Suspicious CertUtil Commands

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2020/02/18"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
  6min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
  7updated_date = "2024/03/28"
  8
  9[transform]
 10[[transform.osquery]]
 11label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
 12query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
 13
 14[[transform.osquery]]
 15label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
 16query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
 17
 18[[transform.osquery]]
 19label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
 20query = """
 21SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
 22NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
 23user_account == null)
 24"""
 25
 26[[transform.osquery]]
 27label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
 28query = """
 29SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
 30services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
 31authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
 32"""
 33
 34[rule]
 35author = ["Elastic", "Austin Songer"]
 36description = """
 37Identifies suspicious commands being used with certutil.exe. CertUtil is a native Windows component which is part of
 38Certificate Services. CertUtil is often abused by attackers to live off the land for stealthier command and control or
 39data exfiltration.
 40"""
 41from = "now-9m"
 42index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.process-*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*", "logs-system.security*"]
 43language = "eql"
 44license = "Elastic License v2"
 45name = "Suspicious CertUtil Commands"
 46note = """## Triage and analysis
 47
 48### Investigating Suspicious CertUtil Commands
 49
 50`certutil.exe` is a command line utility program that is included with Microsoft Windows operating systems. It is used to manage and manipulate digital certificates and certificate services on computers running Windows.
 51
 52Attackers can abuse `certutil.exe` utility to download and/or deobfuscate malware, offensive security tools, and certificates from external sources to take the next steps in a compromised environment. This rule identifies command line arguments used to accomplish these behaviors.
 53
 54> **Note**:
 55> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
 56
 57#### Possible investigation steps
 58
 59- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
 60- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
 61- Examine the command line to determine the nature of the execution.
 62  - If files were downloaded, retrieve them and check whether they were run, and under which security context.
 63  - If files were obfuscated or deobfuscated, retrieve them.
 64- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
 65  - Analyze the involved files using a private sandboxed analysis system.
 66  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
 67    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
 68      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
 69      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
 70        - $osquery_0
 71    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
 72    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
 73      - $osquery_1
 74      - $osquery_2
 75      - $osquery_3
 76  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
 77
 78### False positive analysis
 79
 80- If this rule is noisy in your environment due to expected activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
 81
 82### Response and remediation
 83
 84- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
 85- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
 86- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
 87  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
 88  - Stop suspicious processes.
 89  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
 90  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
 91- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
 92- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
 93- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
 94- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 95"""
 96references = [
 97    "https://twitter.com/Moriarty_Meng/status/984380793383370752",
 98    "https://twitter.com/egre55/status/1087685529016193025",
 99    "https://www.sysadmins.lv/blog-en/certutil-tips-and-tricks-working-with-x509-file-format.aspx",
100    "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/pki/basic-crl-checking-with-certutil",
101]
102risk_score = 47
103rule_id = "fd70c98a-c410-42dc-a2e3-761c71848acf"
104severity = "medium"
105tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Defense Evasion", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Resources: Investigation Guide", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
106timeline_id = "e70679c2-6cde-4510-9764-4823df18f7db"
107timeline_title = "Comprehensive Process Timeline"
108timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
109type = "eql"
110
111query = '''
112process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
113  (process.name : "certutil.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "CertUtil.exe") and
114  process.args : ("?decode", "?encode", "?urlcache", "?verifyctl", "?encodehex", "?decodehex", "?exportPFX")
115'''
116
117
118[[rule.threat]]
119framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
120[[rule.threat.technique]]
121id = "T1140"
122name = "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"
123reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"
124
125
126[rule.threat.tactic]
127id = "TA0005"
128name = "Defense Evasion"
129reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"