GitHub Actions Workflow Run Rapidly Deleted
Detects when a GitHub Actions workflow run is deleted within 30 minutes of its creation. Adversaries who abuse Actions for execution or secret theft may delete short-lived runs afterward to remove job logs that show the malicious steps.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/11/17"
3integration = ["github"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/11/17"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Detects when a GitHub Actions workflow run is deleted within 30 minutes of its creation. Adversaries who abuse Actions
11for execution or secret theft may delete short-lived runs afterward to remove job logs that show the malicious steps.
12"""
13false_positives = [
14 """
15 Automation that deletes failed or temporary workflow runs shortly after execution. Review whether the workflow,
16 repository, and actors are expected.
17 """,
18]
19from = "now-39m"
20language = "esql"
21license = "Elastic License v2"
22name = "GitHub Actions Workflow Run Rapidly Deleted"
23note = """## Triage and analysis
24
25### Investigating GitHub Actions Workflow Run Rapidly Deleted
26
27`workflows.delete_workflow_run` is recorded when a run is deleted. GitHub does not always emit a separate audit event for deleting only the logs; the run deletion itself is the reliable cover-up signal. This rule correlates workflow-run creation and deletion events for the same organization, repository, and workflow when they occur within 30 minutes.
28
29### Possible investigation steps
30
31- Review `user.name`, `github.repo`, `github.data.workflow_id`, and the correlated creation and deletion timestamps.
32- Determine which workflow file ran and whether it was recently added or modified.
33- Look for `git.push` by `github-actions[bot]` or unexpected `GITHUB_TOKEN` usage around the same time.
34- Check org/repo secrets access (`api.request` for secrets) from the same actor.
35
36### False positive analysis
37
38- Admins pruning old CI history.
39- Tools that delete runs after collecting artifacts.
40
41### Response and remediation
42
43- If unauthorized, disable the suspect workflow and rotate secrets used by Actions.
44- Review commits to `.github/workflows/` and restrict `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions.
45- Preserve remaining Actions logs and audit events for the incident window.
46"""
47references = ["https://docs.github.com/en/rest/actions/workflow-runs#delete-a-workflow-run"]
48risk_score = 21
49rule_id = "c3767835-ee6d-4523-8d11-3cabeecbb8cf"
50severity = "low"
51tags = [
52 "Domain: Cloud",
53 "Domain: SaaS",
54 "Platform: GitHub",
55 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
56 "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
57 "Data Source: Github",
58 "Data Source: GitHub Audit Logs",
59 "Service: GitHub Actions",
60 "Rule Type: ES|QL",
61 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
62]
63timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
64type = "esql"
65
66query = '''
67FROM logs-github.audit-*
68| WHERE event.module == "github" AND data_stream.dataset == "github.audit"
69 AND event.action IN (
70 "workflows.created_workflow_run",
71 "workflows.delete_workflow_run"
72 )
73| EVAL
74 Esql.is_workflow_run_created = event.action == "workflows.created_workflow_run",
75 Esql.is_workflow_run_deleted = event.action == "workflows.delete_workflow_run"
76| STATS
77 Esql.workflow_run_created_count = SUM(CASE(Esql.is_workflow_run_created, 1, 0)),
78 Esql.workflow_run_deleted_count = SUM(CASE(Esql.is_workflow_run_deleted, 1, 0)),
79 Esql.workflow_run_created_at = MIN(CASE(Esql.is_workflow_run_created, @timestamp, null)),
80 Esql.workflow_run_deleted_at = MAX(CASE(Esql.is_workflow_run_deleted, @timestamp, null)),
81 user.name = VALUES(user.name),
82 github.actor_ip = VALUES(github.actor_ip),
83 github.hashed_token = VALUES(github.hashed_token),
84 github.programmatic_access_type = VALUES(github.programmatic_access_type),
85 github.user_agent = VALUES(github.user_agent),
86 github.data.workflow_run_id = VALUES(github.data.workflow_run_id)
87 BY github.org, github.repo, github.data.workflow_id
88| EVAL Esql.time_diff_seconds = DATE_DIFF(
89 "second", Esql.workflow_run_created_at, Esql.workflow_run_deleted_at
90 )
91| WHERE Esql.workflow_run_created_count > 0
92 AND Esql.workflow_run_deleted_count > 0
93 AND Esql.time_diff_seconds >= 0
94 AND Esql.time_diff_seconds <= 1800
95 AND DATE_DIFF("minute", Esql.workflow_run_deleted_at, NOW()) <= 10
96| KEEP
97 Esql.workflow_run_created_at,
98 Esql.workflow_run_deleted_at,
99 Esql.time_diff_seconds,
100 Esql.workflow_run_created_count,
101 Esql.workflow_run_deleted_count,
102 user.name,
103 github.org,
104 github.repo,
105 github.actor_ip,
106 github.hashed_token,
107 github.programmatic_access_type,
108 github.user_agent,
109 github.data.workflow_id,
110 github.data.workflow_run_id
111'''
112
113
114[[rule.threat]]
115framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
116[[rule.threat.technique]]
117id = "T1070"
118name = "Indicator Removal"
119reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/"
120
121
122[rule.threat.tactic]
123id = "TA0005"
124name = "Defense Evasion"
125reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
126
127[rule.investigation_fields]
128field_names = [
129 "Esql.workflow_run_created_at",
130 "Esql.workflow_run_deleted_at",
131 "Esql.time_diff_seconds",
132 "user.name",
133 "github.org",
134 "github.repo",
135 "github.actor_ip",
136 "github.hashed_token",
137 "github.programmatic_access_type",
138 "github.user_agent",
139 "github.data.workflow_id",
140 "github.data.workflow_run_id",
141]
142
143[rule.alert_suppression]
144group_by = [
145 "github.org",
146 "github.repo",
147 "github.data.workflow_run_id",
148]
149missing_fields_strategy = "doNotSuppress"
150
151[rule.alert_suppression.duration]
152unit = "h"
153value = 1
Triage and analysis
Investigating GitHub Actions Workflow Run Rapidly Deleted
workflows.delete_workflow_run is recorded when a run is deleted. GitHub does not always emit a separate audit event for deleting only the logs; the run deletion itself is the reliable cover-up signal. This rule correlates workflow-run creation and deletion events for the same organization, repository, and workflow when they occur within 30 minutes.
Possible investigation steps
- Review
user.name,github.repo,github.data.workflow_id, and the correlated creation and deletion timestamps. - Determine which workflow file ran and whether it was recently added or modified.
- Look for
git.pushbygithub-actions[bot]or unexpectedGITHUB_TOKENusage around the same time. - Check org/repo secrets access (
api.requestfor secrets) from the same actor.
False positive analysis
- Admins pruning old CI history.
- Tools that delete runs after collecting artifacts.
Response and remediation
- If unauthorized, disable the suspect workflow and rotate secrets used by Actions.
- Review commits to
.github/workflows/and restrictGITHUB_TOKENpermissions. - Preserve remaining Actions logs and audit events for the incident window.
References
Related rules
- GitHub Actions or Integration Secret Created
- GitHub Organization Removed or Transferred from Enterprise
- GitHub Token Clone Push or ZIP from Unusual ASN
- GitHub OAuth App Access Restrictions Disabled
- GitHub SAML SSO Disabled