Suspicious X509Enrollment - Process Creation

calendar Nov 2, 2023 · attack.defense_evasion attack.t1553.004  ·
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Detect use of X509Enrollment

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 1title: Suspicious X509Enrollment - Process Creation
 2id: 114de787-4eb2-48cc-abdb-c0b449f93ea4
 3related:
 4    - id: 504d63cb-0dba-4d02-8531-e72981aace2c
 5      type: similar
 6status: test
 7description: Detect use of X509Enrollment
 8references:
 9    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=42
10    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=41
11    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/microsoft.hpc.scheduler.store.cx509enrollmentwebclassfactoryclass?view=hpc-sdk-5.1.6115
12author: frack113
13date: 2022/12/23
14tags:
15    - attack.defense_evasion
16    - attack.t1553.004
17logsource:
18    product: windows
19    category: process_creation
20detection:
21    selection:
22        CommandLine|contains:
23            - 'X509Enrollment.CBinaryConverter'
24            - '884e2002-217d-11da-b2a4-000e7bbb2b09'
25    condition: selection
26falsepositives:
27    - Legitimate administrative script
28level: medium

References

  • Hunting for PowerShell Abuse

    PowerShell is the favorit tool of IT guys, who are responsible for administration of Windows infrastructures. It allows them to manage differen services of the operating system and automate almost anything. But along with administrators, PowerShell also is liked by attackers and malware authors. The reason PowerShell is so attractive for adversaries is quite obvious: it has been included in essentially every Windows operating system by default for a decade, provides access to Windows API, and is rarely constrained, thus allowing adversaries to perform different tasks without risking being blocked. ttackers can use PowerShell to direct the execution of a local script, retrieve and execute remote resources using various network protocols, encode payloads passed via the command line, or load PowerShell into other processes. Because of so prevalence of PowerShell among adversaries for Threat Hunters it is very important to be able to detect malicious uses of PowerShell and defend against it. In the presentation author is going to demostrate an approaches for detection of PowerShell abuses based on different event sources like native Windows logging capabilities as well as usage of additional tools, like Sysmon or EDR solutions. How to collect traces of using PowerShell, how to filter out false positives, and how to find evidence of malicious uses among the remaining after filtering volume of events — all these questions will be answered in the talk for present and future threat hunters.


    Read More

  • Hunting for PowerShell Abuse

    PowerShell is the favorit tool of IT guys, who are responsible for administration of Windows infrastructures. It allows them to manage differen services of the operating system and automate almost anything. But along with administrators, PowerShell also is liked by attackers and malware authors. The reason PowerShell is so attractive for adversaries is quite obvious: it has been included in essentially every Windows operating system by default for a decade, provides access to Windows API, and is rarely constrained, thus allowing adversaries to perform different tasks without risking being blocked. ttackers can use PowerShell to direct the execution of a local script, retrieve and execute remote resources using various network protocols, encode payloads passed via the command line, or load PowerShell into other processes. Because of so prevalence of PowerShell among adversaries for Threat Hunters it is very important to be able to detect malicious uses of PowerShell and defend against it. In the presentation author is going to demostrate an approaches for detection of PowerShell abuses based on different event sources like native Windows logging capabilities as well as usage of additional tools, like Sysmon or EDR solutions. How to collect traces of using PowerShell, how to filter out false positives, and how to find evidence of malicious uses among the remaining after filtering volume of events — all these questions will be answered in the talk for present and future threat hunters.


    Read More

  • CX509EnrollmentWebClassFactoryClass Class (Microsoft.Hpc.Scheduler.Store)

    Learn more about the Microsoft.Hpc.Scheduler.Store.CX509EnrollmentWebClassFactoryClass in the Microsoft.Hpc.Scheduler.Store namespace.


    Read More

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