Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2020/10/19"
 3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
 6min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
 7updated_date = "2023/06/22"
 8
 9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Identifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could
13be indicative of adversary lateral movement.
14"""
15from = "now-9m"
16index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
17language = "eql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI"
20note = """## Setup
21
22If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
23"""
24risk_score = 47
25rule_id = "12f07955-1674-44f7-86b5-c35da0a6f41a"
26severity = "medium"
27tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Execution", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
28timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
29type = "eql"
30
31query = '''
32process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
33 process.parent.name : "WmiPrvSE.exe" and process.name : "cmd.exe" and
34 process.args : "\\\\127.0.0.1\\*" and process.args : ("2>&1", "1>")
35'''
36
37
38[[rule.threat]]
39framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
40[[rule.threat.technique]]
41id = "T1047"
42name = "Windows Management Instrumentation"
43reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/"
44
45
46[rule.threat.tactic]
47id = "TA0002"
48name = "Execution"
49reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"