Identifies the execution of Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBins) or GTFOBins on EC2 instances via AWS Systems Manager (SSM) SendCommand API. This detection correlates AWS CloudTrail SendCommand events with endpoint process execution by matching SSM command IDs. While AWS redacts command parameters in CloudTrail logs, this correlation technique reveals the actual commands executed on EC2 instances. Adversaries may abuse SSM to execute malicious commands remotely without requiring SSH or RDP access, using legitimate system utilities for data exfiltration, establishing reverse shells, or lateral movement.

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Detects the execution of commands or scripts on EC2 instances using AWS Systems Manager (SSM), such as RunShellScript, RunPowerShellScript or custom documents. While legitimate users may employ these commands for management tasks, they can also be exploited by attackers with credentials to establish persistence, install malware, or execute reverse shells for further access to compromised instances. This is a New Terms rule that looks for the first instance of this behavior by a user or role.

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Identifies the use of the AWS Systems Manager (SSM) SendCommand API with the either AWS-RunShellScript or AWS-RunPowerShellScript parameters. The SendCommand API call allows users to execute commands on EC2 instances using the SSM service. Adversaries may use this technique to execute commands on EC2 instances without the need for SSH or RDP access. This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to execute commands on an EC2 instance for malicious purposes. This is a New Terms rule that only flags when this behavior is observed for the first time on a host in the last 7 days.

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Correlates successful Azure Virtual Machine Run Command operations with endpoint process execution on the same host within minutes. Adversaries abuse Run Command to run scripts remotely as SYSTEM or root while activity logs only record the control-plane action; Elastic Defend process telemetry reveals the on-guest payload.

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Identifies process start events whose parent matches Azure Virtual Machine Run Command execution patterns on Windows or Linux. On Windows, Run Command often launches PowerShell with -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted and a script?.ps1 file; on Linux, the Azure Linux Agent (waagent) runs downloaded script.sh under "/var/lib/waagent/run-command/". Child process telemetry exposes the on-guest payload that cloud activity logs do not fully describe.

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Identifies create, read, update, or delete (CRUD) operations against Azure VM or VM scale set extensions ("MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/EXTENSIONS/*" or the scale set equivalent) where the combination of the targeted extension resource name and the source autonomous system (AS) number has not been observed recently. VM extensions such as CustomScript and DSC run with high privilege on the guest (SYSTEM on Windows, root on Linux), so writing, modifying, or removing them is a common code-execution and persistence primitive. By keying a new terms approach on the extension resource name and the source AS number, this rule surfaces extension operations originating from networks that have not historically managed that extension, while routine first-party Microsoft automation (which originates from well-known Microsoft AS numbers) is excluded.

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Identifies the successful deployment of a high-risk Azure Virtual Machine extension by an interactive user principal. Attackers with privileged Azure RBAC roles can abuse VM extensions such as VMAccess, CustomScriptExtension, and RunCommand to execute arbitrary code, create backdoor accounts, harvest credentials, and establish persistence on Azure-hosted virtual machines without requiring direct network access to the VM.

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Identifies the creation or update of a managed Azure Run Command resource ("MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/RUNCOMMANDS/WRITE" or the virtual machine scale set equivalent) by an identity that has not performed this operation recently. Unlike the action-based Run Command ("runCommand/action"), the managed Run Command is a persistent resource on the VM whose creation or update executes the supplied script as System (Windows) or root (Linux). Because creating a managed run command both executes code and leaves a durable object, adversaries can use it as an alternative to the action invocation to evade detections that only watch "runCommand/action". Alerting on the first time a given principal performs this operation surfaces unusual or unauthorized use while suppressing routine automation that repeatedly manages the same run commands.

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Identifies a suspicious process executing as a descendant of the Azure VM CustomScript extension handler (CustomScriptHandler.exe) on a Windows host. The Azure CustomScript extension runs an attacker-supplied script with high privilege (SYSTEM) via the guest agent, and is a common cloud-to-host code-execution and persistence primitive. Because the extension's resource name is attacker-controlled and absent from on-host telemetry, this rule anchors on the type-bearing handler binary ('Microsoft.Compute.CustomScriptExtension...\CustomScriptHandler.exe') rather than the spoofable extension name, making it resistant to renaming. CustomScript legitimately launches PowerShell and cmd, so the rule fires only when the descendant is an execution-proxy, download, or discovery LOLBin, or PowerShell exhibiting suspicious tradecraft.

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Identifies the first time a given VM extension name is created or updated on an Azure virtual machine or VM scale set within the rule's lookback window. VM extensions run with high privilege on the guest (SYSTEM on Windows, root on Linux) and are a common code-execution and persistence primitive. The extension instance name is attacker-controlled and the Azure activity log records only that name, not the publisher or type, so the control plane cannot reliably identify the extension family (for example CustomScript). This rule therefore takes a type-agnostic ES|QL new-terms approach: it derives the host and the extension instance name from azure.resource.name and alerts the first time a given (host, extension name) pair is observed in the window, surfacing novel extension deployments while suppressing names a host routinely uses.

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