Unusual Process Network Connection
Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2020/02/18"
3integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/05/04"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these
11applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection.
12"""
13from = "now-9m"
14index = [
15 "winlogbeat-*",
16 "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
17 "logs-endpoint.events.network-*",
18 "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
19 "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
20]
21language = "eql"
22license = "Elastic License v2"
23name = "Unusual Process Network Connection"
24note = """## Triage and analysis
25
26### Investigating Unusual Process Network Connection
27
28This rule identifies network activity from unexpected system utilities and applications. These applications are commonly abused by attackers to execute code, evade detections, and bypass security protections.
29
30#### Possible investigation steps
31
32- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
33- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
34- Investigate the target host that the process is communicating with.
35- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
36
37### False positive analysis
38
39- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
40
41### Response and remediation
42
43- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
44- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
45- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
46- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
47- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
48- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
49- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
50"""
51
52setup = """## Setup
53
54This rule is designed for data generated by [Elastic Defend](https://www.elastic.co/security/endpoint-security), which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.
55
56Setup instructions: https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend
57
58### Additional data sources
59
60This rule also supports the following third-party data sources. For setup instructions, refer to the links below:
61
62- [SentinelOne Cloud Funnel](https://ela.st/sentinel-one-cloud-funnel)
63- [Sysmon Event ID 1 - Process Creation](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-1-setup)
64- [Sysmon Event ID 3 - Network Connection](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-3-setup)
65"""
66
67risk_score = 21
68rule_id = "610949a1-312f-4e04-bb55-3a79b8c95267"
69severity = "low"
70tags = [
71 "Domain: Endpoint",
72 "OS: Windows",
73 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
74 "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
75 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
76 "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
77 "Data Source: Sysmon",
78 "Data Source: SentinelOne",
79]
80type = "eql"
81
82query = '''
83sequence by process.entity_id
84 [process where host.os.type == "windows" and (process.name : "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe" or
85 process.name : "bginfo.exe" or
86 process.name : "cdb.exe" or
87 process.name : "cmstp.exe" or
88 process.name : "csi.exe" or
89 process.name : "dnx.exe" or
90 process.name : "fsi.exe" or
91 process.name : "ieexec.exe" or
92 process.name : "iexpress.exe" or
93 process.name : "odbcconf.exe" or
94 process.name : "rcsi.exe" or
95 process.name : "xwizard.exe") and
96 event.type == "start"]
97 [network where host.os.type == "windows" and (process.name : "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe" or
98 process.name : "bginfo.exe" or
99 process.name : "cdb.exe" or
100 process.name : "cmstp.exe" or
101 process.name : "csi.exe" or
102 process.name : "dnx.exe" or
103 process.name : "fsi.exe" or
104 process.name : "ieexec.exe" or
105 process.name : "iexpress.exe" or
106 process.name : "odbcconf.exe" or
107 process.name : "rcsi.exe" or
108 process.name : "xwizard.exe")]
109'''
110
111
112[[rule.threat]]
113framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
114
115[[rule.threat.technique]]
116id = "T1127"
117name = "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"
118reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/"
119
120[[rule.threat.technique]]
121id = "T1218"
122name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
123reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
124
125[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
126id = "T1218.003"
127name = "CMSTP"
128reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003/"
129
130[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
131id = "T1218.008"
132name = "Odbcconf"
133reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008/"
134
135[rule.threat.tactic]
136id = "TA0005"
137name = "Defense Evasion"
138reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating Unusual Process Network Connection
This rule identifies network activity from unexpected system utilities and applications. These applications are commonly abused by attackers to execute code, evade detections, and bypass security protections.
Possible investigation steps
- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Investigate the target host that the process is communicating with.
- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
False positive analysis
- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
Response and remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
Related rules
- Adding Hidden File Attribute via Attrib
- Alternate Data Stream Creation/Execution at Volume Root Directory
- Clearing Windows Console History
- Clearing Windows Event Logs
- Code Signing Policy Modification Through Built-in tools