Anthropic Multiple Authentication Failures
Detects at least five failed Anthropic authentication events for the same user email within one hour. Failures are matched by authentication category and failure outcome (for example magic-link or SSO login failures). That pattern fits repeated guessing, stale magic link abuse, or automated login attempts against one account.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/09/12"
3integration = ["anthropic"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/09/25"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Detects at least five failed Anthropic authentication events for the same user email within one hour. Failures are
11matched by authentication category and failure outcome (for example magic-link or SSO login failures). That pattern fits
12repeated guessing, stale magic link abuse, or automated login attempts against one account.
13"""
14false_positives = [
15 """
16 A user repeatedly clicking an expired or invalid magic link from the same browser session can produce several
17 failures before requesting a new link or signing in successfully.
18 """,
19 """
20 IdP or SSO cutover testing against a pilot account can generate a short burst of failed attempts for one email
21 during maintenance windows.
22 """,
23]
24from = "now-60m"
25interval = "15m"
26language = "esql"
27license = "Elastic License v2"
28name = "Anthropic Multiple Authentication Failures"
29note = """## Triage and analysis
30
31### Investigating Anthropic Multiple Authentication Failures
32
33One mailbox produced a burst of authentication failures (magic-link, SSO, or other auth failures) within an hour.
34Use IP diversity on the alert to separate focused retries from distributed automation.
35
36Escalate when many distinct IPs hit one email, failures precede a successful login from an unfamiliar IP, or SSO /
37magic-link second-factor weakening sits nearby. Close as FP for expired magic-link retries from one IP/UA or IdP
38pilot testing with a ticket.
39
40#### Possible investigation steps
41
42- Read `Esql.event_count`, `Esql.event_action_values`, `Esql.source_ip_values`, and
43 `Esql.source_ip_distinct_count`.
44- Low IP diversity → one device/egress (typos, expired links, focused guessing). High diversity → distributed
45 automation or proxy rotation — higher priority.
46- Inspect UA / actor-type values for automation. Search for successful `magic_link_login_succeeded` /
47 `sso_login_succeeded` for the same email or IPs in the window.
48- Correlate with **Anthropic SSO Disabled or Connection Removed** or magic-link second-factor disablement when
49 org-scoped admin events are present.
50
51### False positive analysis
52
53- Expired magic-link click storms from one IP and named IdP cutover tests are common FPs.
54
55### Response and remediation
56
57- On suspected stuffing/takeover: invalidate sessions, reset credentials/MFA, and review successful logins from new
58 IPs. If failures precede a successful unfamiliar login, expand to data access and admin changes.
59"""
60references = ["https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/compliance/activities/list"]
61risk_score = 47
62rule_id = "25647990-cc37-430c-9a4e-2793bb5445f5"
63severity = "medium"
64tags = [
65 "Domain: GenAI",
66 "Domain: Identity",
67 "Platform: Anthropic",
68 "Data Source: Anthropic Audit Logs",
69 "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
70 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
71 "Use Case: UEBA",
72 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
73 "Rule Type: ES|QL",
74 "Tactic: Credential Access",
75]
76timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
77type = "esql"
78
79query = '''
80from logs-anthropic.audit-*
81| where
82 data_stream.dataset == "anthropic.audit" and
83 mv_contains(event.category, "authentication") and
84 event.outcome == "failure" and
85 user.email is not null
86| stats
87 Esql.event_count = count(*),
88 Esql.event_id_values = values(event.id),
89 Esql.event_action_values = values(event.action),
90 Esql.source_ip_values = values(source.ip),
91 Esql.source_ip_distinct_count = count_distinct(source.ip),
92 Esql.user_agent_original_values = values(user_agent.original),
93 Esql.anthropic_audit_actor_type_values = values(anthropic.audit.actor.type),
94 Esql.timestamp_first_seen = min(@timestamp),
95 Esql.timestamp_last_seen = max(@timestamp)
96 by user.email
97| where Esql.event_count >= 5
98| keep user.email, Esql.*
99'''
100
101
102[[rule.threat]]
103framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
104[[rule.threat.technique]]
105id = "T1110"
106name = "Brute Force"
107reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"
108
109
110[rule.threat.tactic]
111id = "TA0006"
112name = "Credential Access"
113reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
114[[rule.threat_mappings]]
115framework = "MITRE ATLAS"
116version = "2026.08"
117[[rule.threat_mappings.threat]]
118framework = "MITRE ATLAS"
119
120[rule.threat_mappings.threat.tactic]
121id = "AML.TA0013"
122name = "Credential Access"
123reference = "https://atlas.mitre.org/tactics/AML.TA0013/"
124
125[rule.alert_suppression]
126group_by = ["user.email"]
127missing_fields_strategy = "suppress"
128
129[rule.investigation_fields]
130field_names = [
131 "user.email",
132 "Esql.event_count",
133 "Esql.event_id_values",
134 "Esql.event_action_values",
135 "Esql.source_ip_values",
136 "Esql.source_ip_distinct_count",
137 "Esql.user_agent_original_values",
138 "Esql.anthropic_audit_actor_type_values",
139 "Esql.timestamp_first_seen",
140 "Esql.timestamp_last_seen",
141]
142
143[rule.alert_suppression.duration]
144unit = "h"
145value = 1
Triage and analysis
Investigating Anthropic Multiple Authentication Failures
One mailbox produced a burst of authentication failures (magic-link, SSO, or other auth failures) within an hour. Use IP diversity on the alert to separate focused retries from distributed automation.
Escalate when many distinct IPs hit one email, failures precede a successful login from an unfamiliar IP, or SSO / magic-link second-factor weakening sits nearby. Close as FP for expired magic-link retries from one IP/UA or IdP pilot testing with a ticket.
Possible investigation steps
- Read
Esql.event_count,Esql.event_action_values,Esql.source_ip_values, andEsql.source_ip_distinct_count. - Low IP diversity → one device/egress (typos, expired links, focused guessing). High diversity → distributed automation or proxy rotation — higher priority.
- Inspect UA / actor-type values for automation. Search for successful
magic_link_login_succeeded/sso_login_succeededfor the same email or IPs in the window. - Correlate with Anthropic SSO Disabled or Connection Removed or magic-link second-factor disablement when org-scoped admin events are present.
False positive analysis
- Expired magic-link click storms from one IP and named IdP cutover tests are common FPs.
Response and remediation
- On suspected stuffing/takeover: invalidate sessions, reset credentials/MFA, and review successful logins from new IPs. If failures precede a successful unfamiliar login, expand to data access and admin changes.
References
Related rules
- Anthropic Session Reuse Impossible Travel
- Anthropic Admin API Key Deleted
- Anthropic Impossible Travel Login
- Anthropic Magic Link Second Factor Disabled
- Anthropic Organization Domain Boundary Changed