User Account Creation
Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence on a system or domain.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2020/02/18"
3integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/05/04"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence
11on a system or domain.
12"""
13from = "now-9m"
14index = [
15 "endgame-*",
16 "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
17 "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
18 "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
19 "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
20 "logs-system.security*",
21 "logs-windows.forwarded*",
22 "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
23 "winlogbeat-*",
24]
25language = "eql"
26license = "Elastic License v2"
27name = "User Account Creation"
28note = """## Triage and analysis
29
30### Investigating User Account Creation
31
32Attackers may create new accounts (both local and domain) to maintain access to victim systems.
33
34This rule identifies the usage of `net.exe` to create new accounts.
35
36#### Possible investigation steps
37
38- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
39- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
40- Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation.
41- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
42
43### False positive analysis
44
45- Account creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
46
47### Related rules
48
49- Creation of a Hidden Local User Account - 2edc8076-291e-41e9-81e4-e3fcbc97ae5e
50- Windows User Account Creation - 38e17753-f581-4644-84da-0d60a8318694
51
52### Response and remediation
53
54- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
55- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
56- Delete the created account.
57- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
58- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
59- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
60"""
61
62setup = """## Setup
63
64This rule is designed for data generated by [Elastic Defend](https://www.elastic.co/security/endpoint-security), which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.
65
66Setup instructions: https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend
67
68### Additional data sources
69
70This rule also supports the following third-party data sources. For setup instructions, refer to the links below:
71
72- [CrowdStrike](https://ela.st/crowdstrike-integration)
73- [Microsoft Defender XDR](https://ela.st/m365-defender)
74- [SentinelOne Cloud Funnel](https://ela.st/sentinel-one-cloud-funnel)
75- [Sysmon Event ID 1 - Process Creation](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-1-setup)
76- [Windows Process Creation Logs](https://ela.st/audit-process-creation)
77"""
78
79risk_score = 21
80rule_id = "1aa9181a-492b-4c01-8b16-fa0735786b2b"
81severity = "low"
82tags = [
83 "Domain: Endpoint",
84 "OS: Windows",
85 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
86 "Tactic: Persistence",
87 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
88 "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
89 "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
90 "Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
91 "Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR",
92 "Data Source: Sysmon",
93 "Data Source: SentinelOne",
94 "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
95]
96timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
97type = "eql"
98
99query = '''
100process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
101 (process.name : ("net.exe", "net1.exe") and not process.parent.name : "net.exe") and
102 (process.args : "user" and process.args : ("/ad", "/add"))
103'''
104
105
106[[rule.threat]]
107framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
108
109[[rule.threat.technique]]
110id = "T1136"
111name = "Create Account"
112reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/"
113
114[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
115id = "T1136.001"
116name = "Local Account"
117reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/"
118
119[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
120id = "T1136.002"
121name = "Domain Account"
122reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002/"
123
124[rule.threat.tactic]
125id = "TA0003"
126name = "Persistence"
127reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating User Account Creation
Attackers may create new accounts (both local and domain) to maintain access to victim systems.
This rule identifies the usage of net.exe to create new accounts.
Possible investigation steps
- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
- Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
False positive analysis
- Account creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
Related rules
- Creation of a Hidden Local User Account - 2edc8076-291e-41e9-81e4-e3fcbc97ae5e
- Windows User Account Creation - 38e17753-f581-4644-84da-0d60a8318694
Response and remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- Delete the created account.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
Related rules
- Adding Hidden File Attribute via Attrib
- Execution via MSSQL xp_cmdshell Stored Procedure
- New ActiveSyncAllowedDeviceID Added via PowerShell
- Persistence via WMI Event Subscription
- Potential Application Shimming via Sdbinst