Potential Okta Brute Force (Multi-Source)
Detects potential brute force attacks against a single Okta user account from multiple source IPs, indicating attackers rotating through proxy infrastructure to evade IP-based detection.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/02/19"
3integration = ["okta"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/09/18"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Detects potential brute force attacks against a single Okta user account from multiple source IPs, indicating
11attackers rotating through proxy infrastructure to evade IP-based detection.
12"""
13false_positives = [
14 "Users with legitimate multi-location access (mobile + home + office) experiencing concurrent login issues.",
15 "Shared service accounts accessed from multiple legitimate infrastructure IPs.",
16]
17from = "now-30m"
18language = "esql"
19license = "Elastic License v2"
20name = "Potential Okta Brute Force (Multi-Source)"
21note = """## Triage and analysis
22
23### Investigating Potential Okta Brute Force (Multi-Source)
24
25This rule identifies a single user account receiving failed authentication attempts from multiple unique source IPs. This pattern indicates attackers rotating through proxy infrastructure to evade IP-based detection while targeting a specific account.
26
27#### Possible investigation steps
28- Identify the targeted user account and determine if it has elevated privileges or sensitive access.
29- Review the geographic distribution of source IPs for anomalies such as multiple countries or unusual locations.
30- Examine the ASN ownership of source IPs for signs of proxy, VPN, or cloud infrastructure.
31- Check if Okta flagged any of the sources as known threats or proxies.
32- Determine if any authentication attempts succeeded following the failed attempts.
33- Review the user's recent activity for signs of account compromise.
34
35### False positive analysis
36- Users traveling internationally with mobile devices may generate failed attempts from multiple locations.
37- Service accounts accessed from distributed legitimate infrastructure may trigger this rule.
38- Corporate VPN exit nodes spread across regions could appear as multiple IPs for a single user.
39
40### Response and remediation
41- If attack is confirmed, reset the user's password immediately.
42- Review and potentially reset MFA for the targeted account.
43- Block attacking IP addresses at the network perimeter.
44- Consider implementing geo-restrictions for the targeted account if dispersed access is not expected.
45- Monitor for any successful authentication that may indicate compromise.
46"""
47references = [
48 "https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/Troubleshooting-Distributed-Brute-Force-andor-Password-Spray-attacks-in-Okta",
49 "https://www.okta.com/identity-101/brute-force/",
50 "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/",
51 "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/testing-okta-visibility-and-detection-dorothy",
52 "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/monitoring-okta-threats-with-elastic-security",
53 "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/starter-guide-to-understanding-okta",
54]
55risk_score = 47
56rule_id = "5889760c-9858-4b4b-879c-e299df493295"
57setup = "The Okta Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."
58severity = "medium"
59tags = [
60 "Domain: Identity",
61 "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
62 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
63 "Data Source: Okta",
64 "Data Source: Okta System Logs",
65 "Tactic: Credential Access",
66 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
67 "Noise: Low",
68 "Performance: Fast",
69 "Profile: Recommended",
70 "Threat: Brute Force",
71 "Rule Type: ES|QL",
72 "Platform: Okta",
73]
74timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
75type = "esql"
76
77query = '''
78FROM logs-okta.system-* METADATA _id, _version, _index
79| WHERE data_stream.dataset == "okta.system"
80 AND (event.action LIKE "user.authentication.*" OR event.action == "user.session.start")
81 AND okta.outcome.reason IN ("INVALID_CREDENTIALS", "LOCKED_OUT")
82 AND okta.actor.alternate_id IS NOT NULL
83
84// Create source mapping for analyst context
85| EVAL Esql.source_info = CONCAT(
86 "{\"ip\":\"", COALESCE(okta.client.ip::STRING, "unknown"),
