Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2021/07/19"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2024/05/21"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic", "Austin Songer"]
  9description = """
 10Identifies the use of the Win32_ShadowCopy class and related cmdlets to achieve shadow copy deletion. This commonly
 11occurs in tandem with ransomware or other destructive attacks.
 12"""
 13from = "now-9m"
 14index = [
 15    "winlogbeat-*",
 16    "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
 17    "logs-windows.*",
 18    "endgame-*",
 19    "logs-system.security*",
 20]
 21language = "eql"
 22license = "Elastic License v2"
 23name = "Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell"
 24note = """## Triage and analysis
 25
 26### Investigating Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell
 27
 28The Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) is a Windows feature that enables system administrators to take snapshots of volumes that can later be restored or mounted to recover specific files or folders.
 29
 30A typical step in the playbook of an attacker attempting to deploy ransomware is to delete Volume Shadow Copies to ensure that victims have no alternative to paying the ransom, making any action that deletes shadow copies worth monitoring.
 31
 32This rule monitors the execution of PowerShell cmdlets to interact with the Win32_ShadowCopy WMI class, retrieve shadow copy objects, and delete them.
 33
 34#### Possible investigation steps
 35
 36- Investigate the program execution chain (parent process tree).
 37- Check whether the account is authorized to perform this operation.
 38- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
 39- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
 40- If unsigned files are found on the process tree, retrieve them and determine if they are malicious:
 41  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
 42    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
 43      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
 44      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
 45      - Service creation and launch activities.
 46      - Scheduled task creation.
 47  - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
 48    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
 49- Use process name, command line, and file hash to search for occurrences in other hosts.
 50- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.
 51
 52
 53### False positive analysis
 54
 55- This rule has chances of producing benign true positives (B-TPs). If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
 56
 57### Related rules
 58
 59- Volume Shadow Copy Deleted or Resized via VssAdmin - b5ea4bfe-a1b2-421f-9d47-22a75a6f2921
 60- Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell - d99a037b-c8e2-47a5-97b9-170d076827c4
 61
 62### Response and remediation
 63
 64- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
 65- Consider isolating the involved host to prevent destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.
 66- Priority should be given due to the advanced stage of this activity on the attack.
 67- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
 68  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
 69  - Stop suspicious processes.
 70  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
 71  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
 72- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
 73- If data was encrypted, deleted, or modified, activate your data recovery plan.
 74- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
 75- Perform data recovery locally or restore the backups from replicated copies (cloud, other servers, etc.).
 76- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
 77- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
 78- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 79"""
 80references = [
 81    "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/vsswmi/win32-shadowcopy",
 82    "https://powershell.one/wmi/root/cimv2/win32_shadowcopy",
 83    "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/stomping-shadow-copies-a-second-look-into-deletion-methods",
 84]
 85risk_score = 73
 86rule_id = "d99a037b-c8e2-47a5-97b9-170d076827c4"
 87setup = """## Setup
 88
 89If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 90events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 91Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
 92`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
 93For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
 94"""
 95severity = "high"
 96tags = [
 97    "Domain: Endpoint",
 98    "OS: Windows",
 99    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
100    "Tactic: Impact",
101    "Tactic: Execution",
102    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
103    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
104    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
105]
106timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
107type = "eql"
108
109query = '''
110process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
111  process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") and
112  process.args : ("*Get-WmiObject*", "*gwmi*", "*Get-CimInstance*", "*gcim*") and
113  process.args : ("*Win32_ShadowCopy*") and
114  process.args : ("*.Delete()*", "*Remove-WmiObject*", "*rwmi*", "*Remove-CimInstance*", "*rcim*")
115'''
116
117
118[[rule.threat]]
119framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
120[[rule.threat.technique]]
121id = "T1490"
122name = "Inhibit System Recovery"
123reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/"
124
125
126[rule.threat.tactic]
127id = "TA0040"
128name = "Impact"
129reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
130[[rule.threat]]
131framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
132[[rule.threat.technique]]
133id = "T1059"
134name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
135reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
136[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
137id = "T1059.001"
138name = "PowerShell"
139reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
140
141
142
143[rule.threat.tactic]
144id = "TA0002"
145name = "Execution"
146reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"