User Account Creation

Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence on a system or domain.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2020/02/18"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2024/05/21"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence
 11on a system or domain.
 12"""
 13from = "now-9m"
 14index = [
 15    "winlogbeat-*",
 16    "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
 17    "logs-windows.*",
 18    "endgame-*",
 19    "logs-system.security*",
 20]
 21language = "eql"
 22license = "Elastic License v2"
 23name = "User Account Creation"
 24note = """## Triage and analysis
 25
 26### Investigating User Account Creation
 27
 28Attackers may create new accounts (both local and domain) to maintain access to victim systems.
 29
 30This rule identifies the usage of `net.exe` to create new accounts.
 31
 32#### Possible investigation steps
 33
 34- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
 35- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
 36- Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation.
 37- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
 38
 39### False positive analysis
 40
 41- Account creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
 42
 43### Related rules
 44
 45- Creation of a Hidden Local User Account - 2edc8076-291e-41e9-81e4-e3fcbc97ae5e
 46- Windows User Account Creation - 38e17753-f581-4644-84da-0d60a8318694
 47
 48### Response and remediation
 49
 50- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
 51- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
 52- Delete the created account.
 53- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
 54- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
 55- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 56"""
 57risk_score = 21
 58rule_id = "1aa9181a-492b-4c01-8b16-fa0735786b2b"
 59setup = """## Setup
 60
 61If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
 62events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
 63Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
 64`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
 65For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
 66"""
 67severity = "low"
 68tags = [
 69    "Domain: Endpoint",
 70    "OS: Windows",
 71    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 72    "Tactic: Persistence",
 73    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 74    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
 75    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
 76]
 77timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 78type = "eql"
 79
 80query = '''
 81process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
 82  process.name : ("net.exe", "net1.exe") and
 83  not process.parent.name : "net.exe" and
 84  (process.args : "user" and process.args : ("/ad", "/add"))
 85'''
 86
 87
 88[[rule.threat]]
 89framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 90[[rule.threat.technique]]
 91id = "T1136"
 92name = "Create Account"
 93reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/"
 94[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
 95id = "T1136.001"
 96name = "Local Account"
 97reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/"
 98
 99
100
101[rule.threat.tactic]
102id = "TA0003"
103name = "Persistence"
104reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"

Triage and analysis

Investigating User Account Creation

Attackers may create new accounts (both local and domain) to maintain access to victim systems.

This rule identifies the usage of net.exe to create new accounts.

Possible investigation steps

  • Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
  • Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
  • Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation.
  • Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.

False positive analysis

  • Account creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
  • Creation of a Hidden Local User Account - 2edc8076-291e-41e9-81e4-e3fcbc97ae5e
  • Windows User Account Creation - 38e17753-f581-4644-84da-0d60a8318694

Response and remediation

  • Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
  • Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
  • Delete the created account.
  • Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
  • Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
  • Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).

Related rules

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