Execution via local SxS Shared Module

Identifies the creation, change, or deletion of a DLL module within a Windows SxS local folder. Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads by instructing the Windows module loader to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2020/10/28"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/05/04"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10Identifies the creation, change, or deletion of a DLL module within a Windows SxS local folder. Adversaries may abuse
 11shared modules to execute malicious payloads by instructing the Windows module loader to load DLLs from arbitrary local
 12paths.
 13"""
 14from = "now-9m"
 15index = [
 16    "winlogbeat-*",
 17    "logs-endpoint.events.file-*",
 18    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
 19    "endgame-*",
 20    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
 21    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
 22    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
 23]
 24language = "eql"
 25license = "Elastic License v2"
 26name = "Execution via local SxS Shared Module"
 27note = """## Triage and analysis
 28
 29The SxS DotLocal folder is a legitimate feature that can be abused to hijack standard modules loading order by forcing an executable on the same application.exe.local folder to load a malicious DLL module from the same directory.
 30"""
 31
 32setup = """## Setup
 33
 34This rule is designed for data generated by [Elastic Defend](https://www.elastic.co/security/endpoint-security), which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.
 35
 36Setup instructions: https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend
 37
 38### Additional data sources
 39
 40This rule also supports the following third-party data sources. For setup instructions, refer to the links below:
 41
 42- [CrowdStrike](https://ela.st/crowdstrike-integration)
 43- [Microsoft Defender XDR](https://ela.st/m365-defender)
 44- [SentinelOne Cloud Funnel](https://ela.st/sentinel-one-cloud-funnel)
 45- [Sysmon Event ID 11 - File Create](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-11-setup)
 46"""
 47
 48references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection"]
 49risk_score = 47
 50rule_id = "a3ea12f3-0d4e-4667-8b44-4230c63f3c75"
 51severity = "medium"
 52tags = [
 53    "Domain: Endpoint",
 54    "OS: Windows",
 55    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 56    "Tactic: Execution",
 57    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
 58    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
 59    "Data Source: Sysmon",
 60    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR",
 61    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
 62    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
 63    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 64]
 65timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 66type = "eql"
 67
 68query = '''
 69file where host.os.type == "windows" and file.extension : "dll" and
 70  file.path : (
 71    "C:\\*\\*.exe.local\\*.dll",
 72    /* Crowdstrike specific condition as it uses NT Object paths */
 73    "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*\\*\\*.exe.local\\*.dll"
 74  )
 75'''
 76
 77
 78[[rule.threat]]
 79framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 80
 81[[rule.threat.technique]]
 82id = "T1129"
 83name = "Shared Modules"
 84reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129/"
 85
 86[rule.threat.tactic]
 87id = "TA0002"
 88name = "Execution"
 89reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
 90
 91[[rule.threat]]
 92framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 93
 94[[rule.threat.technique]]
 95id = "T1574"
 96name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
 97reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
 98
 99[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
100id = "T1574.001"
101name = "DLL"
102reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/"
103
104[rule.threat.tactic]
105id = "TA0005"
106name = "Defense Evasion"
107reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

Triage and analysis

The SxS DotLocal folder is a legitimate feature that can be abused to hijack standard modules loading order by forcing an executable on the same application.exe.local folder to load a malicious DLL module from the same directory.

References

Related rules

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