Anthropic Multiple Authentication Failures

Detects at least five failed Anthropic authentication events for the same user email within one hour. Failures are matched by authentication category and failure outcome (for example magic-link or SSO login failures). That pattern fits repeated guessing, stale magic link abuse, or automated login attempts against one account.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2026/09/12"
  3integration = ["anthropic"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/09/21"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10Detects at least five failed Anthropic authentication events for the same user email within one hour.
 11Failures are matched by authentication category and failure outcome (for example magic-link or SSO login
 12failures). That pattern fits repeated guessing, stale magic link abuse, or automated login attempts against
 13one account.
 14"""
 15false_positives = [
 16    """
 17    A user repeatedly clicking an expired or invalid magic link from the same browser session can produce several
 18    failures before requesting a new link or signing in successfully.
 19    """,
 20    """
 21    IdP or SSO cutover testing against a pilot account can generate a short burst of failed attempts for one email
 22    during maintenance windows.
 23    """,
 24]
 25from = "now-60m"
 26interval = "15m"
 27language = "esql"
 28license = "Elastic License v2"
 29name = "Anthropic Multiple Authentication Failures"
 30note = """## Triage and analysis
 31
 32### Investigating Anthropic Multiple Authentication Failures
 33
 34One mailbox produced a burst of authentication failures (magic-link, SSO, or other auth failures) within an hour.
 35Use IP diversity on the alert to separate focused retries from distributed automation.
 36
 37Escalate when many distinct IPs hit one email, failures precede a successful login from an unfamiliar IP, or SSO /
 38magic-link second-factor weakening sits nearby. Close as FP for expired magic-link retries from one IP/UA or IdP
 39pilot testing with a ticket.
 40
 41#### Possible investigation steps
 42
 43- Read `Esql.event_count`, `Esql.event_action_values`, `Esql.source_ip_values`, and
 44  `Esql.source_ip_distinct_count`.
 45- Low IP diversity → one device/egress (typos, expired links, focused guessing). High diversity → distributed
 46  automation or proxy rotation — higher priority.
 47- Inspect UA / actor-type values for automation. Search for successful `magic_link_login_succeeded` /
 48  `sso_login_succeeded` for the same email or IPs in the window.
 49- Correlate with **Anthropic SSO Disabled or Connection Removed** or magic-link second-factor disablement when
 50  org-scoped admin events are present.
 51
 52### False positive analysis
 53
 54- Expired magic-link click storms from one IP and named IdP cutover tests are common FPs.
 55
 56### Response and remediation
 57
 58- On suspected stuffing/takeover: invalidate sessions, reset credentials/MFA, and review successful logins from new
 59  IPs. If failures precede a successful unfamiliar login, expand to data access and admin changes.
 60"""
 61references = [
 62    "https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/compliance/activities/list",
 63]
 64risk_score = 47
 65rule_id = "25647990-cc37-430c-9a4e-2793bb5445f5"
 66severity = "medium"
 67tags = [
 68    "Domain: GenAI",
 69    "Domain: Identity",
 70    "Platform: Anthropic",
 71    "Data Source: Anthropic Audit Logs",
 72    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
 73    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 74    "Use Case: UEBA",
 75    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 76    "Rule Type: ES|QL",
 77    "Tactic: Credential Access",
 78]
 79timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 80type = "esql"
 81
 82query = '''
 83from logs-anthropic.audit-*
 84| where
 85    data_stream.dataset == "anthropic.audit" and
 86    mv_contains(event.category, "authentication") and
 87    event.outcome == "failure" and
 88    user.email is not null
 89| stats
 90    Esql.event_count = count(*),
 91    Esql.event_id_values = values(event.id),
 92    Esql.event_action_values = values(event.action),
 93    Esql.source_ip_values = values(source.ip),
 94    Esql.source_ip_distinct_count = count_distinct(source.ip),
 95    Esql.user_agent_original_values = values(user_agent.original),
 96    Esql.anthropic_audit_actor_type_values = values(anthropic.audit.actor.type),
 97    Esql.timestamp_first_seen = min(@timestamp),
 98    Esql.timestamp_last_seen = max(@timestamp)
 99  by user.email
100| where Esql.event_count >= 5
101| keep user.email, Esql.*
102'''
103
104
105[[rule.threat]]
106framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
107[[rule.threat.technique]]
108id = "T1110"
109name = "Brute Force"
110reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"
111
112
113[rule.threat.tactic]
114id = "TA0006"
115name = "Credential Access"
116reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
117
118[rule.alert_suppression]
119group_by = ["user.email"]
120duration = {value = 1, unit = "h"}
121missing_fields_strategy = "suppress"
122
123[rule.investigation_fields]
124field_names = [
125    "user.email",
126    "Esql.event_count",
127    "Esql.event_id_values",
128    "Esql.event_action_values",
129    "Esql.source_ip_values",
130    "Esql.source_ip_distinct_count",
131    "Esql.user_agent_original_values",
132    "Esql.anthropic_audit_actor_type_values",
133    "Esql.timestamp_first_seen",
134    "Esql.timestamp_last_seen",
135]

Triage and analysis

Investigating Anthropic Multiple Authentication Failures

One mailbox produced a burst of authentication failures (magic-link, SSO, or other auth failures) within an hour. Use IP diversity on the alert to separate focused retries from distributed automation.

Escalate when many distinct IPs hit one email, failures precede a successful login from an unfamiliar IP, or SSO / magic-link second-factor weakening sits nearby. Close as FP for expired magic-link retries from one IP/UA or IdP pilot testing with a ticket.

Possible investigation steps

  • Read Esql.event_count, Esql.event_action_values, Esql.source_ip_values, and Esql.source_ip_distinct_count.
  • Low IP diversity → one device/egress (typos, expired links, focused guessing). High diversity → distributed automation or proxy rotation — higher priority.
  • Inspect UA / actor-type values for automation. Search for successful magic_link_login_succeeded / sso_login_succeeded for the same email or IPs in the window.
  • Correlate with Anthropic SSO Disabled or Connection Removed or magic-link second-factor disablement when org-scoped admin events are present.

False positive analysis

  • Expired magic-link click storms from one IP and named IdP cutover tests are common FPs.

Response and remediation

  • On suspected stuffing/takeover: invalidate sessions, reset credentials/MFA, and review successful logins from new IPs. If failures precede a successful unfamiliar login, expand to data access and admin changes.

References

Related rules

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