Unusual File Modification by dns.exe

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2020/07/16"
 3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
 6min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
 7updated_date = "2023/10/23"
 8
 9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Identifies an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe, the process responsible for Windows DNS Server services, which
13may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation.
14"""
15from = "now-9m"
16index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
17language = "eql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "Unusual File Modification by dns.exe"
20note = """## Triage and analysis
21
22### Investigating Unusual File Write
23Detection alerts from this rule indicate potential unusual/abnormal file writes from the DNS Server service process (`dns.exe`) after exploitation from CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed) has occurred. Here are some possible avenues of investigation:
24- Post-exploitation, adversaries may write additional files or payloads to the system as additional discovery/exploitation/persistence mechanisms.
25- Any suspicious or abnormal files written from `dns.exe` should be reviewed and investigated with care.
26
27"""
28references = [
29    "https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/",
30    "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/07/14/july-2020-security-update-cve-2020-1350-vulnerability-in-windows-domain-name-system-dns-server/",
31    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detection-rules-for-sigred-vulnerability",
32]
33risk_score = 73
34rule_id = "c7ce36c0-32ff-4f9a-bfc2-dcb242bf99f9"
35setup="""
36
37If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
38events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
39Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
40`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
41For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
42"""
43severity = "high"
44tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Lateral Movement", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Use Case: Vulnerability", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
45timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
46type = "eql"
47
48query = '''
49file where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "dns.exe" and event.type in ("creation", "deletion", "change") and
50  not file.name : "dns.log" and not
51  (file.extension : ("old", "temp", "bak", "dns", "arpa") and file.path : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\dns\\*")
52'''
53
54
55[[rule.threat]]
56framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
57[[rule.threat.technique]]
58id = "T1210"
59name = "Exploitation of Remote Services"
60reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/"
61
62
63[rule.threat.tactic]
64id = "TA0008"
65name = "Lateral Movement"
66reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"