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Entra ID Actor Token User Impersonation Abuse
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Identity Data Source: Azure Data Source: Entra ID Data Source: Entra ID Audit Logs Data Source: Entra Audit Logs Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Initial Access Tactic: Privilege Escalation Resources: Investigation Guide Noise: Low Performance: Normal Profile: Recommended Threat: Vulnerability Exploit Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Entra ID Vuln: CVE-2025-55241 ·Identifies potential abuse of actor tokens in Microsoft Entra ID audit logs. Actor tokens are undocumented backend mechanisms used by Microsoft for service-to-service (S2S) operations, allowing services to perform actions on behalf of users. These tokens appear in logs with the service's display name but the impersonated user's UPN. While some legitimate Microsoft operations use actor tokens, unexpected usage may indicate exploitation of CVE-2025-55241, which allowed unauthorized access to Azure AD Graph API across tenants before being patched by Microsoft.
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Identifies when a new credential is added to an application in Azure. An application may use a certificate or secret string to prove its identity when requesting a token. Multiple certificates and secrets can be added for an application and an adversary may abuse this by creating an additional authentication method to evade defenses or persist in an environment.
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Identifies an invitation to an external user in Azure Active Directory (AD). Azure AD is extended to include collaboration, allowing you to invite people from outside your organization to be guest users in your cloud account. Unless there is a business need to provision guest access, it is best practice avoid creating guest users. Guest users could potentially be overlooked indefinitely leading to a potential vulnerability.
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Identifies an Azure Active Directory (AD) Global Administrator role addition to a Privileged Identity Management (PIM) user account. PIM is a service that enables you to manage, control, and monitor access to important resources in an organization. Users who are assigned to the Global administrator role can read and modify any administrative setting in your Azure AD organization.
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Azure Active Directory (AD) Privileged Identity Management (PIM) is a service that enables you to manage, control, and monitor access to important resources in an organization. PIM can be used to manage the built-in Azure resource roles such as Global Administrator and Application Administrator. An adversary may add a user to a PIM role in order to maintain persistence in their target's environment or modify a PIM role to weaken their target's security controls.
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Identifies when a user is added as an owner for an Azure application. An adversary may add a user account as an owner for an Azure application in order to grant additional permissions and modify the application's configuration using another account.
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Identifies when a user is added as an owner for an Azure service principal. The service principal object defines what the application can do in the specific tenant, who can access the application, and what resources the app can access. A service principal object is created when an application is given permission to access resources in a tenant. An adversary may add a user account as an owner for a service principal and use that account in order to define what an application can do in the Azure AD tenant.
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Entra ID Windows Hello for Business Credential Registered
Sep 19, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: Identity Platform: Entra ID Use Case: Identity and Access Audit Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Persistence Rule Type: New Terms Data Source: Azure Data Source: Entra ID Audit Logs Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit Logs Resources: Investigation Guide ·Identifies the first-seen registration of a Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) credential for a Microsoft Entra ID user from a given source ASN in a tenant, based on a prefixed historic window. Enrollment is commonly part of legitimate onboarding or passwordless rollout and is not inherently malicious. Adversaries who have obtained a token that satisfies fresh (NGC) multi-factor authentication, for example by borrowing an existing WHfB key or passkey, can also enroll their own WHfB credential to establish durable, phishing-resistant persistence that survives password resets and standard session revocation. Correlate first-seen enrollments with the sign-in and device state that preceded them.
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