Attachment: HTML smuggling with atob and high entropy
Recursively scans files and archives to detect HTML smuggling techniques using Javascript atob functions.
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1name: "Attachment: HTML smuggling with atob and high entropy"
2description: |
3 Recursively scans files and archives to detect HTML smuggling techniques using Javascript atob functions.
4references:
5 - "https://delivr.to/payloads?id=7dbf0d83-1557-4345-bf67-d18c4256b0c1"
6type: "rule"
7severity: "high"
8source: |
9 type.inbound
10 and any(attachments,
11 (
12 .file_extension in~ ("html", "htm", "shtml", "dhtml", "eml")
13 or .file_extension in~ $file_extensions_common_archives
14 or .file_type == "html"
15 or .content_type == "message/rfc822"
16 or .file_extension in ('eml')
17 )
18 and any(file.explode(.),
19 .scan.entropy.entropy >= 5
20 and (
21 length(filter(.scan.javascript.identifiers,
22 strings.like(., "document", "write", "atob")
23 )
24 ) == 3
25 // usage: document['write'](atob)
26 or any(.scan.strings.strings,
27 regex.icontains(., "document.{0,10}write.{0,10}atob")
28 )
29 // usage: some_var = atob();
30 or any(.scan.strings.strings,
31 regex.icontains(., "=.?atob.*;")
32 )
33 // usage: atob(atob
34 or any(.scan.strings.strings, strings.ilike(., "*atob?atob*"))
35 // usage: {src: atob
36 or any(.scan.strings.strings,
37 strings.ilike(., "*{src: atob*")
38 )
39 // usage: eval(atob)
40 or any(.scan.strings.strings, strings.ilike(., "*eval?atob*"))
41 // usage: atob(_0x)
42 or any(.scan.strings.strings, strings.ilike(., "*atob(?0x*"))
43 // usage : 'at'+'ob'
44 or any(.scan.strings.strings, strings.ilike(., "*'at'+'ob'*"))
45 // usage: obfuscating "atob"
46 or any(.scan.javascript.identifiers,
47 strings.ilike(., '*ato\u0062*')
48 )
49 // usage: document.head.insertAdjacentHTML("beforeend", atob(...
50 or any(.scan.strings.strings,
51 strings.ilike(., "*document*insertAdjacentHTML*atob*")
52 )
53 )
54 )
55 )
56 // negate bouncebacks and undeliverables
57 and not any(attachments,
58 .content_type in (
59 "message/global-delivery-status",
60 "message/delivery-status"
61 )
62 )
63 // negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
64 and not (
65 sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
66 and coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
67 )
68attack_types:
69 - "Credential Phishing"
70 - "Malware/Ransomware"
71tactics_and_techniques:
72 - "HTML smuggling"
73 - "Scripting"
74detection_methods:
75 - "Archive analysis"
76 - "Content analysis"
77 - "File analysis"
78 - "HTML analysis"
79 - "Javascript analysis"
80 - "Sender analysis"
81 - "URL analysis"
82id: "03fcac11-ffc9-5a9c-9e1e-c866e683b48e"