Anthropic Organization Domain Boundary Changed
Verified organization domains control which email addresses can join or be pulled into an Anthropic tenant. Verifying, claiming, adding, or removing a domain changes the tenant boundary and can pull in attacker-controlled mailboxes or push out legitimate corporate domains. These events are infrequent and affect organization-wide membership trust.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/09/12"
3integration = ["anthropic"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/09/21"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Verified organization domains control which email addresses can join or be pulled into an Anthropic tenant. Verifying,
11claiming, adding, or removing a domain changes the tenant boundary and can pull in attacker-controlled mailboxes or
12push out legitimate corporate domains. These events are infrequent and affect organization-wide membership trust.
13"""
14false_positives = [
15 """
16 IT and identity teams verify or add corporate domains during tenant onboarding, mergers, or DNS migrations.
17 Confirm the domain and actor against change management records.
18 """,
19]
20from = "now-9m"
21language = "esql"
22license = "Elastic License v2"
23name = "Anthropic Organization Domain Boundary Changed"
24note = """## Triage and analysis
25
26### Investigating Anthropic Organization Domain Boundary Changed
27
28Verified domains control which email domains are trusted for membership. Verifying, adding, removing, or claiming a
29domain changes the tenant boundary (attacker-controlled mailboxes in, or corporate domains out).
30
31Unauthorized = domain not on the corporate allowlist / merger plan, `domain_claim_initiated` without DNS ownership
32work, or domain change paired with external invites or SSO changes.
33
34#### Possible investigation steps
35
36- Read `event.action` and `anthropic.audit.domain` (may be empty on `org_domain_add_initiated` /
37 `domain_claim_initiated` — pivot org + nearby domain events to recover the name).
38- Validate actor (email/IP/UA for `user_actor`) against identity admins.
39- For claims/adds, confirm DNS ownership work was planned. Look for related invites, SSO, or membership changes in
40 the same window.
41
42### False positive analysis
43
44- New Enterprise onboarding routinely verifies corporate domains — match change management.
45
46### Response and remediation
47
48- On unauthorized change: revert via Anthropic administration and review users added under the affected domain.
49"""
50references = [
51 "https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/compliance/activities/list",
52]
53risk_score = 73
54rule_id = "fb3b43e2-0358-4bd0-b8b6-569d7c2baed1"
55severity = "high"
56tags = [
57 "Domain: GenAI",
58 "Platform: Anthropic",
59 "Data Source: Anthropic Audit Logs",
60 "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
61 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
62 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
63 "Rule Type: ES|QL",
64 "Tactic: Persistence",
65]
66timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
67type = "esql"
68
69query = '''
70from logs-anthropic.audit-* metadata _id, _version, _index
71| where
72 data_stream.dataset == "anthropic.audit" and
73 mv_contains(event.category, "configuration") and
74 event.action in (
75 "org_domain_verified",
76 "org_domain_removed",
77 "org_domain_add_initiated",
78 "domain_claim_initiated"
79 )
80| keep _id, _version, _index, @timestamp, event.*, organization.*, user.*, source.*, user_agent.*, anthropic.audit.*, data_stream.*
81'''
82
83
84[[rule.threat]]
85framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
86[[rule.threat.technique]]
87id = "T1098"
88name = "Account Manipulation"
89reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
90
91
92[rule.threat.tactic]
93id = "TA0003"
94name = "Persistence"
95reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
96
97[rule.investigation_fields]
98field_names = [
99 "@timestamp",
100 "event.action",
101 "event.id",
102 "organization.id",
103 "anthropic.audit.domain",
104 "anthropic.audit.actor.type",
105 "user.email",
106 "user.id",
107 "source.ip",
108 "user_agent.original",
109]
Triage and analysis
Investigating Anthropic Organization Domain Boundary Changed
Verified domains control which email domains are trusted for membership. Verifying, adding, removing, or claiming a domain changes the tenant boundary (attacker-controlled mailboxes in, or corporate domains out).
Unauthorized = domain not on the corporate allowlist / merger plan, domain_claim_initiated without DNS ownership
work, or domain change paired with external invites or SSO changes.
Possible investigation steps
- Read
event.actionandanthropic.audit.domain(may be empty onorg_domain_add_initiated/domain_claim_initiated— pivot org + nearby domain events to recover the name). - Validate actor (email/IP/UA for
user_actor) against identity admins. - For claims/adds, confirm DNS ownership work was planned. Look for related invites, SSO, or membership changes in the same window.
False positive analysis
- New Enterprise onboarding routinely verifies corporate domains — match change management.
Response and remediation
- On unauthorized change: revert via Anthropic administration and review users added under the affected domain.
References
Related rules
- Anthropic Admin API Key Created
- Anthropic Admin Role Assigned to User
- Anthropic Compliance API Key Created
- Anthropic Organization User Invite Sent
- Anthropic Admin API Key Deleted