Suspicious SolarWinds Child Process
A suspicious SolarWinds child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to execute malicious programs.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2020/12/14"
3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
4maturity = "production"
5min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
6min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
7updated_date = "2023/06/22"
8
9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = "A suspicious SolarWinds child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to execute malicious programs."
12false_positives = [
13 "Trusted SolarWinds child processes, verify process details such as network connections and file writes.",
14]
15from = "now-9m"
16index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
17language = "eql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "Suspicious SolarWinds Child Process"
20note = """## Setup
21
22If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
23"""
24references = [
25 "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html",
26 "https://github.com/mandiant/sunburst_countermeasures/blob/main/rules/SUNBURST/hxioc/SUNBURST%20SUSPICIOUS%20CHILD%20PROCESSES%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc",
27]
28risk_score = 47
29rule_id = "93b22c0a-06a0-4131-b830-b10d5e166ff4"
30severity = "medium"
31tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Execution", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
32timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
33type = "eql"
34
35query = '''
36process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
37 process.parent.name: ("SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe", "SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHostx64.exe") and
38 not process.name : (
39 "APMServiceControl*.exe",
40 "ExportToPDFCmd*.Exe",
41 "SolarWinds.Credentials.Orion.WebApi*.exe",
42 "SolarWinds.Orion.Topology.Calculator*.exe",
43 "Database-Maint.exe",
44 "SolarWinds.Orion.ApiPoller.Service.exe",
45 "WerFault.exe",
46 "WerMgr.exe",
47 "SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe",
48 "SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHostx64.exe") and
49 not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\ARP.EXE", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\lodctr.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\unlodctr.exe")
50'''
51
52
53[[rule.threat]]
54framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
55[[rule.threat.technique]]
56id = "T1106"
57name = "Native API"
58reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/"
59
60
61[rule.threat.tactic]
62id = "TA0002"
63name = "Execution"
64reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
65[[rule.threat]]
66framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
67[[rule.threat.technique]]
68id = "T1195"
69name = "Supply Chain Compromise"
70reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/"
71[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
72id = "T1195.002"
73name = "Compromise Software Supply Chain"
74reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/"
75
76
77
78[rule.threat.tactic]
79id = "TA0001"
80name = "Initial Access"
81reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
Setup
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested
and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate event.ingested
to @timestamp for this rule to work.
References
Related rules
- Command Execution via SolarWinds Process
- Command Shell Activity Started via RunDLL32
- Conhost Spawned By Suspicious Parent Process
- Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE
- Execution from Unusual Directory - Command Line