Potential Persistence Via COM Hijacking From Suspicious Locations
Detects potential COM object hijacking where the "Server" (In/Out) is pointing to a suspicious or unsuale location
Sigma rule (View on GitHub)
1title: Potential Persistence Via COM Hijacking From Suspicious Locations
2id: 3d968d17-ffa4-4bc0-bfdc-f139de76ce77
3status: experimental
4description: Detects potential COM object hijacking where the "Server" (In/Out) is pointing to a suspicious or unsuale location
5references:
6 - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/ (idea)
7author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
8date: 2022/07/28
9modified: 2023/09/28
10tags:
11 - attack.persistence
12 - attack.t1546.015
13logsource:
14 category: registry_set
15 product: windows
16detection:
17 selection:
18 TargetObject|contains: '\CLSID\'
19 TargetObject|endswith:
20 - '\InprocServer32\(Default)'
21 - '\LocalServer32\(Default)'
22 Details|contains: # Add more suspicious paths and locations
23 - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
24 - '\Desktop\'
25 - '\Downloads\'
26 - '\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
27 - '\System32\spool\drivers\color\' # as seen in the knotweed blog
28 - '\Users\Public\'
29 - '\Windows\Temp\'
30 - '%appdata%'
31 - '%temp%'
32 - '%tmp%'
33 condition: selection
34falsepositives:
35 - Probable legitimate applications. If you find these please add them to an exclusion list
36level: high
References
Related rules
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