Brand impersonation: Adobe (QR code)

Detects messages using Adobe image based lures, referencing or including a QR code from an Unsolicited sender. These messages often lead users to phishing sites or initiate unwanted downloads.

Sublime rule (View on GitHub)

  1name: "Brand impersonation: Adobe (QR code)"
  2description: "Detects messages using Adobe image based lures, referencing or including a QR code from an Unsolicited sender. These messages often lead users to phishing sites or initiate unwanted downloads."
  3type: "rule"
  4severity: "high"
  5source: |
  6  type.inbound
  7  and (
  8    any(attachments,
  9        (.file_type in $file_types_images or .file_type == "pdf")
 10        and (
 11          any(ml.logo_detect(.).brands,
 12              .name == "Adobe" and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
 13          )
 14          or any(ml.logo_detect(file.message_screenshot()).brands,
 15                 .name == "Adobe"
 16          )
 17          or any(file.explode(.),
 18                 any(.scan.strings.strings,
 19                     regex.icontains(., "adobe (acrobat|sign)")
 20                     // negate PDF data, like "xmp:CreatorTool>Adobe Acrobat Pro (64-bit) 24.4.20272</xmp:CreatorTool>"
 21                     and not regex.icontains(.,
 22                                             "(creatortool|producer|creator).{1,5}adobe acrobat"
 23                     )
 24                 )
 25          )
 26        )
 27    )
 28    or any(attachments,
 29           .file_extension in $file_extensions_macros
 30           and any(file.explode(.), .depth == 0 and .scan.docx.image_count > 0)
 31           and any(file.explode(.),
 32                   any(.scan.strings.strings, strings.ilike(., "*adobe*"))
 33           )
 34    )
 35  )
 36  and any(attachments,
 37          (
 38            .file_type in $file_types_images
 39            or .file_type == "pdf"
 40            or .file_type in $file_extensions_macros
 41          )
 42          and (
 43            any(file.explode(.),
 44                regex.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, 'scan|camera')
 45                and regex.icontains(.scan.ocr.raw, '\bQR\b|Q\.R\.|barcode')
 46            )
 47            or (
 48              any(file.explode(.),
 49                  .scan.qr.type == "url"
 50                  // recipient email address is present in the URL, a common tactic used in credential phishing attacks
 51                  and (
 52                    any(recipients.to,
 53                        (
 54                          (
 55                            .email.domain.valid
 56                            and (
 57                              strings.icontains(..scan.qr.data, .email.email)
 58                              or any(strings.scan_base64(..scan.qr.data,
 59                                                         format="url"
 60                                     ),
 61                                     strings.icontains(., ..email.email)
 62                              )
 63                            )
 64                          )
 65                          or strings.icontains(.display_name, "undisclosed")
 66                        )
 67                    )
 68  
 69                    // the recipients sld is in the senders display name
 70                    or any(recipients.to,
 71                           strings.icontains(sender.display_name,
 72                                             .email.domain.sld
 73                           )
 74                    )
 75  
 76                    // the recipient local is in the body
 77                    or any(recipients.to,
 78                           strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
 79                                             .email.local_part
 80                           )
 81                    )
 82  
 83                    // or the body is null
 84                    or body.current_thread.text is null
 85                    or body.current_thread.text == ""
 86  
 87                    // or the subject contains authentication/urgency verbiage
 88                    or regex.contains(subject.subject,
 89                                      "(Authenticat(e|or|ion)|2fa|Multi.Factor|(qr|bar).code|action.require|alert|Att(n|ention):)"
 90                    )
 91  
 92                    // high confidence cred theft in body
 93                    or any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
 94                           .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence in ("high")
 95                    )
 96                  )
 97              )
 98            )
 99          )
100  )
101  and (
102    not sender.email.domain.root_domain in (
103      "acrobat.com",
104      "adobecc.com",
105      "adobecces.com",
106      "adobeccstatic.com",
107      "adobe.com",
108      "adobeexchange.com",
109      "adobe-identity.com",
110      "adobe.io",
111      "adobejanus.com",
112      "adobelogin.com",
113      "adobe.net",
114      "adobeprojectm.com",
115      "adoberesources.net",
116      "adobesc.com",
117      "adobesign.com",
118      "adobestock.com",
119      "createjs.com",
120      "licensingstack.com",
121      "myportfolio.com",
122      "photoshop.com",
123      "typekit.com",
124      "typekit.net"
125    )
126    or not any(headers.hops,
127               .authentication_results.compauth.verdict is not null
128               and .authentication_results.compauth.verdict == "pass"
129    )
130  )
131  
132  // negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
133  and (
134    (
135      sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
136      and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
137    )
138    or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
139  )  
140attack_types:
141  - "Credential Phishing"
142tactics_and_techniques:
143  - "Impersonation: Brand"
144  - "PDF"
145  - "QR code"
146detection_methods:
147  - "Computer Vision"
148  - "Header analysis"
149  - "QR code analysis"
150  - "Sender analysis"
151id: "2fc36c6d-86a2-5b12-b5a4-5d8744858381"
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