Okta User Sessions Started from Different Geolocations

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2023/11/18"
  3integration = ["okta"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.15.0 for the Okta Integration."
  6min_stack_version = "8.15.0"
  7updated_date = "2024/12/09"
  8
  9[rule]
 10author = ["Elastic"]
 11description = """
 12Detects when a specific Okta actor has multiple sessions started from different geolocations. Adversaries may attempt to
 13launch an attack by using a list of known usernames and passwords to gain unauthorized access to user accounts from
 14different locations.
 15"""
 16from = "now-30m"
 17interval = "15m"
 18language = "esql"
 19license = "Elastic License v2"
 20name = "Okta User Sessions Started from Different Geolocations"
 21note = """
 22
 23## Triage and analysis
 24
 25### Investigating Okta User Sessions Started from Different Geolocations
 26
 27This rule detects when a specific Okta actor has multiple sessions started from different geolocations. Adversaries may attempt to launch an attack by using a list of known usernames and passwords to gain unauthorized access to user accounts from different locations.
 28
 29#### Possible investigation steps:
 30- Since this is an ES|QL rule, the `okta.actor.alternate_id` and `okta.client.id` values can be used to pivot into the raw authentication events related to this alert.
 31- Identify the users involved in this action by examining the `okta.actor.id`, `okta.actor.type`, `okta.actor.alternate_id`, and `okta.actor.display_name` fields.
 32- Determine the device client used for these actions by analyzing `okta.client.ip`, `okta.client.user_agent.raw_user_agent`, `okta.client.zone`, `okta.client.device`, and `okta.client.id` fields.
 33- With Okta end users identified, review the `okta.debug_context.debug_data.dt_hash` field.
 34    - Historical analysis should indicate if this device token hash is commonly associated with the user.
 35- Review the `okta.event_type` field to determine the type of authentication event that occurred.
 36    - If the event type is `user.authentication.sso`, the user may have legitimately started a session via a proxy for security or privacy reasons.
 37    - If the event type is `user.authentication.password`, the user may be using a proxy to access multiple accounts for password spraying.
 38    - If the event type is `user.session.start`, the source may have attempted to establish a session via the Okta authentication API.
 39- Review the past activities of the actor(s) involved in this action by checking their previous actions.
 40- Evaluate the actions that happened just before and after this event in the `okta.event_type` field to help understand the full context of the activity.
 41    - This may help determine the authentication and authorization actions that occurred between the user, Okta and application.
 42
 43### False positive analysis:
 44- It is very rare that a legitimate user would have multiple sessions started from different geo-located countries in a short time frame.
 45
 46### Response and remediation:
 47- If the user is legitimate and the authentication behavior is not suspicious based on device analysis, no action is required.
 48- If the user is legitimate but the authentication behavior is suspicious, consider resetting passwords for the users involves and enabling multi-factor authentication (MFA).
 49    - If MFA is already enabled, consider resetting MFA for the users.
 50- If any of the users are not legitimate, consider deactivating the user's account.
 51- Conduct a review of Okta policies and ensure they are in accordance with security best practices.
 52- Check with internal IT teams to determine if the accounts involved recently had MFA reset at the request of the user.
 53    - If so, confirm with the user this was a legitimate request.
 54    - If so and this was not a legitimate request, consider deactivating the user's account temporarily.
 55        - Reset passwords and reset MFA for the user.
 56- If this is a false positive, consider adding the `okta.debug_context.debug_data.dt_hash` field to the `exceptions` list in the rule.
 57    - This will prevent future occurrences of this event for this device from triggering the rule.
 58    - Alternatively adding `okta.client.ip` or a CIDR range to the `exceptions` list can prevent future occurrences of this event from triggering the rule.
 59        - This should be done with caution as it may prevent legitimate alerts from being generated.
 60"""
 61references = [
 62    "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/",
 63    "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/",
 64    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/testing-okta-visibility-and-detection-dorothy",
 65    "https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection",
 66    "https://www.rezonate.io/blog/okta-logs-decoded-unveiling-identity-threats-through-threat-hunting/",
 67    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/monitoring-okta-threats-with-elastic-security",
 68    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/starter-guide-to-understanding-okta",
 69]
 70risk_score = 47
 71rule_id = "2e56e1bc-867a-11ee-b13e-f661ea17fbcd"
 72setup = """
 73The Okta Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
 74"""
 75severity = "medium"
 76tags = ["Use Case: Identity and Access Audit", "Data Source: Okta", "Tactic: Initial Access"]
 77timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 78type = "esql"
 79
 80query = '''
 81FROM logs-okta*
 82| WHERE
 83    event.dataset == "okta.system"
 84    AND (event.action RLIKE "user\\.authentication(.*)" OR event.action == "user.session.start")
 85    AND okta.security_context.is_proxy != true and okta.actor.id != "unknown"
 86    AND event.outcome == "success"
 87| KEEP event.action, okta.security_context.is_proxy, okta.actor.id, event.outcome, client.geo.country_name, okta.actor.alternate_id
 88| STATS
 89    geo_auth_counts = COUNT_DISTINCT(client.geo.country_name)
 90    BY okta.actor.id, okta.actor.alternate_id
 91| WHERE
 92    geo_auth_counts >= 2
 93'''
 94
 95[[rule.threat]]
 96framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 97[[rule.threat.technique]]
 98id = "T1078"
 99name = "Valid Accounts"
100reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
101[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
102id = "T1078.004"
103name = "Cloud Accounts"
104reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/"
105
106[rule.threat.tactic]
107id = "TA0001"
108name = "Initial Access"
109reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"