Unusual Process Network Connection
Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2020/02/18"
3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2024/10/15"
6min_stack_version = "8.14.0"
7min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.14.0 for the Windows Integration."
8
9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Identifies network activity from unexpected system applications. This may indicate adversarial activity as these
13applications are often leveraged by adversaries to execute code and evade detection.
14"""
15from = "now-9m"
16index = [
17 "winlogbeat-*",
18 "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
19 "logs-endpoint.events.network-*",
20 "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
21]
22language = "eql"
23license = "Elastic License v2"
24name = "Unusual Process Network Connection"
25note = """## Triage and analysis
26
27### Investigating Unusual Process Network Connection
28
29This rule identifies network activity from unexpected system utilities and applications. These applications are commonly abused by attackers to execute code, evade detections, and bypass security protections.
30
31#### Possible investigation steps
32
33- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
34- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
35- Investigate the target host that the process is communicating with.
36- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
37
38### False positive analysis
39
40- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
41
42### Response and remediation
43
44- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
45- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
46- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
47- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
48- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
49- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
50- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
51"""
52risk_score = 21
53rule_id = "610949a1-312f-4e04-bb55-3a79b8c95267"
54severity = "low"
55tags = [
56 "Domain: Endpoint",
57 "OS: Windows",
58 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
59 "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
60 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
61 "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
62 "Data Source: Sysmon",
63]
64type = "eql"
65
66query = '''
67sequence by process.entity_id
68 [process where host.os.type == "windows" and (process.name : "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe" or
69 process.name : "bginfo.exe" or
70 process.name : "cdb.exe" or
71 process.name : "cmstp.exe" or
72 process.name : "csi.exe" or
73 process.name : "dnx.exe" or
74 process.name : "fsi.exe" or
75 process.name : "ieexec.exe" or
76 process.name : "iexpress.exe" or
77 process.name : "odbcconf.exe" or
78 process.name : "rcsi.exe" or
79 process.name : "xwizard.exe") and
80 event.type == "start"]
81 [network where host.os.type == "windows" and (process.name : "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe" or
82 process.name : "bginfo.exe" or
83 process.name : "cdb.exe" or
84 process.name : "cmstp.exe" or
85 process.name : "csi.exe" or
86 process.name : "dnx.exe" or
87 process.name : "fsi.exe" or
88 process.name : "ieexec.exe" or
89 process.name : "iexpress.exe" or
90 process.name : "odbcconf.exe" or
91 process.name : "rcsi.exe" or
92 process.name : "xwizard.exe")]
93'''
94
95
96[[rule.threat]]
97framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
98[[rule.threat.technique]]
99id = "T1127"
100name = "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"
101reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/"
102
103
104[rule.threat.tactic]
105id = "TA0005"
106name = "Defense Evasion"
107reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating Unusual Process Network Connection
This rule identifies network activity from unexpected system utilities and applications. These applications are commonly abused by attackers to execute code, evade detections, and bypass security protections.
Possible investigation steps
- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Investigate the target host that the process is communicating with.
- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
False positive analysis
- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
Response and remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
Related rules
- Code Signing Policy Modification Through Registry
- Conhost Spawned By Suspicious Parent Process
- Creation or Modification of Root Certificate
- Execution from Unusual Directory - Command Line
- Microsoft Build Engine Using an Alternate Name