.
44- Pivot using `session_id` and `device_detail_device_id`: Determine if a device is targeting multiple accounts.
45- Review `conditional_access_status`: If not enforced, ensure Conditional Access policies are scoped correctly.
46
47### False positive analysis
48
49- Legitimate automation (e.g., misconfigured scripts, sync processes) can trigger repeated failures.
50- Internal red team activity or penetration tests may mimic brute-force behaviors.
51- Certain service accounts or mobile clients may generate repetitive sign-in noise if not properly configured.
52
53### Response and remediation
54
55- Notify your identity security team for further analysis.
56- Investigate and lock or reset impacted accounts if compromise is suspected.
57- Block offending IPs or ASNs at the firewall, proxy, or using Conditional Access.
58- Confirm MFA and Conditional Access are enforced for all user types.
59- Audit targeted accounts for credential reuse across services.
60- Implement account lockout or throttling for failed sign-in attempts where possible.
61"""
62references = [
63 "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/attackers-unleash-teamfiltration-account-takeover-campaign",
64 "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/05/27/new-russia-affiliated-actor-void-blizzard-targets-critical-sectors-for-espionage/",
65 "https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-unauthenticated-enum-and-initial-entry/az-password-spraying",
66 "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/operations/incident-response-playbook-password-spray",
67 "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-detailed-properties",
68 "https://securityscorecard.com/research/massive-botnet-targets-m365-with-stealthy-password-spraying-attacks/",
69 "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/reference-error-codes",
70 "https://github.com/0xZDH/Omnispray",
71 "https://github.com/0xZDH/o365spray",
72]
73risk_score = 47
74rule_id = "cca64114-fb8b-11ef-86e2-f661ea17fbce"
75severity = "medium"
76tags = [
77 "Domain: Cloud",
78 "Domain: Identity",
79 "Data Source: Azure",
80 "Data Source: Entra ID",
81 "Data Source: Entra ID Sign-In Logs",
82 "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
83 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
84 "Tactic: Credential Access",
85 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
86 "Noise: Medium",
87 "Performance: Normal",
88 "Profile: Recommended",
89 "Threat: Brute Force",
90 "Rule Type: ES|QL",
91 "Platform: Entra ID",
92]
93timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
94type = "esql"
95
96query = '''
97from logs-azure.signinlogs-*
98
99// Define a time window for grouping and maintain the original event timestamp
100| eval Esql.time_window_date_trunc = date_trunc(15 minutes, @timestamp)
101
102// Filter relevant failed authentication events with specific error codes
103| where data_stream.dataset == "azure.signinlogs"
104 and event.category == "authentication"
105 and azure.signinlogs.category in ("NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs", "SignInLogs")
106 and event.outcome == "failure"
107 and azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_requirement == "singleFactorAuthentication"
108 and azure.signinlogs.properties.status.error_code in (
109 50034, // UserAccountNotFound
110 50126, // InvalidUsernameOrPassword
111 50055, // PasswordExpired
112 50056, // InvalidPassword
113 50057, // UserDisabled
114 50064, // CredentialValidationFailure
115 50076, // MFARequiredButNotPassed
116 50079, // MFARegistrationRequired
117 50105, // EntitlementGrantsNotFound
118 70000, // InvalidGrant
119 70008, // ExpiredOrRevokedRefreshToken
120 70043, // BadTokenDueToSignInFrequency
121 80002, // OnPremisePasswordValidatorRequestTimedOut
122 80005, // OnPremisePasswordValidatorUnpredictableWebException
123 50144, // InvalidPasswordExpiredOnPremPassword
124 50135, // PasswordChangeCompromisedPassword
125 50142, // PasswordChangeRequiredConditionalAccess
126 120000, // PasswordChangeIncorrectCurrentPassword
127 120002, // PasswordChangeInvalidNewPasswordWeak
128 120020 // PasswordChangeFailure
129 )
130 and azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name is not null and azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name != ""
131 and user_agent.original != "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSAL 1.0) PKeyAuth/1.0"
132 and source.`as`.organization.name != "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-as-BLOCK"
133
134| stats
135 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_authentication_requirement_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_requirement),
136 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_id_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.app_id),
137 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_display_name_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name),
138 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_resource_id_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_id),
139 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_resource_display_name_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name),
140 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_conditional_access_status_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.conditional_access_status),
141 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_device_detail_browser_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.browser),
142 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_device_detail_device_id_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.device_id),
143 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_device_detail_operating_system_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.operating_system),
144 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_incoming_token_type_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.incoming_token_type),
145 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_risk_state_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.risk_state),
146 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_session_id_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id),
147 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.user_id),
148 Esql_priv.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_principal_name_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name),
149 Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_values = values(azure.signinlogs.result_description),
150 Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_signature_values = values(azure.signinlogs.result_signature),
151 Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_type_values = values(azure.signinlogs.result_type),
152
153 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_count_distinct = count_distinct(azure.signinlogs.properties.user_id),
154 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_list = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.user_id),
155 Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_values_all = values(azure.signinlogs.result_description),
156 Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_count_distinct = count_distinct(azure.signinlogs.result_description),
157 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_status_error_code_values = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.status.error_code),
158 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_status_error_code_count_distinct = count_distinct(azure.signinlogs.properties.status.error_code),
159 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_incoming_token_type_values_all = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.incoming_token_type),
160 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_display_name_values_all = values(azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name),
161 Esql.source_ip_values = values(source.ip),
