Suspicious SolarWinds Child Process

A suspicious SolarWinds child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to execute malicious programs.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2020/12/14"
 3integration = ["endpoint"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
 6min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
 7updated_date = "2024/03/28"
 8
 9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = "A suspicious SolarWinds child process was detected, which may indicate an attempt to execute malicious programs."
12false_positives = [
13    "Trusted SolarWinds child processes, verify process details such as network connections and file writes.",
14]
15from = "now-9m"
16index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process-*", "endgame-*"]
17language = "eql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "Suspicious SolarWinds Child Process"
20references = [
21    "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html",
22    "https://github.com/mandiant/sunburst_countermeasures/blob/main/rules/SUNBURST/hxioc/SUNBURST%20SUSPICIOUS%20CHILD%20PROCESSES%20(METHODOLOGY).ioc",
23]
24risk_score = 47
25rule_id = "93b22c0a-06a0-4131-b830-b10d5e166ff4"
26setup = """## Setup
27
28If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
29events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
30Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
31`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
32For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
33"""
34severity = "medium"
35tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Execution", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
36timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
37type = "eql"
38
39query = '''
40process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
41 process.parent.name: ("SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe", "SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHostx64.exe") and
42 not (
43    process.name : (
44        "APMServiceControl*.exe",
45        "ExportToPDFCmd*.Exe",
46        "SolarWinds.Credentials.Orion.WebApi*.exe",
47        "SolarWinds.Orion.Topology.Calculator*.exe",
48        "Database-Maint.exe",
49        "SolarWinds.Orion.ApiPoller.Service.exe",
50        "WerFault.exe",
51        "WerMgr.exe",
52        "SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe",
53        "SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHostx64.exe",
54        "SolarWinds.Topology.Calculator.exe",
55        "SolarWinds.Topology.Calculatorx64.exe",
56        "SolarWinds.APM.RealTimeProcessPoller.exe") and
57    process.code_signature.trusted == true
58 ) and
59 not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\ARP.EXE", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\lodctr.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\unlodctr.exe")
60'''
61
62
63[[rule.threat]]
64framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
65[[rule.threat.technique]]
66id = "T1106"
67name = "Native API"
68reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/"
69
70
71[rule.threat.tactic]
72id = "TA0002"
73name = "Execution"
74reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
75[[rule.threat]]
76framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
77[[rule.threat.technique]]
78id = "T1195"
79name = "Supply Chain Compromise"
80reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/"
81[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
82id = "T1195.002"
83name = "Compromise Software Supply Chain"
84reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/"
85
86
87
88[rule.threat.tactic]
89id = "TA0001"
90name = "Initial Access"
91reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"

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