Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2021/04/12"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.13.0 for SentinelOne Integration."
  6min_stack_version = "8.13.0"
  7updated_date = "2025/01/15"
  8
  9[transform]
 10[[transform.osquery]]
 11label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
 12query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
 13
 14[[transform.osquery]]
 15label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
 16query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
 17
 18[[transform.osquery]]
 19label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
 20query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
 21
 22[[transform.osquery]]
 23label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
 24query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
 25
 26[[transform.osquery]]
 27label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
 28query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
 29
 30[[transform.osquery]]
 31label = "Osquery - Retrieve Process Info"
 32query = "SELECT name, cmdline, parent, path, uid FROM processes"
 33
 34
 35[rule]
 36author = ["Elastic"]
 37description = """
 38Identifies the execution of the EarthWorm tunneler. Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim
 39system within a separate protocol to avoid detection and network filtering, or to enable access to otherwise unreachable
 40systems.
 41"""
 42from = "now-9m"
 43index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*", "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*"]
 44language = "eql"
 45license = "Elastic License v2"
 46name = "Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm"
 47note = """## Triage and analysis
 48
 49### Investigating Potential Protocol Tunneling via EarthWorm
 50
 51Attackers can leverage `earthworm` to clandestinely tunnel network communications and evade security measures, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems.
 52
 53This rule looks for several command line arguments that are consistent with `earthworm` tunneling behavior. 
 54
 55> **Note**:
 56> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
 57> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
 58
 59#### Possible investigation steps
 60
 61- Identify any signs of suspicious network activity or anomalies that may indicate protocol tunneling. This could include unexpected traffic patterns or unusual network behavior.
 62  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential protocol tunneling, reverse shells, or data exfiltration.
 63    - $osquery_0
 64    - $osquery_1
 65- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
 66  - $osquery_2
 67- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
 68  - $osquery_3
 69- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
 70  - $osquery_4
 71  - $osquery_5
 72- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
 73  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
 74    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
 75      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
 76        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
 77          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
 78          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
 79        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
 80
 81### Related rules
 82
 83- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Client - 3f12325a-4cc6-410b-8d4c-9fbbeb744cfd
 84- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Chisel Server - ac8805f6-1e08-406c-962e-3937057fa86f
 85- Potential Linux Tunneling and/or Port Forwarding - 6ee947e9-de7e-4281-a55d-09289bdf947e
 86
 87### False positive analysis
 88
 89- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
 90- If this activity is related to a system administrator or developer who uses port tunneling for benign purposes, consider adding exceptions for specific user accounts or hosts. 
 91- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
 92
 93### Response and remediation
 94
 95- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
 96- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
 97- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
 98  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
 99  - Stop suspicious processes.
100  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
101  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors, such as reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers, that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
102- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
103- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
104- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
105- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
106- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
107"""
108references = [
109    "http://rootkiter.com/EarthWorm/",
110    "https://decoded.avast.io/luigicamastra/apt-group-targeting-governmental-agencies-in-east-asia/",
111]
112risk_score = 47
113rule_id = "9f1c4ca3-44b5-481d-ba42-32dc215a2769"
114setup = """## Setup
115
116This rule requires data coming in either from Elastic Defend, or Auditbeat integration.
117
118### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
119Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
120
121#### Prerequisite Requirements:
122- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
123- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
124
125#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
126- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
127- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
128- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
129- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
130- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
131- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
132- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
133- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
134For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
135- Click "Save and Continue".
136- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
137For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
138
139### Auditbeat Setup
140Auditbeat is a lightweight shipper that you can install on your servers to audit the activities of users and processes on your systems. For example, you can use Auditbeat to collect and centralize audit events from the Linux Audit Framework. You can also use Auditbeat to detect changes to critical files, like binaries and configuration files, and identify potential security policy violations.
141
142#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Auditbeat on a Linux System:
143- Elastic provides repositories available for APT and YUM-based distributions. Note that we provide binary packages, but no source packages.
144- To install the APT and YUM repositories follow the setup instructions in this [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setup-repositories.html).
145- To run Auditbeat on Docker follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-docker.html).
146- To run Auditbeat on Kubernetes follow the setup instructions in the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/running-on-kubernetes.html).
147- For complete “Setup and Run Auditbeat” information refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/setting-up-and-running.html).
148
149#### Custom Ingest Pipeline
150For versions <8.2, you need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate `event.ingested` with @timestamp for non-elastic-agent indexes, like auditbeats/filebeat/winlogbeat etc. For more details to add a custom ingest pipeline refer to the [guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html).
151"""
152severity = "medium"
153tags = [
154    "Domain: Endpoint",
155    "OS: Linux",
156    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
157    "Tactic: Command and Control",
158    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
159    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
160    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
161    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
162    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
163]
164timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
165type = "eql"
166
167query = '''
168process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
169 process.args : "-s" and process.args : "-d" and process.args : "rssocks"
170'''
171
172
173[[rule.threat]]
174framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
175[[rule.threat.technique]]
176id = "T1572"
177name = "Protocol Tunneling"
178reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/"
179
180
181[rule.threat.tactic]
182id = "TA0011"
183name = "Command and Control"
184reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"