162 Esql.source_ip_count_distinct = count_distinct(source.ip),
163 Esql.source_as_organization_name_values = values(source.`as`.organization.name),
164 Esql.source_geo_country_name_values = values(source.geo.country_name),
165 Esql.source_geo_country_name_count_distinct = count_distinct(source.geo.country_name),
166 Esql.source_as_organization_name_count_distinct = count_distinct(source.`as`.organization.name),
167 Esql.timestamp_first_seen = min(@timestamp),
168 Esql.timestamp_last_seen = max(@timestamp),
169 Esql.event_count = count()
170by Esql.time_window_date_trunc
171
172| eval
173 Esql.duration_seconds = date_diff("seconds", Esql.timestamp_first_seen, Esql.timestamp_last_seen),
174 Esql.brute_force_type = case(
175 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_count_distinct >= 10 and Esql.event_count >= 30 and Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_count_distinct <= 3
176 and Esql.source_ip_count_distinct >= 5
177 and Esql.duration_seconds <= 600
178 and Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_count_distinct > Esql.source_ip_count_distinct,
179 "credential_stuffing",
180
181 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_count_distinct >= 15 and Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_count_distinct == 1 and Esql.event_count >= 15 and Esql.duration_seconds <= 1800,
182 "password_spraying",
183
184 (Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_count_distinct == 1 and Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_count_distinct == 1 and Esql.event_count >= 30 and Esql.duration_seconds <= 300)
185 or (Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_count_distinct <= 3 and Esql.source_ip_count_distinct > 30 and Esql.event_count >= 100),
186 "password_guessing",
187
188 "other"
189 )
190
191| keep
192 Esql.time_window_date_trunc,
193 Esql.brute_force_type,
194 Esql.duration_seconds,
195 Esql.event_count,
196 Esql.timestamp_first_seen,
197 Esql.timestamp_last_seen,
198 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_count_distinct,
199 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_list,
200 Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_values_all,
201 Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_count_distinct,
202 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_status_error_code_count_distinct,
203 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_status_error_code_values,
204 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_incoming_token_type_values_all,
205 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_display_name_values_all,
206 Esql.source_ip_values,
207 Esql.source_ip_count_distinct,
208 Esql.source_as_organization_name_values,
209 Esql.source_geo_country_name_values,
210 Esql.source_geo_country_name_count_distinct,
211 Esql.source_as_organization_name_count_distinct,
212 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_authentication_requirement_values,
213 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_id_values,
214 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_app_display_name_values,
215 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_resource_id_values,
216 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_resource_display_name_values,
217 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_conditional_access_status_values,
218 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_device_detail_browser_values,
219 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_device_detail_device_id_values,
220 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_device_detail_operating_system_values,
221 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_incoming_token_type_values,
222 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_risk_state_values,
223 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_session_id_values,
224 Esql.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_id_values,
225 Esql_priv.azure_signinlogs_properties_user_principal_name_values,
226 Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_description_values,
227 Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_signature_values,
228 Esql.azure_signinlogs_result_type_values
229
230| where Esql.brute_force_type != "other"
231'''
232
233
234[[rule.threat]]
235framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
236[[rule.threat.technique]]
237id = "T1110"
238name = "Brute Force"
239reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"
240[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
241id = "T1110.001"
242name = "Password Guessing"
243reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/"
244
245[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
246id = "T1110.003"
247name = "Password Spraying"
248reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/"
249
250[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
251id = "T1110.004"
252name = "Credential Stuffing"
253reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004/"
254
255
256
257[rule.threat.tactic]
258id = "TA0006"
259name = "Credential Access"
260reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating Entra ID User Sign-in Brute Force Attempted
This rule detects brute-force authentication activity in Entra ID sign-in logs. It classifies failed sign-in attempts into behavior types such as password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing. The classification (bf_type) helps prioritize triage and incident response.
Possible investigation steps
- Review
bf_type: Determines the brute-force technique being used (password_spraying,credential_stuffing, orpassword_guessing). - Examine
user_id_list: Identify if high-value accounts (e.g., administrators, service principals, federated identities) are being targeted. - Review
login_errors: Repetitive error types like"Invalid Grant"or"User Not Found"suggest automated attacks. - Check
ip_listandsource_orgs: Investigate if the activity originates from suspicious infrastructure (VPNs, hosting providers, etc.). - Validate
unique_ipsandcountries: Geographic diversity and IP volume may indicate distributed or botnet-based attacks. - Compare
total_attemptsvsduration_seconds: High rate of failures in a short time period implies automation. - Analyze
user_agent.originalanddevice_detail_browser: User agents likecurl,Python, or generic libraries may indicate scripting tools. - Investigate
client_app_display_nameandincoming_token_type: Detect potential abuse of legacy or unattended login mechanisms. - Inspect
target_resource_display_name: Understand what application or resource the attacker is trying to access. - Pivot using
session_idanddevice_detail_device_id: Determine if a device is targeting multiple accounts. - Review
conditional_access_status: If not enforced, ensure Conditional Access policies are scoped correctly.
False positive analysis
- Legitimate automation (e.g., misconfigured scripts, sync processes) can trigger repeated failures.
- Internal red team activity or penetration tests may mimic brute-force behaviors.
- Certain service accounts or mobile clients may generate repetitive sign-in noise if not properly configured.
Response and remediation
- Notify your identity security team for further analysis.
- Investigate and lock or reset impacted accounts if compromise is suspected.
- Block offending IPs or ASNs at the firewall, proxy, or using Conditional Access.
- Confirm MFA and Conditional Access are enforced for all user types.
- Audit targeted accounts for credential reuse across services.
- Implement account lockout or throttling for failed sign-in attempts where possible.
References
Related rules
- Entra ID MFA TOTP Brute Force Attempted
- Entra ID OAuth Device Code Flow with Concurrent Sign-ins
- Entra ID Sign-in Brute Force Attempted (Microsoft 365)
- Entra ID OAuth Flow by Microsoft Authentication Broker to Device Registration Service (DRS)
- M365 or Entra ID Identity Sign-in from a Suspicious Source