87 "\",\"country\":\"", COALESCE(client.geo.country_name, "unknown"),
88 "\",\"asn\":\"", COALESCE(source.as.organization.name, "unknown"),
89 "\",\"user_agent\":\"", COALESCE(okta.client.user_agent.raw_user_agent, "unknown"), "\"}"
90 )
91
92| STATS
93 Esql.unique_source_ips = COUNT_DISTINCT(okta.client.ip),
94 Esql.total_attempts = COUNT(*),
95 Esql.unique_user_agents = COUNT_DISTINCT(okta.client.user_agent.raw_user_agent),
96 Esql.unique_dt_hashes = COUNT_DISTINCT(okta.debug_context.debug_data.dt_hash),
97 Esql.unique_asns = COUNT_DISTINCT(source.as.number),
98 Esql.unique_countries = COUNT_DISTINCT(client.geo.country_name),
99 Esql.first_seen = MIN(@timestamp),
100 Esql.last_seen = MAX(@timestamp),
101 Esql.source_ip_values = VALUES(okta.client.ip),
102 Esql.source_mapping = VALUES(Esql.source_info),
103 Esql.event_action_values = VALUES(event.action),
104 Esql.user_agent_values = VALUES(okta.client.user_agent.raw_user_agent),
105 Esql.device_values = VALUES(okta.client.device),
106 Esql.is_proxy_values = VALUES(okta.security_context.is_proxy),
107 Esql.geo_country_values = VALUES(client.geo.country_name),
108 Esql.geo_city_values = VALUES(client.geo.city_name),
109 Esql.source_asn_values = VALUES(source.as.number),
110 Esql.source_asn_org_values = VALUES(source.as.organization.name),
111 Esql.threat_suspected_values = VALUES(okta.debug_context.debug_data.threat_suspected),
112 Esql.risk_level_values = VALUES(okta.debug_context.debug_data.risk_level),
113 Esql.risk_reasons_values = VALUES(okta.debug_context.debug_data.risk_reasons)
114 BY okta.actor.alternate_id
115
116| EVAL
117 Esql.attempts_per_ip = Esql.total_attempts * 1.0 / Esql.unique_source_ips,
118 Esql.duration_seconds = DATE_DIFF("seconds", Esql.first_seen, Esql.last_seen)
119
120| WHERE
121 Esql.unique_source_ips >= 5
122 AND Esql.total_attempts >= 10
123 AND (
124 Esql.unique_countries >= 2 OR
125 Esql.unique_asns >= 3 OR
126 Esql.unique_source_ips >= 8 OR
127 Esql.unique_user_agents >= 3
128 )
129
130| SORT Esql.unique_source_ips DESC
131| KEEP Esql.*, okta.actor.alternate_id
132'''
133
134
135[[rule.threat]]
136framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
137[[rule.threat.technique]]
138id = "T1110"
139name = "Brute Force"
140reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"
141[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
142id = "T1110.001"
143name = "Password Guessing"
144reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/"
145
146
147[rule.threat.tactic]
148id = "TA0006"
149name = "Credential Access"
150reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating Potential Okta Brute Force (Multi-Source)
This rule identifies a single user account receiving failed authentication attempts from multiple unique source IPs. This pattern indicates attackers rotating through proxy infrastructure to evade IP-based detection while targeting a specific account.
Possible investigation steps
- Identify the targeted user account and determine if it has elevated privileges or sensitive access.
- Review the geographic distribution of source IPs for anomalies such as multiple countries or unusual locations.
- Examine the ASN ownership of source IPs for signs of proxy, VPN, or cloud infrastructure.
- Check if Okta flagged any of the sources as known threats or proxies.
- Determine if any authentication attempts succeeded following the failed attempts.
- Review the user's recent activity for signs of account compromise.
False positive analysis
- Users traveling internationally with mobile devices may generate failed attempts from multiple locations.
- Service accounts accessed from distributed legitimate infrastructure may trigger this rule.
- Corporate VPN exit nodes spread across regions could appear as multiple IPs for a single user.
Response and remediation
- If attack is confirmed, reset the user's password immediately.
- Review and potentially reset MFA for the targeted account.
- Block attacking IP addresses at the network perimeter.
- Consider implementing geo-restrictions for the targeted account if dispersed access is not expected.
- Monitor for any successful authentication that may indicate compromise.
References
Related rules
- Okta Successful Login After Credential Attack
- Potential Okta Password Spray (Multi-Source)
- Okta AiTM Session Cookie Replay
- Okta Alerts Following Unusual Proxy Authentication
- Okta Multiple OS Names Detected for a Single DT Hash