Remote File Download via MpCmdRun

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2020/09/03"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2024/03/28"
  6min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
  7min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
  8
  9[transform]
 10[[transform.osquery]]
 11label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
 12query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
 13
 14[[transform.osquery]]
 15label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
 16query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
 17
 18[[transform.osquery]]
 19label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
 20query = """
 21SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
 22NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
 23user_account == null)
 24"""
 25
 26[[transform.osquery]]
 27label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
 28query = """
 29SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
 30services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
 31authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
 32"""
 33
 34[[transform.investigate]]
 35label = "Alerts associated with the user in the last 48h"
 36relativeFrom = "now-48h/h"
 37relativeTo = "now"
 38providers = [
 39    [
 40        {field = "event.kind", excluded = false, queryType = "phrase", value = "signal", valueType = "string"},
 41        {field = "user.id", excluded = false, queryType = "phrase", value = "{{user.id}}", valueType = "string"}
 42    ]
 43]
 44
 45[[transform.investigate]]
 46label = "Alerts associated with the host in the last 48h"
 47relativeFrom = "now-48h/h"
 48relativeTo = "now"
 49providers = [
 50    [
 51        {field = "event.kind", excluded = false, queryType = "phrase", value = "signal", valueType = "string"},
 52        {field = "host.name", excluded = false, queryType = "phrase", value = "{{host.name}}", valueType = "string"}
 53    ]
 54]
 55
 56[[transform.investigate]]
 57label = "Investigate the Subject Process Network Events"
 58providers = [
 59    [
 60        {field = "process.entity_id", excluded = false, queryType = "phrase", value = "{{process.entity_id}}", valueType = "string"},
 61        {field = "event.category", excluded = false, queryType = "phrase", value = "network", valueType = "string"}
 62    ]
 63]
 64
 65
 66[rule]
 67author = ["Elastic"]
 68description = "Identifies the Windows Defender configuration utility (MpCmdRun.exe) being used to download a remote file."
 69from = "now-9m"
 70index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.process-*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*", "logs-system.security*"]
 71language = "eql"
 72license = "Elastic License v2"
 73name = "Remote File Download via MpCmdRun"
 74note = """## Triage and analysis
 75
 76### Investigating Remote File Download via MpCmdRun
 77
 78Attackers commonly transfer tooling or malware from external systems into a compromised environment using the command and control channel. However, they can also abuse signed utilities to drop these files.
 79
 80The `MpCmdRun.exe` is a command-line tool part of Windows Defender and is used to manage various Microsoft Windows Defender Antivirus settings and perform certain tasks. It can also be abused by attackers to download remote files, including malware and offensive tooling. This rule looks for the patterns used to perform downloads using the utility.
 81
 82> **Note**:
 83> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
 84> This investigation guide uses the [Investigate Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/interactive-investigation-guides.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.8.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
 85
 86#### Possible investigation steps
 87
 88- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
 89- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
 90- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
 91- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
 92  - $investigate_0
 93  - $investigate_1
 94- Check the reputation of the domain or IP address used to host the downloaded file.
 95- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
 96  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
 97  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
 98    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
 99      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
100        - $investigate_2
101      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
102        - $osquery_0
103    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
104    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
105      - $osquery_1
106      - $osquery_2
107      - $osquery_3
108  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
109- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
110
111### False positive analysis
112
113- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
114
115### Response and remediation
116
117- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
118- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
119- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
120  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
121  - Stop suspicious processes.
122  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
123  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
124- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
125- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
126- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
127- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
128- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
129"""
130references = [
131    "https://twitter.com/mohammadaskar2/status/1301263551638761477",
132    "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-defender-can-ironically-be-used-to-download-malware/",
133]
134risk_score = 47
135rule_id = "c6453e73-90eb-4fe7-a98c-cde7bbfc504a"
136setup = """## Setup
137
138If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
139events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
140Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
141`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
142For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
143"""
144severity = "medium"
145tags = [
146    "Domain: Endpoint",
147    "OS: Windows",
148    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
149    "Tactic: Command and Control",
150    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
151    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
152    "Data Source: Elastic Defend"
153]
154timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
155type = "eql"
156
157query = '''
158process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
159  (process.name : "MpCmdRun.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "MpCmdRun.exe") and
160   process.args : "-DownloadFile" and process.args : "-url" and process.args : "-path"
161'''
162
163
164[[rule.threat]]
165framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
166[[rule.threat.technique]]
167id = "T1105"
168name = "Ingress Tool Transfer"
169reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"
170
171
172[rule.threat.tactic]
173id = "TA0011"
174name = "Command and Control"
175reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"