Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry
Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
Sigma rule (View on GitHub)
1title: Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry
2id: ba226dcf-d390-4642-b9af-b534872f1156
3status: experimental
4description: |
5 Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn't be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil".
6references:
7 - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1562.002#atomic-test-8---modify-event-log-channel-access-permissions-via-registry---powershell
8 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSYvHUVU8xY
9 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-definition-language
10author: X__Junior
11date: 2025-01-16
12modified: 2025-02-05
13tags:
14 - attack.t1547.001
15 - attack.t1112
16logsource:
17 category: registry_set
18 product: windows
19detection:
20 # O:SYG:SYD:(D;;0x1;;;WD)
21 # O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0x2;;;S-1-15-2-1)(D;;0x1;;;WD)
22 selection_key_1:
23 TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\'
24 TargetObject|endswith: '\CustomSD'
25 selection_key_2:
26 TargetObject|contains:
27 - '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\'
28 - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels'
29 TargetObject|endswith: '\ChannelAccess'
30 selection_details:
31 - Details|contains: 'D:(D;'
32 - Details|contains|all:
33 - 'D:('
34 - ')(D;'
35 condition: 1 of selection_key_* and selection_details
36falsepositives:
37 - Administrative activity, still unlikely
38level: high
References
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