Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker Sign-In with Non-Standard User Agent
Detects Microsoft Entra ID sign-in activity where the Microsoft Authentication Broker authenticates is using a user agent that is not consistent with common browser, mobile, or Windows platform authentication clients. Adversary-in-the-middle and OAuth phishing tooling often presents scripted or relayed user agents (for example Node.js, Python, or generic HTTP libraries) while still targeting first-party resources through the broker.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/05/27"
3integration = ["azure"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/05/27"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Detects Microsoft Entra ID sign-in activity where the Microsoft Authentication Broker authenticates is using a user agent
11that is not consistent with common browser, mobile, or Windows platform authentication clients. Adversary-in-the-middle and OAuth phishing
12tooling often presents scripted or relayed user agents (for example Node.js, Python, or generic HTTP libraries) while
13still targeting first-party resources through the broker.
14"""
15false_positives = [
16 """
17 Legitimate automation, SDKs, or custom applications that obtain tokens through the Microsoft Authentication Broker
18 against Graph, Azure AD, or Device Registration Service may use non-browser user agents. Baseline approved
19 service principals, managed identities, and developer tooling before tuning exclusions for known automation
20 patterns.
21 """,
22]
23from = "now-9m"
24index = ["logs-azure.signinlogs-*"]
25language = "kuery"
26license = "Elastic License v2"
27name = "Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker Sign-In with Non-Standard User Agent"
28note = """## Triage and analysis
29
30### Investigating Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker Sign-In with Non-Standard User Agent
31
32Review `azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name`, `user_agent.original`,
33`azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name`, `azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id`, `source.ip`, and
34`source.as.organization.name`.
35
36Confirm whether the user or application intentionally used a non-browser client against the requested resource.
37
38### Possible investigation steps
39
40- Inspect `user_agent.original` for automation libraries (for example `node`, `axios`, `python-requests`, `curl`).
41- Correlate `azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id` with other sign-ins, device registration audit events, or Graph
42 activity in the same time window.
43- Review conditional access outcomes and identity protection signals for the user.
44- Compare `source.ip` and ASN against expected VPN, MDM, and developer egress.
45
46### False positive analysis
47
48- Microsoft platform and mobile clients using Mozilla-, Dalvik-, CFNetwork-, or Windows-AzureAD-Authentication-Provider-
49 style user agents are excluded by design.
50- First-party CLI tools and test harnesses that legitimately broker tokens may still match if they use uncommon user
51 agent strings.
52
53### Response and remediation
54
55- If malicious, revoke refresh tokens for the user, review newly registered devices, and reset credentials per policy.
56- Escalate when paired with suspicious ASN sign-ins, multi-IP OAuth flows, or follow-on Graph data access.
57"""
58references = [
59 "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2025/04/22/phishing-for-codes-russian-threat-actors-target-microsoft-365-oauth-workflows/",
60 "https://dirkjanm.io/phishing-for-microsoft-entra-primary-refresh-tokens/",
61 "https://any.run/malware-trends/tycoon/",
62]
63risk_score = 73
64rule_id = "c22f89d9-b674-4650-8454-02242c8b35eb"
65severity = "high"
66setup = """
67Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs (`logs-azure.signinlogs-*`) must populate `user_agent.original`,
68`azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name`, and `azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name`.
69"""
70tags = [
71 "Domain: Cloud",
72 "Domain: Identity",
73 "Data Source: Azure",
74 "Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID",
75 "Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Logs",
76 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
77 "Tactic: Initial Access",
78 "Tactic: Credential Access",
79 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
80]
81timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
82type = "query"
83
84query = '''
85data_stream.dataset:"azure.signinlogs" and event.action:"Sign-in activity" and event.outcome:(success or Success) and
86(azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name:"Microsoft Authentication Broker" or azure.signinlogs.properties.app_id:"29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e") and
87user_agent.original:(* and not (Mozilla* or Dalvik* or *CFNetwork* or Windows-AzureAD-Authentication-Provider* or Java*ThinkPad*)) and
88azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name:*
89'''
90
91[rule.investigation_fields]
92field_names = [
93 "@timestamp",
94 "user.name",
95 "user_agent.original",
96 "source.ip",
97 "source.as.number",
98 "source.as.organization.name",
99 "source.geo.country_name",
100 "event.outcome",
101 "azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name",
102 "azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id",
103 "azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name",
104 "azure.signinlogs.properties.app_id",
105 "azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name",
106 "azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_id",
107 "azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_protocol",
108 "azure.tenant_id",
109]
110
111[[rule.threat]]
112framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
113
114[[rule.threat.technique]]
115id = "T1566"
116name = "Phishing"
117reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
118
119[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
120id = "T1566.002"
121name = "Spearphishing Link"
122reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/"
123
124[rule.threat.tactic]
125id = "TA0001"
126name = "Initial Access"
127reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
128
129[[rule.threat]]
130framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
131
132[[rule.threat.technique]]
133id = "T1078"
134name = "Valid Accounts"
135reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
136
137[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
138id = "T1078.004"
139name = "Cloud Accounts"
140reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/"
141
142[rule.threat.tactic]
143id = "TA0005"
144name = "Defense Evasion"
145reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
146
147[[rule.threat]]
148framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
149
150[[rule.threat.technique]]
151id = "T1539"
152name = "Steal Web Session Cookie"
153reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539/"
154
155[rule.threat.tactic]
156id = "TA0006"
157name = "Credential Access"
158reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker Sign-In with Non-Standard User Agent
Review azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name, user_agent.original,
azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name, azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id, source.ip, and
source.as.organization.name.
Confirm whether the user or application intentionally used a non-browser client against the requested resource.
Possible investigation steps
- Inspect
user_agent.originalfor automation libraries (for examplenode,axios,python-requests,curl). - Correlate
azure.signinlogs.properties.session_idwith other sign-ins, device registration audit events, or Graph activity in the same time window. - Review conditional access outcomes and identity protection signals for the user.
- Compare
source.ipand ASN against expected VPN, MDM, and developer egress.
False positive analysis
- Microsoft platform and mobile clients using Mozilla-, Dalvik-, CFNetwork-, or Windows-AzureAD-Authentication-Provider- style user agents are excluded by design.
- First-party CLI tools and test harnesses that legitimately broker tokens may still match if they use uncommon user agent strings.
Response and remediation
- If malicious, revoke refresh tokens for the user, review newly registered devices, and reset credentials per policy.
- Escalate when paired with suspicious ASN sign-ins, multi-IP OAuth flows, or follow-on Graph data access.
References
Related rules
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