Chkconfig Service Add

Detects the use of the chkconfig binary to manually add a service for management by chkconfig. Threat actors may utilize this technique to maintain persistence on a system. When a new service is added, chkconfig ensures that the service has either a start or a kill entry in every runlevel and when the system is rebooted the service file added will run providing long-term persistence.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2022/07/22"
  3maturity = "production"
  4min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
  5min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
  6updated_date = "2023/12/13"
  7integration = ["endpoint"]
  8
  9[transform]
 10[[transform.osquery]]
 11label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information"
 12query = "SELECT * FROM file WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/init.d/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/rc%.d/%')"
 13
 14[[transform.osquery]]
 15label = "Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information"
 16query = """
 17SELECT
 18  f.path,
 19  u.username AS file_owner,
 20  g.groupname AS group_owner,
 21  datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_access_time,
 22  datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time,
 23  datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_status_change_time,
 24  datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time,
 25  f.size AS size_bytes
 26FROM
 27  file f
 28  LEFT JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid
 29  LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid
 30WHERE (path LIKE '/etc/init.d/%' OR path LIKE '/etc/rc%.d/%')
 31"""
 32
 33[[transform.osquery]]
 34label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
 35query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
 36
 37[[transform.osquery]]
 38label = "Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information"
 39query = "SELECT * FROM crontab"
 40
 41[[transform.osquery]]
 42label = "Osquery - Retrieve Listening Ports"
 43query = "SELECT pid, address, port, socket, protocol, path FROM listening_ports"
 44
 45[[transform.osquery]]
 46label = "Osquery - Retrieve Open Sockets"
 47query = "SELECT pid, family, remote_address, remote_port, socket, state FROM process_open_sockets"
 48
 49[[transform.osquery]]
 50label = "Osquery - Retrieve Information for a Specific User"
 51query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = {{user.name}}"
 52
 53[[transform.osquery]]
 54label = "Osquery - Investigate the Account Authentication Status"
 55query = "SELECT * FROM logged_in_users WHERE user = {{user.name}}"
 56
 57[rule]
 58author = ["Elastic"]
 59description = """
 60Detects the use of the chkconfig binary to manually add a service for management by chkconfig. Threat actors may utilize
 61this technique to maintain persistence on a system. When a new service is added, chkconfig ensures that the service has
 62either a start or a kill entry in every runlevel and when the system is rebooted the service file added will run 
 63providing long-term persistence.
 64"""
 65from = "now-9m"
 66index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
 67language = "eql"
 68license = "Elastic License v2"
 69name = "Chkconfig Service Add"
 70note = """## Triage and analysis
 71
 72### Investigating Chkconfig Service Add
 73Service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services. The `Chkconfig` binary can be used to manually add, delete or modify a service. 
 74
 75Malicious actors can leverage services to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
 76
 77This rule monitors the usage of the `chkconfig` binary to manually add a service for management by `chkconfig`, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.
 78
 79> **Note**:
 80> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
 81> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
 82
 83#### Possible Investigation Steps
 84
 85- Investigate the service that was created or modified.
 86- Investigate the currently enabled system services through the following commands `sudo chkconfig --list | grep on` and `sudo systemctl list-unit-files`.
 87- Investigate the status of potentially suspicious services through the `chkconfig --list service_name` command. 
 88- Search for the `rc.d` or `init.d` service files that were created or modified, and analyze their contents.
 89- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available `rc.d` or `init.d` directories have been altered through OSQuery.
 90  - $osquery_0
 91  - $osquery_1
 92- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
 93  - $osquery_2
 94- Investigate syslog through the `sudo cat /var/log/syslog | grep 'LSB'` command to find traces of the LSB header of the script (if present). If syslog is being ingested into Elasticsearch, the same can be accomplished through Kibana.
 95- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
 96- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
 97- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system. 
 98  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
 99    - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
100      - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
101        - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
102          - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
103          - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
104        - File access, modification, and creation activities.
105        - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
106            - $osquery_3
107- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
108  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
109    - $osquery_4
110    - $osquery_5
111  - Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
112    - $osquery_6
113- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
114    - $osquery_7
115
116### False Positive Analysis
117
118- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
119- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses the `chkconfig` binary for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account. 
120- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
121
122### Related Rules
123
124- Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence - 1c84dd64-7e6c-4bad-ac73-a5014ee37042
125- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
126- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
127- New Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
128- New Systemd Service Created by Previously Unknown Process - 17b0a495-4d9f-414c-8ad0-92f018b8e001
129
130### Response and remediation
131
132- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
133- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
134- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
135  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
136  - Stop suspicious processes.
137  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
138  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
139- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
140- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
141- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
142- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
143- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
144"""
145references = [
146    "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/lightning-framework-new-linux-threat/"
147]
148risk_score = 47
149rule_id = "b910f25a-2d44-47f2-a873-aabdc0d355e6"
150setup = """## Setup
151
152This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
153
154### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
155Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
156
157#### Prerequisite Requirements:
158- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
159- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
160
161#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
162- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
163- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
164- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
165- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
166- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
167- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
168- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
169- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
170For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
171- Click "Save and Continue".
172- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
173For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
174"""
175severity = "medium"
176tags = [
177        "Domain: Endpoint",
178        "OS: Linux",
179        "Use Case: Threat Detection",
180        "Tactic: Persistence",
181        "Threat: Lightning Framework",
182        "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
183        "Data Source: Elastic Defend"
184        ]
185timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
186type = "eql"
187
188query = '''
189process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event") and
190( 
191  (process.executable : "/usr/sbin/chkconfig" and process.args : "--add") or
192  (process.args : "*chkconfig" and process.args : "--add")
193) and 
194not process.parent.name in ("rpm", "qualys-scan-util", "qualys-cloud-agent", "update-alternatives") and
195not process.parent.args : ("/var/tmp/rpm*", "/var/lib/waagent/*")
196'''
197
198[[rule.threat]]
199framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
200
201[[rule.threat.technique]]
202id = "T1037"
203name = "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"
204reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/"
205
206[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
207id = "T1037.004"
208name = "RC Scripts"
209reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004/"
210
211[rule.threat.tactic]
212id = "TA0003"
213name = "Persistence"
214reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"

