Suspicious LSASS Access via MalSecLogon

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2022/06/29"
 3integration = ["windows"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5min_stack_comments = "Build time field required_fields divergence between -8.7 and 8.8+ due to schema versions."
 6min_stack_version = "8.8.0"
 7updated_date = "2024/03/08"
 8
 9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to seclogon.dll and with a suspicious access
13rights value. This may indicate an attempt to leak an LSASS handle via abusing the Secondary Logon service in
14preparation for credential access.
15"""
16from = "now-9m"
17index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*"]
18language = "eql"
19license = "Elastic License v2"
20name = "Suspicious LSASS Access via MalSecLogon"
21references = ["https://splintercod3.blogspot.com/p/the-hidden-side-of-seclogon-part-3.html"]
22risk_score = 73
23rule_id = "7ba58110-ae13-439b-8192-357b0fcfa9d7"
24setup = """## Setup
25
26If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
27events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
28Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
29`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
30For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
31"""
32severity = "high"
33tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Credential Access", "Data Source: Sysmon"]
34timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
35type = "eql"
36
37query = '''
38process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code == "10" and
39  winlog.event_data.TargetImage : "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe" and
40
41   /* seclogon service accessing lsass */
42  winlog.event_data.CallTrace : "*seclogon.dll*" and process.name : "svchost.exe" and
43
44   /* PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS & PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE & PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION */
45  winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess == "0x14c0"
46'''
47
48
49[[rule.threat]]
50framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
51[[rule.threat.technique]]
52id = "T1003"
53name = "OS Credential Dumping"
54reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
55[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
56id = "T1003.001"
57name = "LSASS Memory"
58reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/"
59
60
61
62[rule.threat.tactic]
63id = "TA0006"
64name = "Credential Access"
65reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"