Scheduled Task Created by a Windows Script
A scheduled task was created by a Windows script via cscript.exe, wscript.exe or powershell.exe. This can be abused by an adversary to establish persistence.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2020/11/29"
3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/09/18"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10A scheduled task was created by a Windows script via cscript.exe, wscript.exe or powershell.exe. This can be abused by
11an adversary to establish persistence.
12"""
13false_positives = ["Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software."]
14from = "now-9m"
15index = [
16 "winlogbeat-*",
17 "logs-endpoint.events.registry-*",
18 "logs-endpoint.events.library-*",
19 "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
20 "endgame-*",
21]
22language = "eql"
23license = "Elastic License v2"
24name = "Scheduled Task Created by a Windows Script"
25note = """## Triage and analysis
26
27Decode the base64 encoded Tasks Actions registry value to investigate the task's configured action."""
28risk_score = 47
29rule_id = "689b9d57-e4d5-4357-ad17-9c334609d79a"
30severity = "medium"
31tags = [
32 "Domain: Endpoint",
33 "OS: Windows",
34 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
35 "Tactic: Persistence",
36 "Tactic: Execution",
37 "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
38 "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
39 "Data Source: Sysmon",
40 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
41 "Noise: Medium",
42 "Performance: Normal",
43 "Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)",
44 "Platform: Windows",
45]
46type = "eql"
47
48query = '''
49sequence by host.id with maxspan = 30s
50 [any where host.os.type == "windows" and
51 (event.category : ("library", "driver") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
52 (?dll.name : "taskschd.dll" or file.name : "taskschd.dll") and
53 process.name : ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")]
54 [registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and registry.value : "Actions" and
55 registry.path : (
56 "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\TaskCache\\Tasks\\*\\Actions",
57 "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\TaskCache\\Tasks\\*\\Actions"
58 )]
59'''
60
61setup = """## Setup
62
63This rule is designed for data generated by [Elastic Defend](https://www.elastic.co/security/endpoint-security), which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.
64
65Setup instructions: https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend
66
67### Additional data sources
68
69This rule also supports the following third-party data sources. For setup instructions, refer to the links below:
70
71- [Sysmon Event ID 7 - Image Loaded](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-7-setup)
72- [Sysmon Registry Events](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-reg-setup)
73"""
74
75
76[[rule.threat]]
77framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
78[[rule.threat.technique]]
79id = "T1053"
80name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
81reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
82[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
83id = "T1053.005"
84name = "Scheduled Task"
85reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"
86
87
88
89[rule.threat.tactic]
90id = "TA0003"
91name = "Persistence"
92reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
93[[rule.threat]]
94framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
95[[rule.threat.technique]]
96id = "T1059"
97name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
98reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
99[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
100id = "T1059.001"
101name = "PowerShell"
102reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
103
104[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
105id = "T1059.005"
106name = "Visual Basic"
107reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/"
108
109
110
111[rule.threat.tactic]
112id = "TA0002"
113name = "Execution"
114reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
Triage and analysis
Decode the base64 encoded Tasks Actions registry value to investigate the task's configured action.
Related rules
- New ActiveSyncAllowedDeviceID Added via PowerShell
- Persistence via WMI Event Subscription
- Adding Hidden File Attribute via Attrib
- Clearing Windows Console History
- Command Shell Activity Started via RunDLL32