Triage and analysis

Investigating Chkconfig Service Add

Service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services. The Chkconfig binary can be used to manually add, delete or modify a service.

Malicious actors can leverage services to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.

This rule monitors the usage of the chkconfig binary to manually add a service for management by chkconfig, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.

Note: This investigation guide uses the Osquery Markdown Plugin introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide. This investigation guide uses placeholder fields to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.

Possible Investigation Steps

  • Investigate the service that was created or modified.
  • Investigate the currently enabled system services through the following commands sudo chkconfig --list | grep on and sudo systemctl list-unit-files.
  • Investigate the status of potentially suspicious services through the chkconfig --list service_name command.
  • Search for the rc.d or init.d service files that were created or modified, and analyze their contents.
  • Investigate whether any other files in any of the available rc.d or init.d directories have been altered through OSQuery.
    • $osquery_0
    • $osquery_1
  • Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
    • $osquery_2
  • Investigate syslog through the sudo cat /var/log/syslog | grep 'LSB' command to find traces of the LSB header of the script (if present). If syslog is being ingested into Elasticsearch, the same can be accomplished through Kibana.
  • Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
  • Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
  • Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system.
    • If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
      • Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
        • Observe and collect information about the following activities:
          • Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
            • Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
            • Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
          • File access, modification, and creation activities.
          • Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
            • $osquery_3
  • Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
    • Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
      • $osquery_4
      • $osquery_5
    • Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
      • $osquery_6
  • Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
    • $osquery_7

False Positive Analysis

  • If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
  • If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses the chkconfig binary for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account.
  • Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.
  • Suspicious File Creation in /etc for Persistence - 1c84dd64-7e6c-4bad-ac73-a5014ee37042
  • Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
  • Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
  • New Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c
  • New Systemd Service Created by Previously Unknown Process - 17b0a495-4d9f-414c-8ad0-92f018b8e001

Response and remediation

  • Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
  • Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
  • If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
    • Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
    • Stop suspicious processes.
    • Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
    • Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
  • Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
  • Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
  • Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
  • Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
  • Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).

References

Related rules

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