AWS SES Enumeration via Long-Term Access Key

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2026/08/24"
  3integration = ["aws"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/08/24"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10Detects enumeration of Amazon Simple Email Service (SES) resources using long-term IAM access
 11keys (AKIA* prefix). Long-term access keys are associated with IAM users and are the credential
 12type most commonly exfiltrated from repositories, configuration files, and environment variables.
 13An adversary who obtains a long-term key may enumerate SES to discover verified email identities,
 14sending quotas, and DKIM/MAIL FROM domain configurations as a precursor to phishing or spam
 15campaigns launched from the compromised account's verified domains.
 16"""
 17false_positives = [
 18    """
 19    Automated monitoring scripts, infrastructure inventory tools, or CI/CD pipelines that use
 20    long-term IAM keys to audit SES configuration will trigger this rule. Migrate automation
 21    to IAM roles with short-lived credentials; long-term keys used for SES management are a
 22    security anti-pattern regardless of this alert.
 23    """,
 24]
 25from = "now-6m"
 26index = ["logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
 27language = "kuery"
 28license = "Elastic License v2"
 29name = "AWS SES Enumeration via Long-Term Access Key"
 30note = """## Triage and analysis
 31
 32### Investigating AWS SES Enumeration via Long-Term Access Key
 33
 34Amazon SES verified identities (email addresses and domains) are the sending credentials that allow SES to send email on behalf of a domain. Adversaries who exfiltrate long-term IAM keys may enumerate SES to identify available verified domains for phishing, discover DKIM configurations, or check sending limits before launching a bulk email campaign.
 35
 36Long-term keys (AKIA* prefix) are lower-security than assumed-role credentials: they do not expire and are frequently exposed in source code, .env files, CI/CD configuration, and developer workstations. This makes them the most common compromised credential type in cloud environments.
 37
 38### Possible investigation steps
 39
 40- Identify the IAM user behind the long-term key from aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn.
 41- Check whether this access key has been rotated recently (GetAccessKeyLastUsed, ListAccessKeys). Confirm the user who owns the key initiated this activity.
 42- Review source.ip and source.as.organization.name against known developer or automation infrastructure. API calls from unexpected geographies using a long-term key are high-risk.
 43- Query CloudTrail for subsequent SES write operations (SendEmail, SendRawEmail, VerifyEmailIdentity, UpdateAccountSendingEnabled) using the same access key.
 44- Check GitHub, GitLab, and CI/CD logs for any public exposure of this key.
 45
 46### Response and remediation
 47
 48- Immediately deactivate the long-term access key (UpdateAccessKey --status Inactive).
 49- Rotate all credentials associated with the IAM user.
 50- Review all SES quotas and sending history to determine whether unauthorized email was sent.
 51- Migrate automation that used this key to IAM roles with short-lived assumed-role credentials.
 52"""
 53references = [
 54    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ses/latest/APIReference/API_ListIdentities.html",
 55    "https://permiso.io/blog/s/aws-ses-pionage-detecting-ses-abuse/",
 56    "https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.discovery.ses-enumerate/",
 57]
 58risk_score = 21
 59rule_id = "8d05971b-5858-4b72-b09a-17e3cee0af54"
 60setup = "The AWS integration must be ingesting management events into `logs-aws.cloudtrail-*`. SES management APIs are logged by default."
 61severity = "low"
 62tags = [
 63    "Domain: Cloud",
 64    "Platform: AWS",
 65    "Data Source: AWS CloudTrail",
 66    "Service: AWS SES",
 67    "Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL)",
 68    "Tactic: Discovery",
 69    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 70]
 71timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 72type = "query"
 73
 74query = '''
 75data_stream.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
 76    and event.provider: "ses.amazonaws.com"
 77    and event.action: (
 78        "ListIdentities" or
 79        "GetAccountSendingEnabled" or
 80        "GetSendQuota" or
 81        "ListEmailIdentities" or
 82        "GetEmailIdentity" or
 83        "DescribeActiveReceiptRuleSet" or
 84        "ListReceiptRuleSets"
 85    )
 86    and event.outcome: "success"
 87    and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id: AKIA*
 88'''
 89
 90
 91[[rule.threat]]
 92framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 93[[rule.threat.technique]]
 94id = "T1526"
 95name = "Cloud Service Discovery"
 96reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526/"
 97
 98
 99[rule.threat.tactic]
100id = "TA0007"
101name = "Discovery"
102reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
103
104[rule.investigation_fields]
105field_names = [
106    "@timestamp",
107    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
108    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
109    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id",
110    "user.name",
111    "event.action",
112    "event.outcome",
113    "source.ip",
114    "source.as.organization.name",
115    "cloud.region",
116    "cloud.account.id",
117]