Whoami Process Activity

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2020/02/18"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "system", "windows"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
  6min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
  7updated_date = "2023/06/22"
  8
  9[rule]
 10author = ["Elastic"]
 11description = """
 12Identifies suspicious use of whoami.exe which displays user, group, and privileges information for the user who is
 13currently logged on to the local system.
 14"""
 15false_positives = [
 16    """
 17    Some normal use of this program, at varying levels of frequency, may originate from scripts, automation tools and
 18    frameworks. Usage by non-engineers and ordinary users is unusual.
 19    """,
 20]
 21from = "now-9m"
 22index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*", "logs-system.*", "endgame-*"]
 23language = "eql"
 24license = "Elastic License v2"
 25name = "Whoami Process Activity"
 26note = """## Triage and analysis
 27
 28### Investigating Whoami Process Activity
 29
 30After successfully compromising an environment, attackers may try to gain situational awareness to plan their next steps. This can happen by running commands to enumerate network resources, users, connections, files, and installed security software.
 31
 32This rule looks for the execution of the `whoami` utility. Attackers commonly use this utility to measure their current privileges, discover the current user, determine if a privilege escalation was successful, etc.
 33
 34#### Possible investigation steps
 35
 36- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
 37- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
 38- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
 39- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network connections.
 40
 41### False positive analysis
 42
 43- Discovery activities are not inherently malicious if they occur in isolation. As long as the analyst did not identify suspicious activity related to the user or host, such alerts can be dismissed.
 44
 45### Related rules
 46
 47- Account Discovery Command via SYSTEM Account - 2856446a-34e6-435b-9fb5-f8f040bfa7ed
 48
 49### Response and remediation
 50
 51- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
 52- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
 53- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
 54- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
 55- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
 56- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 57
 58## Setup
 59
 60If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
 61"""
 62risk_score = 21
 63rule_id = "ef862985-3f13-4262-a686-5f357bbb9bc2"
 64severity = "low"
 65tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Discovery", "Resources: Investigation Guide", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
 66timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 67type = "eql"
 68
 69query = '''
 70process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "whoami.exe" and
 71(
 72
 73 (/* scoped for whoami execution under system privileges */
 74  (user.domain : ("NT AUTHORITY", "NT-AUTORITÄT", "AUTORITE NT", "IIS APPPOOL") or user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20")) and
 75
 76   not (process.parent.name : "cmd.exe" and
 77        process.parent.args : ("chcp 437>nul 2>&1 & C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\whoami.exe  /groups",
 78                               "chcp 437>nul 2>&1 & %systemroot%\\system32\\whoami /user",
 79                               "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\whoami.exe /groups",
 80                               "*WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\systemprofile*")) and
 81   not (process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\system32\\inetsrv\\appcmd.exe" and process.parent.args : "LIST") and
 82   not process.parent.executable : ("C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\Agent\\MonitoringHost.exe",
 83                                    "C:\\Program Files\\Cohesity\\cohesity_windows_agent_service.exe")) or
 84
 85  process.parent.name : ("wsmprovhost.exe", "w3wp.exe", "wmiprvse.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe")
 86
 87)
 88'''
 89
 90
 91[[rule.threat]]
 92framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 93[[rule.threat.technique]]
 94id = "T1033"
 95name = "System Owner/User Discovery"
 96reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"
 97
 98
 99[rule.threat.tactic]
100id = "TA0007"
101name = "Discovery"
102reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"