Entra ID Password Reset of Another User

Identifies an Entra ID administrative password reset where the initiating principal differs from the target user ("Reset user password" / "Update PasswordProfile"). Adversaries and business email compromise operators reset another user's password to hijack the account or establish persistence. This ES|QL rule compares the initiator to the target and normalizes the initiator across user- and app-initiated operations.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2026/11/12"
 3integration = ["azure"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5updated_date = "2026/11/12"
 6
 7[rule]
 8author = ["Elastic"]
 9description = """
10Identifies an Entra ID administrative password reset where the initiating principal differs from the target user
11("Reset user password" / "Update PasswordProfile"). Adversaries and business email compromise operators reset another
12user's password to hijack the account or establish persistence. This ES|QL rule compares the initiator to the target and
13normalizes the initiator across user- and app-initiated operations.
14"""
15from = "now-10m"
16interval = "5m"
17language = "esql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "Entra ID Password Reset of Another User"
20note = """## Triage and analysis
21
22> **Disclaimer**:
23> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
24
25### Investigating Entra ID Password Reset of Another User
26
27An administrator (or an identity with reset rights) resetting another user's password is a routine helpdesk action, but it is also a direct account-takeover and BEC persistence primitive. This rule surfaces resets where the actor is not the target.
28
29### Possible investigation steps
30
31- Confirm the actor (`Esql.actor`) and target (`Esql.target`), and whether the reset was expected/ticketed.
32- Review `source.ip` and `source.as.organization.name` for the initiator; unusual networks warrant scrutiny.
33- Correlate with subsequent sign-ins to the target account, MFA changes, and mailbox-rule or app-consent activity.
34
35### False positive analysis
36
37- Helpdesk, IT admins, and self-service-delegated roles reset passwords routinely. Baseline known helpdesk/IDM principals and consider layering rareness (first-seen actor) to reduce volume.
38
39### Response and remediation
40
41- If unauthorized, re-reset the target's password, revoke its sessions, review follow-on activity, and rotate the initiator's credentials.
42"""
43references = [
44    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-audit-logs",
45    "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098.003/T1098.003.md",
46]
47risk_score = 47
48rule_id = "16be5981-be9e-4fcd-887d-0069c47c7ff7"
49severity = "medium"
50tags = [
51    "Domain: Cloud",
52    "Data Source: Azure",
53    "Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit Logs",
54    "Domain: Identity",
55    "Platform: Azure",
56    "Platform: Microsoft Entra ID",
57    "Tactic: Persistence",
58    "Rule Type: ES|QL",
59    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
60]
61timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
62type = "esql"
63
64query = '''
65FROM logs-azure.auditlogs-* METADATA _id, _version, _index
66| WHERE event.dataset == "azure.auditlogs"
67    AND event.action IN ("Reset user password", "Update PasswordProfile")
68    AND event.outcome == "success"
69    AND azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.app.displayName != "Microsoft password reset service"
70| EVAL Esql.actor = COALESCE(azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.user.userPrincipalName, azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.app.displayName),
71       Esql.target = `azure.auditlogs.properties.target_resources.0.user_principal_name`
72| WHERE Esql.actor IS NOT NULL AND Esql.target IS NOT NULL AND Esql.actor != Esql.target
73| KEEP _id, _version, _index, @timestamp, Esql.*, event.*, source.*, azure.*
74'''
75
76
77[[rule.threat]]
78framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
79[[rule.threat.technique]]
80id = "T1098"
81name = "Account Manipulation"
82reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
83
84
85[rule.threat.tactic]
86id = "TA0003"
87name = "Persistence"
88reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"

Triage and analysis

Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

Investigating Entra ID Password Reset of Another User

An administrator (or an identity with reset rights) resetting another user's password is a routine helpdesk action, but it is also a direct account-takeover and BEC persistence primitive. This rule surfaces resets where the actor is not the target.

Possible investigation steps

  • Confirm the actor (Esql.actor) and target (Esql.target), and whether the reset was expected/ticketed.
  • Review source.ip and source.as.organization.name for the initiator; unusual networks warrant scrutiny.
  • Correlate with subsequent sign-ins to the target account, MFA changes, and mailbox-rule or app-consent activity.

False positive analysis

  • Helpdesk, IT admins, and self-service-delegated roles reset passwords routinely. Baseline known helpdesk/IDM principals and consider layering rareness (first-seen actor) to reduce volume.

Response and remediation

  • If unauthorized, re-reset the target's password, revoke its sessions, review follow-on activity, and rotate the initiator's credentials.

References

Related rules

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