Azure Run Command Correlated with Process Execution
Correlates successful Azure Virtual Machine Run Command operations with endpoint process execution on the same host within minutes. Adversaries abuse Run Command to run scripts remotely as SYSTEM or root while activity logs only record the control-plane action; Elastic Defend process telemetry reveals the on-guest payload.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/05/20"
3integration = ["azure", "endpoint"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/05/20"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Correlates successful Azure Virtual Machine Run Command operations with endpoint process execution on the same host
11within minutes. Adversaries abuse Run Command to run scripts remotely as SYSTEM or root while activity logs only record the
12control-plane action; Elastic Defend process telemetry reveals the on-guest payload.
13"""
14false_positives = [
15 """
16 Legitimate automation that deploys configuration via Azure Run Command and launches PowerShell with unrestricted
17 policy and numbered script files (for example `script1.ps1`) may match. Baseline known deployment pipelines, VM
18 names, and principal IDs before tuning.
19 """,
20]
21from = "now-9m"
22language = "esql"
23license = "Elastic License v2"
24name = "Azure Run Command Correlated with Process Execution"
25note = """## Triage and analysis
26
27### Investigating Azure Run Command Correlated with Process Execution
28
29This ES|QL rule correlates Azure Activity Log `MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/RUNCOMMAND/ACTION` events with
30endpoint process starts, joined on host name within a two-minute bucket and a 0–120 second delay between Run Command and process start.
31
32Pivot into raw `logs-azure.activitylogs-*` and `logs-endpoint.events.process-*` events for full command lines and
33resource identifiers.
34
35### Possible investigation steps
36
37- Review `user.email` and `azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id` for who invoked Run Command.
38- Inspect `Esql.process_command_line_values` for script paths and arguments beyond the matched pattern.
39- Confirm `Esql.host_name` maps to the intended VM and whether Run Command timing aligns with change windows.
40- Hunt for additional Run Command or PowerShell activity from the same principal or subscription.
41
42### Response and remediation
43
44- If unauthorized, isolate the VM, revoke credentials used for Run Command, and review role assignments on the VM and
45 subscription.
46- Collect endpoint artifacts and Azure activity logs for incident reporting.
47"""
48references = [
49 "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/built-in-roles#virtual-machine-contributor",
50 "https://posts.specterops.io/attacking-azure-azure-ad-and-introducing-powerzure-ca70b330511a",
51 "https://adsecurity.org/?p=4277",
52]
53risk_score = 47
54rule_id = "ebbc1959-3309-4abf-b6cb-2bee3dbc9a7b"
55severity = "medium"
56tags = [
57 "Domain: Cloud",
58 "Domain: Endpoint",
59 "OS: Windows",
60 "OS: Linux",
61 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
62 "Tactic: Execution",
63 "Data Source: Azure",
64 "Data Source: Microsoft Azure",
65 "Data Source: Azure Activity Logs",
66 "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
67 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
68]
69timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
70type = "esql"
71
72query = '''
73FROM logs-azure.activitylogs-*, logs-endpoint.events.process-* METADATA _id, _version, _index
74| WHERE
75 (
76 event.category == "process" AND KQL("event.action:start")
77 AND process.parent.name == "powershell.exe"
78 AND process.parent.command_line LIKE "powershell -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -File script?.ps1"
79 AND process.name != "conhost.exe"
80 ) OR
81 (
82 KQL("event.category:process and event.action:exec and process.parent.name:(dash or bash or sh) and process.parent.args:/var/lib/waagent/run-command/download/*/script.sh")
83 ) OR
84 (
85 event.module == "azure"
86 AND event.action == "MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/RUNCOMMAND/ACTION"
87 AND NOT KQL("event.outcome:failure")
88 )
89
90// Azure hostname comes as upper-case while Endpoint event comes as lowercase
91| EVAL Esql.host_name = COALESCE(
92 TO_LOWER(host.name),
93 TO_LOWER(azure.resource.name)
94 )
95| EVAL ts_runcommand = CASE(event.module == "azure", @timestamp, null)
96| EVAL ts_endpoint = CASE(event.category == "process", @timestamp, null)
97| EVAL is_runcommand = CASE(event.module == "azure", 1, null)
98| EVAL is_endpoint = CASE(event.category == "process", 1, null)
99| EVAL Esql.time_bucket = DATE_TRUNC(2 minutes, @timestamp)
100| STATS
101 runcommand_count = COUNT(is_runcommand),
102 endpoint_count = COUNT(is_endpoint),
103 user.email = VALUES(user.email),
104 azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id = VALUES(azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id),
105 azure.activitylogs.tenant_id = VALUES(azure.activitylogs.tenant_id),
106 azure.subscription_id = VALUES(azure.subscription_id),
107 source.ip = VALUES(source.ip),
108 source.geo.country_name = VALUES(source.geo.country_name),
109 source.as.number = VALUES(source.as.number),
110 Esql.process_command_line_values = VALUES(process.command_line),
111 first_runcommand = MIN(ts_runcommand),
112 first_ps_exec = MIN(ts_endpoint),
113 outcome = VALUES(event.outcome)
114 BY Esql.host_name, Esql.time_bucket
115| WHERE runcommand_count >= 1 AND endpoint_count >= 1
116| EVAL delta_ms = TO_LONG(first_ps_exec) - TO_LONG(first_runcommand)
117| EVAL delta_sec = delta_ms / 1000
118| WHERE delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 120
119| KEEP
120 user.email,
121 azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id,
122 source.ip,
123 source.as.number,
124 source.geo.country_name,
125 azure.activitylogs.tenant_id,
126 azure.subscription_id,
127 Esql.*
128'''
129
130
131[[rule.threat]]
132framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
133
134[[rule.threat.technique]]
135id = "T1059"
136name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
137reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
138
139[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
140id = "T1059.001"
141name = "PowerShell"
142reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
143
144[[rule.threat.technique]]
145id = "T1651"
146name = "Cloud Administration Command"
147reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651/"
148
149[rule.threat.tactic]
150id = "TA0002"
151name = "Execution"
152reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating Azure Run Command Correlated with Process Execution
This ES|QL rule correlates Azure Activity Log MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/RUNCOMMAND/ACTION events with
endpoint process starts, joined on host name within a two-minute bucket and a 0–120 second delay between Run Command and process start.
Pivot into raw logs-azure.activitylogs-* and logs-endpoint.events.process-* events for full command lines and
resource identifiers.
Possible investigation steps
- Review
user.emailandazure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_idfor who invoked Run Command. - Inspect
Esql.process_command_line_valuesfor script paths and arguments beyond the matched pattern. - Confirm
Esql.host_namemaps to the intended VM and whether Run Command timing aligns with change windows. - Hunt for additional Run Command or PowerShell activity from the same principal or subscription.
Response and remediation
- If unauthorized, isolate the VM, revoke credentials used for Run Command, and review role assignments on the VM and subscription.
- Collect endpoint artifacts and Azure activity logs for incident reporting.
References
Related rules
- Azure Run Command Script Child Process
- AWS SSM Session Manager Child Process Execution
- AWS SSM `SendCommand` with Run Shell Command Parameters
- Azure VM Extension Deployment by User
- Suspicious Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) API Command Line Execution