Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO

Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a scheduled task in the objects controlled by the GPO.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2021/11/08"
  3integration = ["system", "windows"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/05/04"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10Detects the modification of Group Policy Object attributes to execute a scheduled task in the objects controlled by the
 11GPO.
 12"""
 13index = ["logs-system.security*", "logs-windows.forwarded*", "winlogbeat-*"]
 14language = "eql"
 15license = "Elastic License v2"
 16name = "Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO"
 17note = """## Triage and analysis
 18
 19### Investigating Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO
 20
 21Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can be used by attackers to execute scheduled tasks at scale to compromise objects controlled by a given GPO. This is done by changing the contents of the `<GPOPath>\\Machine\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml` file.
 22
 23#### Possible investigation steps
 24
 25- This attack abuses a legitimate mechanism of Active Directory, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate and the administrator is authorized to perform this operation.
 26- Retrieve the contents of the `ScheduledTasks.xml` file, and check the `<Command>` and `<Arguments>` XML tags for any potentially malicious commands or binaries.
 27- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
 28- Scope which objects may be compromised by retrieving information about which objects are controlled by the GPO.
 29
 30### False positive analysis
 31
 32- Verify if the execution is allowed and done under change management, and if the execution is legitimate.
 33
 34### Related rules
 35
 36- Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition - b9554892-5e0e-424b-83a0-5aef95aa43bf
 37- Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object - 16fac1a1-21ee-4ca6-b720-458e3855d046
 38
 39### Response and remediation
 40
 41- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
 42- The investigation and containment must be performed in every computer controlled by the GPO, where necessary.
 43- Remove the script from the GPO.
 44- Check if other GPOs have suspicious scheduled tasks attached.
 45- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
 46- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 47"""
 48references = [
 49    "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0025_windows_audit_directory_service_changes.md",
 50    "https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/f2bbb51ecf68e2c9f488e3c70dcdd3df51d2a46b/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0029_windows_audit_detailed_file_share.md",
 51    "https://labs.f-secure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse",
 52    "https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1106899890377052160",
 53    "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_gpo_scheduledtasks.yml",
 54]
 55risk_score = 47
 56rule_id = "15a8ba77-1c13-4274-88fe-6bd14133861e"
 57setup = """## Setup
 58
 59The following Windows audit policies must be enabled to generate the events used by this rule:
 60- [Audit Directory Service Changes](https://ela.st/audit-directory-service-changes)
 61- [Audit Detailed File Share](https://ela.st/audit-detailed-file-share)
 62"""
 63severity = "medium"
 64tags = [
 65    "Domain: Endpoint",
 66    "OS: Windows",
 67    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 68    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
 69    "Tactic: Lateral Movement",
 70    "Data Source: Active Directory",
 71    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 72    "Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring",
 73    "Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
 74]
 75timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 76type = "eql"
 77
 78query = '''
 79any where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code in ("5136", "5145") and
 80(
 81  (
 82    winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName : (
 83      "gPCMachineExtensionNames",
 84      "gPCUserExtensionNames"
 85    ) and
 86    winlog.event_data.AttributeValue : "*CAB54552-DEEA-4691-817E-ED4A4D1AFC72*" and
 87    winlog.event_data.AttributeValue : "*AADCED64-746C-4633-A97C-D61349046527*"
 88  ) or
 89  (
 90    winlog.event_data.ShareName : "\\\\*\\SYSVOL" and
 91    winlog.event_data.RelativeTargetName : "*ScheduledTasks.xml" and
 92    winlog.event_data.AccessList:"*%%4417*"
 93  )
 94)
 95'''
 96
 97
 98[[rule.threat]]
 99framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
100[[rule.threat.technique]]
101id = "T1053"
102name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
103reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
104[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
105id = "T1053.005"
106name = "Scheduled Task"
107reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"
108
109
110[[rule.threat.technique]]
111id = "T1484"
112name = "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"
113reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/"
114[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
115id = "T1484.001"
116name = "Group Policy Modification"
117reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001/"
118
119
120
121[rule.threat.tactic]
122id = "TA0004"
123name = "Privilege Escalation"
124reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
125[[rule.threat]]
126framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
127[[rule.threat.technique]]
128id = "T1570"
129name = "Lateral Tool Transfer"
130reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/"
131
132
133[rule.threat.tactic]
134id = "TA0008"
135name = "Lateral Movement"
136reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"

Triage and analysis

Investigating Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO

Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can be used by attackers to execute scheduled tasks at scale to compromise objects controlled by a given GPO. This is done by changing the contents of the <GPOPath>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml file.

Possible investigation steps

  • This attack abuses a legitimate mechanism of Active Directory, so it is important to determine whether the activity is legitimate and the administrator is authorized to perform this operation.
  • Retrieve the contents of the ScheduledTasks.xml file, and check the <Command> and <Arguments> XML tags for any potentially malicious commands or binaries.
  • Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
  • Scope which objects may be compromised by retrieving information about which objects are controlled by the GPO.

False positive analysis

  • Verify if the execution is allowed and done under change management, and if the execution is legitimate.
  • Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition - b9554892-5e0e-424b-83a0-5aef95aa43bf
  • Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object - 16fac1a1-21ee-4ca6-b720-458e3855d046

Response and remediation

  • Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
  • The investigation and containment must be performed in every computer controlled by the GPO, where necessary.
  • Remove the script from the GPO.
  • Check if other GPOs have suspicious scheduled tasks attached.
  • Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
  • Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).

References

Related rules

to-top