New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner
This rule detects the registration of a self-hosted GitHub Actions runner by a user and source ASN (autonomous system) pair not seen in the last 5 days. The source IP is resolved to its ASN at query time, so address churn inside the same ISP or cloud provider does not produce new alerts. Adversaries may abuse self-hosted runners to execute workflow jobs on customer infrastructure.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2025/11/28"
3integration = ["github"]
4maturity = "production"
5min_stack_comments = "ES|QL IP_LOCATION requires 9.5.0+."
6min_stack_version = "9.5.0"
7updated_date = "2026/10/07"
8
9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12This rule detects the registration of a self-hosted GitHub Actions runner by a user and source ASN (autonomous
13system) pair not seen in the last 5 days. The source IP is resolved to its ASN at query time, so address churn inside
14the same ISP or cloud provider does not produce new alerts. Adversaries may abuse self-hosted runners to execute
15workflow jobs on customer infrastructure.
16"""
17false_positives = [
18 "Authorized self-hosted GitHub actions runner.",
19]
20from = "now-7205m"
21interval = "5m"
22language = "esql"
23license = "Elastic License v2"
24name = "New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner"
25note = """## Triage and analysis
26
27### Investigating New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner
28
29Adversaries who gain the ability to modify or trigger workflows in a linked GitHub repository can execute arbitrary commands on the runner host.
30
31### Possible investigation steps
32
33- Validate the user is authoried to perform this change
34- Review the purpose of the self-hosted action runner and what actions will be executed.
35- Verify if there is any adjascent sensitive file access or collection.
36- Correlate with other alerts and investiguate if this activity is related to a supply chain attack.
37
38### False positive analysis
39
40- Authorized github self-hosted actions runner.
41
42### Response and remediation
43
44- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized command execution and potential lateral movement.
45- Terminate any suspicious child processes that were initiated by the Github actions runner.
46- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's logs and configurations to identify any unauthorized changes or additional indicators of compromise.
47- Restore the system from a known good backup if any unauthorized changes or malicious activities are confirmed.
48- Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized execution.
49- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on the broader network."""
50references = [
51 "https://www.elastic.co/blog/shai-hulud-worm-npm-supply-chain-compromise",
52 "https://socket.dev/blog/shai-hulud-strikes-again-v2",
53 "https://www.wiz.io/blog/shai-hulud-2-0-ongoing-supply-chain-attack"
54]
55risk_score = 47
56rule_id = "40c34c8a-b0bc-43bc-83aa-d2b76bf129e1"
57severity = "medium"
58tags = [
59 "Domain: Cloud",
60 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
61 "Tactic: Initial Access",
62 "Data Source: Github",
63 "Data Source: GitHub Audit Logs",
64 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
65 "Noise: Low",
66 "Performance: Fast",
67 "Profile: Recommended",
68 "Threat: Supply Chain",
69 "Rule Type: ES|QL",
70 "Platform: GitHub",
71 "Domain: SaaS",
72]
73timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
74type = "esql"
75
76query = '''
77FROM logs-github.audit-*
78| WHERE event.dataset == "github.audit" AND event.category == "configuration"
79 AND event.action IN ("repo.register_self_hosted_runner", "org.register_self_hosted_runner", "enterprise.register_self_hosted_runner")
80 AND user.name IS NOT NULL AND github.actor_ip IS NOT NULL
81| IP_LOCATION asn = github.actor_ip WITH { "database_file": "GeoLite2-ASN.mmdb", "properties": ["asn", "organization_name"] }
82| IP_LOCATION geo = github.actor_ip WITH { "properties": ["country_iso_code"] }
83| WHERE asn.asn IS NOT NULL
84| STATS Esql.event_count = COUNT(*),
85 Esql.first_seen = MIN(@timestamp),
86 Esql.last_seen = MAX(@timestamp),
87 Esql.ip_values = VALUES(github.actor_ip),
88 Esql.event_action_values = VALUES(event.action),
89 Esql.repo_values = VALUES(github.repo),
90 Esql.org_values = VALUES(github.org),
91 Esql.country_values = VALUES(geo.country_iso_code),
92 Esql.user_agent_values = VALUES(github.user_agent)
93 BY user.name, asn.asn, asn.organization_name
94// The 5-day history is the rule look-back (from = now-7205m). A user/ASN pair is new when its first
95// event falls inside the current interval; the 10m bound allows for the 5m interval plus scheduling drift.
96| WHERE DATE_DIFF("minute", Esql.first_seen, NOW()) <= 10
97| EVAL Esql.source_as_number = asn.asn, Esql.source_as_organization_name = asn.organization_name
98| KEEP user.name, Esql.*
99'''
100
101[[rule.threat]]
102framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
103
104[[rule.threat.technique]]
105id = "T1195"
106name = "Supply Chain Compromise"
107reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/"
108
109[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
110id = "T1195.001"
111name = "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools"
112reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001/"
113
114[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
115id = "T1195.002"
116name = "Compromise Software Supply Chain"
117reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/"
118
119[rule.threat.tactic]
120id = "TA0001"
121name = "Initial Access"
122reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner
Adversaries who gain the ability to modify or trigger workflows in a linked GitHub repository can execute arbitrary commands on the runner host.
Possible investigation steps
- Validate the user is authoried to perform this change
- Review the purpose of the self-hosted action runner and what actions will be executed.
- Verify if there is any adjascent sensitive file access or collection.
- Correlate with other alerts and investiguate if this activity is related to a supply chain attack.
False positive analysis
- Authorized github self-hosted actions runner.
Response and remediation
- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized command execution and potential lateral movement.
- Terminate any suspicious child processes that were initiated by the Github actions runner.
- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's logs and configurations to identify any unauthorized changes or additional indicators of compromise.
- Restore the system from a known good backup if any unauthorized changes or malicious activities are confirmed.
- Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized execution.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on the broader network.
References
Related rules
- GitHub Actions Workflow Modification Blocked
- GitHub Activity on a Private Repository from an Unusual ASN
- GitHub Actions Unusual Bot Push to Repository
- High Number of Closed Pull Requests by User
- Several Failed Protected Branch Force Pushes by User