Anthropic Organization Domain Boundary Changed
Verified organization domains control which email addresses can join or be pulled into an Anthropic tenant. Verifying, claiming, adding, or removing a domain changes the tenant boundary and can pull in attacker-controlled mailboxes or push out legitimate corporate domains. These events are infrequent and affect organization-wide membership trust.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/09/12"
3integration = ["anthropic"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/09/25"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Verified organization domains control which email addresses can join or be pulled into an Anthropic tenant. Verifying,
11claiming, adding, or removing a domain changes the tenant boundary and can pull in attacker-controlled mailboxes or push
12out legitimate corporate domains. These events are infrequent and affect organization-wide membership trust.
13"""
14false_positives = [
15 """
16 IT and identity teams verify or add corporate domains during tenant onboarding, mergers, or DNS migrations. Confirm
17 the domain and actor against change management records.
18 """,
19]
20from = "now-9m"
21language = "esql"
22license = "Elastic License v2"
23name = "Anthropic Organization Domain Boundary Changed"
24note = """## Triage and analysis
25
26### Investigating Anthropic Organization Domain Boundary Changed
27
28Verified domains control which email domains are trusted for membership. Verifying, adding, removing, or claiming a
29domain changes the tenant boundary (attacker-controlled mailboxes in, or corporate domains out).
30
31Unauthorized = domain not on the corporate allowlist / merger plan, `domain_claim_initiated` without DNS ownership
32work, or domain change paired with external invites or SSO changes.
33
34#### Possible investigation steps
35
36- Read `event.action` and `anthropic.audit.domain` (may be empty on `org_domain_add_initiated` /
37 `domain_claim_initiated` — pivot org + nearby domain events to recover the name).
38- Validate actor (email/IP/UA for `user_actor`) against identity admins.
39- For claims/adds, confirm DNS ownership work was planned. Look for related invites, SSO, or membership changes in
40 the same window.
41
42### False positive analysis
43
44- New Enterprise onboarding routinely verifies corporate domains — match change management.
45
46### Response and remediation
47
48- On unauthorized change: revert via Anthropic administration and review users added under the affected domain.
49"""
50references = ["https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/compliance/activities/list"]
51risk_score = 73
52rule_id = "fb3b43e2-0358-4bd0-b8b6-569d7c2baed1"
53severity = "high"
54tags = [
55 "Domain: GenAI",
56 "Domain: Identity",
57 "Platform: Anthropic",
58 "Data Source: Anthropic Audit Logs",
59 "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
60 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
61 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
62 "Rule Type: ES|QL",
63 "Tactic: Persistence",
64]
65timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
66type = "esql"
67
68query = '''
69from logs-anthropic.audit-* metadata _id, _version, _index
70| where
71 data_stream.dataset == "anthropic.audit" and
72 mv_contains(event.category, "configuration") and
73 event.action in (
74 "org_domain_verified",
75 "org_domain_removed",
76 "org_domain_add_initiated",
77 "domain_claim_initiated"
78 )
79| keep _id, _version, _index, @timestamp, event.*, organization.*, user.*, source.*, user_agent.*, anthropic.audit.*, data_stream.*
80'''
81
82
83[[rule.threat]]
84framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
85[[rule.threat.technique]]
86id = "T1098"
87name = "Account Manipulation"
88reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
89
90
91[rule.threat.tactic]
92id = "TA0003"
93name = "Persistence"
94reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
95[[rule.threat_mappings]]
96framework = "MITRE ATLAS"
97version = "2026.08"
98[[rule.threat_mappings.threat]]
99framework = "MITRE ATLAS"
100
101[rule.threat_mappings.threat.tactic]
102id = "AML.TA0006"
103name = "Persistence"
104reference = "https://atlas.mitre.org/tactics/AML.TA0006/"
105
106[rule.investigation_fields]
107field_names = [
108 "@timestamp",
109 "event.action",
110 "event.id",
111 "organization.id",
112 "anthropic.audit.domain",
113 "anthropic.audit.actor.type",
114 "user.email",
115 "user.id",
116 "source.ip",
117 "user_agent.original",
118]
Triage and analysis
Investigating Anthropic Organization Domain Boundary Changed
Verified domains control which email domains are trusted for membership. Verifying, adding, removing, or claiming a domain changes the tenant boundary (attacker-controlled mailboxes in, or corporate domains out).
Unauthorized = domain not on the corporate allowlist / merger plan, domain_claim_initiated without DNS ownership
work, or domain change paired with external invites or SSO changes.
Possible investigation steps
- Read
event.actionandanthropic.audit.domain(may be empty onorg_domain_add_initiated/domain_claim_initiated— pivot org + nearby domain events to recover the name). - Validate actor (email/IP/UA for
user_actor) against identity admins. - For claims/adds, confirm DNS ownership work was planned. Look for related invites, SSO, or membership changes in the same window.
False positive analysis
- New Enterprise onboarding routinely verifies corporate domains — match change management.
Response and remediation
- On unauthorized change: revert via Anthropic administration and review users added under the affected domain.
References
Related rules
- Anthropic Admin API Key Created
- Anthropic Admin API Key Deleted
- Anthropic Compliance API Key Created
- Anthropic Impossible Travel Login
- Anthropic Magic Link Second Factor Disabled