Potential Privilege Escalation via Service ImagePath Modification

Identifies registry modifications to default services that could enable privilege escalation to SYSTEM. Attackers with privileges from groups like Server Operators may change the ImagePath of services to executables under their control or to execute commands.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2024/06/05"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2024/10/15"
  6min_stack_version = "8.14.0"
  7min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.14.0 for the Windows Integration."
  8
  9[rule]
 10author = ["Elastic"]
 11description = """
 12Identifies registry modifications to default services that could enable privilege escalation to SYSTEM. Attackers with
 13privileges from groups like Server Operators may change the ImagePath of services to executables under their control or
 14to execute commands.
 15"""
 16from = "now-9m"
 17index = ["logs-endpoint.events.registry-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "winlogbeat-*"]
 18language = "eql"
 19license = "Elastic License v2"
 20name = "Potential Privilege Escalation via Service ImagePath Modification"
 21references = [
 22    "https://cube0x0.github.io/Pocing-Beyond-DA/"
 23]
 24risk_score = 47
 25rule_id = "b66b7e2b-d50a-49b9-a6fc-3a383baedc6b"
 26severity = "medium"
 27tags = [
 28    "Domain: Endpoint",
 29    "OS: Windows",
 30    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 31    "Tactic: Execution",
 32    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
 33    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
 34    "Data Source: Sysmon"
 35]
 36timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 37type = "eql"
 38
 39query = '''
 40registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and process.executable != null and 
 41  event.action == "modification" and registry.value == "ImagePath" and
 42  registry.key : (
 43    "*\\ADWS", "*\\AppHostSvc", "*\\AppReadiness", "*\\AudioEndpointBuilder", "*\\AxInstSV", "*\\camsvc", "*\\CertSvc",
 44    "*\\COMSysApp", "*\\CscService", "*\\defragsvc", "*\\DeviceAssociationService", "*\\DeviceInstall", "*\\DevQueryBroker",
 45    "*\\Dfs", "*\\DFSR", "*\\diagnosticshub.standardcollector.service", "*\\DiagTrack", "*\\DmEnrollmentSvc", "*\\DNS",
 46    "*\\dot3svc", "*\\Eaphost", "*\\GraphicsPerfSvc", "*\\hidserv", "*\\HvHost", "*\\IISADMIN", "*\\IKEEXT",
 47    "*\\InstallService", "*\\iphlpsvc", "*\\IsmServ", "*\\LanmanServer", "*\\MSiSCSI", "*\\NcbService", "*\\Netlogon",
 48    "*\\Netman", "*\\NtFrs", "*\\PlugPlay", "*\\Power", "*\\PrintNotify", "*\\ProfSvc", "*\\PushToInstall", "*\\RSoPProv",
 49    "*\\sacsvr", "*\\SENS", "*\\SensorDataService", "*\\SgrmBroker", "*\\ShellHWDetection", "*\\shpamsvc", "*\\StorSvc",
 50    "*\\svsvc", "*\\swprv", "*\\SysMain", "*\\Themes", "*\\TieringEngineService", "*\\TokenBroker", "*\\TrkWks",
 51    "*\\UALSVC", "*\\UserManager", "*\\vm3dservice", "*\\vmicguestinterface", "*\\vmicheartbeat", "*\\vmickvpexchange",
 52    "*\\vmicrdv", "*\\vmicshutdown", "*\\vmicvmsession", "*\\vmicvss", "*\\vmvss", "*\\VSS", "*\\w3logsvc", "*\\W3SVC",
 53    "*\\WalletService", "*\\WAS", "*\\wercplsupport", "*\\WerSvc", "*\\Winmgmt", "*\\wisvc", "*\\wmiApSrv",
 54    "*\\WPDBusEnum", "*\\WSearch"
 55  ) and
 56  not (
 57    registry.data.strings : (
 58        "?:\\Windows\\system32\\*.exe",
 59        "%systemroot%\\system32\\*.exe",
 60        "%windir%\\system32\\*.exe",
 61        "%SystemRoot%\\system32\\svchost.exe -k *",
 62        "%windir%\\system32\\svchost.exe -k *"
 63    ) and
 64        not registry.data.strings : (
 65            "*\\cmd.exe",
 66            "*\\cscript.exe",
 67            "*\\ieexec.exe",
 68            "*\\iexpress.exe",
 69            "*\\installutil.exe",
 70            "*\\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe",
 71            "*\\msbuild.exe",
 72            "*\\mshta.exe",
 73            "*\\msiexec.exe",
 74            "*\\msxsl.exe",
 75            "*\\net.exe",
 76            "*\\powershell.exe",
 77            "*\\pwsh.exe",
 78            "*\\reg.exe",
 79            "*\\RegAsm.exe",
 80            "*\\RegSvcs.exe",
 81            "*\\regsvr32.exe",
 82            "*\\rundll32.exe",
 83            "*\\vssadmin.exe",
 84            "*\\wbadmin.exe",
 85            "*\\wmic.exe",
 86            "*\\wscript.exe"
 87        )
 88  )
 89'''
 90
 91
 92[[rule.threat]]
 93framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 94[[rule.threat.technique]]
 95id = "T1543"
 96name = "Create or Modify System Process"
 97reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
 98[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
 99id = "T1543.003"
100name = "Windows Service"
101reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"
102
103[[rule.threat.technique]]
104id = "T1574"
105name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
106reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
107[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
108id = "T1574.011"
109name = "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"
110reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011/"
111
112
113
114[rule.threat.tactic]
115id = "TA0004"
116name = "Privilege Escalation"
117reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
118
119
120
121[[rule.threat]]
122framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
123[[rule.threat.technique]]
124id = "T1569"
125name = "System Services"
126reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/"
127[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
128id = "T1569.002"
129name = "Service Execution"
130reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002/"
131
132
133
134[rule.threat.tactic]
135id = "TA0002"
136name = "Execution"
137reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"

References

Related rules

to-top