Brand impersonation: Microsoft Teams invitation

Detects messages impersonating a Microsoft Teams invites by matching known invite text patterns while containing join links that do not resolve to Microsoft domains. Additional verification includes checking for absent phone dial-in options and missing standard Teams help text or HTML meeting components.

Sublime rule (View on GitHub)

  1name: "Brand impersonation: Microsoft Teams invitation"
  2description: "Detects messages impersonating a Microsoft Teams invites by matching known invite text patterns while containing join links that do not resolve to Microsoft domains. Additional verification includes checking for absent phone dial-in options and missing standard Teams help text or HTML meeting components."
  3type: "rule"
  4severity: "high"
  5source: |
  6  type.inbound
  7  and (
  8    (
  9      strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, 'Microsoft Teams')
 10      and strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
 11                            'join the meeting',
 12                            'confirm your attendance',
 13                            'confirm attendance'
 14      )
 15      and strings.contains(body.current_thread.text, 'Meeting ID:')
 16      and strings.contains(body.current_thread.text, 'Passcode:')
 17    )
 18    or (
 19      strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, "teams")
 20      // strings that give us confidence it's teams
 21      and 2 of (
 22        strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, "internal"),
 23        strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, "message"),
 24        strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, "meeting"),
 25        strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, "Download Teams")
 26      )
 27    )
 28    or any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
 29           .name == "org" and strings.icontains(.text, 'microsoft teams meeting')
 30    )
 31    // either the subject or sender.display name containt Microsoft Teams and Meeting
 32    or (
 33      any([subject.base, sender.display_name],
 34          strings.icontains(., 'Microsoft Teams')
 35          and strings.icontains(., 'meeting')
 36      )
 37    )
 38    or length(filter(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
 39                     .name == "org"
 40                     and strings.icontains(.text, "microsoft teams")
 41              )
 42    ) >= 2
 43  )
 44  and (
 45    (
 46      // not a reply
 47      length(headers.references) == 0
 48      and headers.in_reply_to is null
 49      // few links
 50      and length(distinct(body.links, .href_url.url)) < 10
 51      // short body
 52      and (
 53        length(body.current_thread.text) < 600
 54        // account for NLU disclaimer in length
 55        or any(map(filter(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
 56                          .name == "disclaimer"
 57                   ),
 58                   .text
 59               ),
 60               (length(body.current_thread.text) - length(.)) < 600
 61        )
 62        // NLU only tags the first english disclaimer, so pick up repeat disclaimers or non-english disclaimers as well
 63        or any(regex.iextract(body.current_thread.text,
 64                              '^(?P<disclaimer>.{100,}?)(?:confidentiality notice|nota di riservatezza)'
 65               ),
 66               length(.named_groups["disclaimer"]) < 600
 67        )
 68      )
 69    ) // or sender domain is new
 70    or network.whois(sender.email.domain).days_old < 365
 71  )
 72  // no unsubscribe links
 73  // common in newsletters which link to a webinar style event
 74  and not any(body.links, strings.icontains(.display_text, "unsub"))
 75  
 76  // one of the links contains is a CTA that doesn't link to MS
 77  and any(body.current_thread.links,
 78          (
 79            .display_text =~ "join the meeting"
 80            or strings.icontains(.display_text,
 81                                 "join the meeting",
 82                                 "play recording",
 83                                 "open in teams"
 84            )
 85            // is a mismatched domain via .display_url
 86            or (
 87              .display_url.domain.root_domain in (
 88                "microsoft.com",
 89                "microsoft.us",
 90                "microsoft.cn",
 91                "live.com"
 92              )
 93              and .mismatched
 94            )
 95          )
 96          and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in (
 97            "microsoft.com",
 98            "microsoft.us",
 99            "microsoft.cn",
100            "live.com"
101          )
102          and not (
103            .href_url.domain.root_domain == "mimecastprotect.com"
104            and (
105              strings.parse_domain(.href_url.query_params_decoded["domain"][0]).root_domain in (
106                "microsoft.com",
107                "microsoft.us",
108                "microsoft.cn",
109                "live.com"
110              )
111              or strings.parse_domain(.href_url.query_params_decoded["domain"][0]).root_domain in $bulk_mailer_url_root_domains
112            )
113          )
114          // rewriters often abstract the link
115          and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in $bulk_mailer_url_root_domains
116  )
117  // missing the dial by phone element
118  and not strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, 'Dial in by phone')
119  
120  // any of these suspicious elements from the body
121  and (
122    // malicious samples leveraged recipient domain branding here
123    not strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, 'Microsoft Teams Need help?')
124    // malicious samples contained unique html elements not present in legit ones
125    or strings.icontains(body.html.raw, '<div class="meeting-title">')
126    or strings.icontains(body.html.raw, '<div class="meeting-time">')
127    or strings.icontains(body.html.raw, '<div class="meeting-location">')
128    or strings.icontains(body.html.raw, '<span class="conflict-badge">')
129    or strings.icontains(body.html.raw, 'class="join-button"')
130  )
131  
132  // negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
133  and not (
134    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
135    and coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
136  )  
137attack_types:
138  - "Credential Phishing"
139tactics_and_techniques:
140  - "Impersonation: Brand"
141  - "Social engineering"
142detection_methods:
143  - "Content analysis"
144  - "Header analysis"
145  - "HTML analysis"
146  - "URL analysis"
147id: "46410ad8-3465-505f-a78e-f77704910a91"
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